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The prevailing image of the Lebanese state as weak and marginalised by clientelistic networks has been challenged in recent years, not least by the violent repression of the 2015 garbage protests by Lebanese state security forces. Yet despite the wide currency of clientelism in scholarship on Lebanese politics, this body offers only a limited understanding of the relation between clientelistic networks and the state, usually based on simplistic, and often dismissive, conceptualisations of the Lebanese state. This thesis calls for a reconsideration of the effects clientelism has on the Lebanese state, and seeks to contribute to a small but growing sub-field of literature dedicated to challenging the insufficiently-argued classification of the Lebanese state as 'weak'. For this thesis I propose to conceive of the Lebanese state as a mediated state - meaning a state with limited capabilities which relies on non-state authorities to fulfil its governance tasks. My argument will mark a contribution by emphasising how clientelism is the main mechanism organising the power structures and political process of the mediated Lebanese state. This thesis follows an interpretive single case study methodology based on a mixed-method approach, involving extensive fieldwork in 2015 and 2016, semi-structured interviews, document analysis and observations. First I will offer an analysis of the Lebanese hybrid security sector, where I argue that clientelism resembles its organising mechanism by blurring the boundaries between state and non-state actors. Based on the example of the Internal Security Forces, I argue that state security forces form crucial parts in the reproduction and maintenance of clientelism and the mediated Lebanese state. In the subsequent chapters I will not only highlight how municipalities serve as switch-boards for clientelistic mediation between local residents and higher echelons of the state, but also how clientelistic networks subjugate local councils to serve their interests on the national level. The case of solid waste management serves as an ideal example to illustrate the latter. Building on the previous chapters, the analysis of civil unrest during the 2015 garbage crisis serves to exemplify the workings of the Lebanese hybrid security arrangement as a protective and repressive mechanism for political elites, and hence its critical role in reproducing o political order based on clientelism. The above-described study underscores the merit in conceptualising the Lebanese state as a mediated state, and adds to similar works by emphasising how clientelism is the prime mechanism organising these power structures and political process. It further highlights how 4 formal state institutions indeed work in partnership with clientelistic non-state actors, and hence the former are part in protecting and reproducing clientelism as the organising mechanisms and very core of the mediated Lebanese state.

Although canonical models of clientelism argue that brokers use dense social networks to monitor and enforce vote buying, recent evidence suggests that brokers can instead target intrinsically reciprocal voters and reduce the need for active monitoring and enforcement. Combining a trove of survey data on brokers and voters in the Philippines with an experiment‐based measure of reciprocity, and relying on local naming conventions to build social networks, we demonstrate that brokers employ both strategies conditional on the underlying social network structure. We show that brokers are chosen for their central position in networks and are knowledgeable about voters, including their reciprocity levels. We then show that, where village social networks are dense, brokers prefer to target voters who have many ties in the network because their votes are easiest to monitor. Where networks are sparse, brokers target intrinsically reciprocal voters whose behavior they need not monitor.

Political parties and candidates are engaging various methods and efforts to mobilize voters during electoral campaigns. Some of them are buying votes, offer jobs while others are using threats, intimidation and violence. All of these are components of more complex phenomenon, known as political clientelism. Much scholarly attention is paid to why political parties use clientelism, what are the costs and benefits and what are the implications for democracy. However, we know little about the forms in which this occurs. The paper addresses this gap in literature and analyzes what types of clientelism exist and what are its main forms of manifestation, in various political and social contexts. It reviews the extensive literature on clientelism and focuses on two major categories: positive clientelism and negative clientelism.

How do authoritarian regimes punish ordinary opposition voters? I argue that elected community politicians help make \"punishment regimes,\" which discourage opposition support, credible. Strengthened by decentralization reforms, community politicians have information and leverage necessary to identify and punish opposition supporters. When the regime wins community elections, these politicians extend the regime's reach deep into communities. When opposition parties win, their reach is constrained weak- ening their electoral control. Using mixed-methods evidence from Tanzania, I show regime-loyal community politicians use their distributive and legal-coercive powers to \"deliver the vote\" leading voters in these communities to fear individual reprisals for opposition support. In contrast, voters fear individual punishment in opposition-run communities significantly less. This study demonstrates the importance of local institutions and elections when understanding regime durability.

Why do politicians cluster the distribution of benefits in the run-up to elections? I suggest that credit claiming is an explanation for political budget cycles. Brazilian rules banning credit claiming before elections while allowing the distribution of benefits until Election Day provides an opportunity to differentiate between distribution and credit claiming combined with distribution as an engine that reinforces political budget cycles. Evidence from housing and conditionalcash-transfer programs demonstrates that officials expand these programs before the credit-claiming ban and halt expansion after the ban yet prior to Election Day. Drawing on social media and qualitative data, I show that politicians use credit claiming to convey information about their competence and attribution. Distribution without attribution reduces the likelihood of political budget cycles compared to distribution with attribution, which together reinforces pre-election expansion of policy benefits. I rule out rival explanations of clientelism and party favoritism.

Objective/Context: What characteristics does the presidential primary system adopt? And what are the effects of the primaries on the Honduran political system? Honduras is among the precursor countries in Latin America to adopt the primary system as a mechanism of internal democracy within party structures to select their presidential, legislative, and municipal candidates. Although parties are not obliged to use primaries to select their candidates, the law mandates it for those political groups that have more than one internal movement. Thus, over the years, after eight experiences—in some political parties—the system has become established. The objective of this work is to analyze the origin of the presidential primary system in Honduras, its characteristics, and its effects on the political system. Methodology: This involves analyzing all primary elections held since their adoption to the present. Conclusions: the evidence indicates that, while the primary election system has allowed for the resolution of internal conflicts within parties, it has also contributed to the consolidation of political clientelism in the country. Originality: this work provides tools for analyzing the process of selecting presidential candidates in a political context of low programmatic competition, clientelism, and high personalism. Objetivo/contexto: ¿qué características adopta el sistema de primarias presidenciales? y ¿cuáles son los efectos de las primarias en el sistema político hondureño? Honduras figura entre los países precursores en América Latina en adoptar el sistema de primarias como mecanismo de democracia interna de las estructuras partidarias para seleccionar a sus candidatos a la presidencia, al Poder Legislativo y a los cargos municipales. Si bien los partidos no tienen la obligación de acudir a primarias para seleccionar a sus candidatos, la ley indica su obligatoriedad para aquellas agrupaciones políticas que cuentan con más de un movimiento interno. Así, con el paso de los años, luego de ocho experiencias —en algunos partidos políticos— se encuentran afianzadas. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar el origen del sistema de primarias presidenciales en Honduras, sus características, así como sus efectos en el sistema político. Metodología: para ello se analizan todas las elecciones primarias celebradas desde su adopción hasta la actualidad. Conclusiones: la evidencia indica que, si bien el sistema de elecciones primarias ha permitido dirimir conflictos internos en los partidos, también ha contribuido a la consolidación del clientelismo político en el país. Originalidad: este trabajo aporta herramientas para el análisis del proceso de selección de candidatos presidenciales en un contexto político de baja competencia programática, clientelismo y elevado personalismo. Objetivo/contexto: quais características o sistema de primárias presidenciais adota? E quais são os efeitos das primárias no sistema político hondurenho? Honduras figura entre os países precursores na América Latina a adotar o sistema de primárias como mecanismo de democracia interna das estruturas partidárias para selecionar seus candidatos à presidência, ao Poder Legislativo e aos cargos municipais. Embora os partidos não sejam obrigados a recorrer a primárias para selecionar seus candidatos, a lei indica sua obrigatoriedade para aquelas agrupações políticas que contam com mais de um movimento interno. Assim, com o passar dos anos, após oito experiências — em alguns partidos políticos — encontram-se consolidadas. O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar a origem do sistema de primárias presidenciais em Honduras, suas características, bem como seus efeitos no sistema político. Metodologia: para isso, analisam-se todas as eleições primárias realizadas desde sua adoção até a atualidade. Conclusões: a evidência indica que, embora o sistema de eleições primárias tenha permitido resolver conflitos internos nos partidos, também contribuiu para a consolidação do clientelismo político no país. Originalidade: este trabalho fornece ferramentas para a análise do processo de seleção de candidatos presidenciais em um contexto político de baixa competição programática, clientelismo e elevado personalismo.

Why do candidates give voters handouts during political campaigns? Drawing on qualitative data from Mumbai, this article argues that competitive elections prompt candidates to distribute handouts for strategic reasons. While they know handouts to be inefficient, candidates face a prisoner’s dilemma. Fearing that their opponents will distribute handouts, they distribute them themselves to counter, or neutralize, their opponents’ strategies.

This article challenges the assumption that once democracy is established in a state, it adheres to liberal democratic mechanisms. In contentious rural areas of Malaysia, such as Sik, unique factors, including communal politics, grassroots education, and community engagement, play a significant role. This study analyses why certain figures, such as Kedah Chief Minister, Dato’ Seri Muhammad Sanusi Md Nor, gain popularity despite insufficient explanation by existing theories. Based on original data from in-depth interviews with local political leaders and participant observation, this article explores the factors influencing voting patterns in Sik and their implications for the wider Kedah region during the 2023 Malaysian State Elections. It applies the political concept of ‘clientelism’ as found is previous research and incorporating a communitarian dimension, leading to the proposition of ‘communitarian clientelism’ to better understand diverse democratic practices.

After reviewing social exchange theory and identifying emotions as key to exchange relations the article introduces Chinese guanxi as a form of gift exchange, elsewhere treated in terms of its network attributes. The obligatory nature of exchange, noted by Mauss and extensively discussed by Blau, is explained through ‘social sentiments’ that substantiate assurance in exchange. The emotions-complexes renqing and ganqing, basic to guanxi, are outlined. Social esteem as a consequence of participation in exchange distinguishes the latter from bribery, in which coercion predominates. The article advances sociological understanding in these and associated ways by regarding exchange and guanxi as arenas of emotion practices.