Explore the vast range of titles available.

With the increasing bandwidth, videos have been gradually used as submissions for online peer assessment activities. However, their transient nature imposes a high cognitive load on students, particularly low-ability students. Therefore, reviewers' ability is a key factor that may affect the reviewing process and performance in an online video peer assessment activity. This study examined how reviewers' ability affected the comments they provided and their reviewing behaviors and performance. Thirty-eight first-year undergraduate students participated in an online video peer assessment activity for 3 weeks. This study analyzed data collected from the teacher's and peer reviewers' ratings, comments provided by peer reviewers, and system logs. Several findings are significant. First, low-ability reviewers preferred to rate higher scores than high-ability reviewers did. Second, low-ability reviewers had higher review errors than high-ability reviewers. Third, high-ability reviewers provided more high-level comments, while low-ability reviewers provided more low-level comments. Finally, low- and high-ability reviewers showed different behavior patterns when reviewing peers' videos. In particular, low-ability reviewers invested more time and effort in understanding video content, while high-ability reviewers invested more time and effort in detecting and diagnosing problems. These findings are discussed, and several suggestions for improving the instructional and system design of online video peer assessment activities are provided.

Although the Cadillac Tax is not scheduled to come into effect until 2018, the tax is already having an impact on companies that must follow accounting guidance and estimate the impact of the Cadillac Tax on their post-retirement benefit obligations. The purpose of this Comment is to examine the efficacy and equity of the use of the Cadillac Tax in health care reform and to urge for its retooling before it is actually levied. This Comment argues that while the Cadillac Tax would counteract some of the concerns at the heart of the current treatment of ESI under the Code, it does so in a manner that is inequitable and inefficient. This Comment concludes that an alternative model should be designed that is more sensitive to the valuation of health insurance.

Congress has instructed the federal judiciary to construct federal common law remedies needed to replace state laws preempted by ERISA where fact-sensitive analysis shows that plan benefits are being unreasonably delayed or disregarded by insurers, employers, and plan administrators. Federal courts already had begun to develop federal common law of employer agency prior to Erie Railroad Co v. Tompkins (1938), and now have renewed authority to continue development of that common law under ERISA. The statutory purposes of ERISA support the adoption of a fact-sensitive rule similar to the approach of Paulson V. Western Life Insurance Co (1981). Congressional intent, as expressed in legislative history, also supports the adoption of this integrated approach. Common sense principles of equity and fairness require a rule that allows beneficiaries, who have fulfilled their obligations under their insurance contracts, a remedy to recover the benefits of their bargain.

When first implemented in Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, the Buyers Health Care Action Group's (BHCAG) purchasing approach received considerable attention as an employer-managed, consumer-driven health care model embodying many of the principles of managed competition. First BHCAG and, later, a for-profit management company attempted to export this model to other communities. Their efforts were met with resistance from local hospitals and, in many cases, apathy by employers who were expected to be supportive. This experience underscores several difficulties that appear to be inherent in implementing purchasing models based on competing care systems. It also, once again, suggests caution in drawing lessons from community-level experiments in purchasing health care.

To ensure that women receive access to contraceptives, state legislatures have recently enacted measures requiring insurers to cover contraceptives under their insurance plans. Congress is considering a similar law that would require insurance plans to provide the same level of coverage for all FDA-approved prescription contraceptives and related outpatient services as they provide for other prescription drugs and preventive care. Currently, most insurance plans cover preventive prescription drugs yet do not cover contraceptive drugs and devices. Legislatures passed these contraceptive coverage laws, therefore, to eliminate this gender discrimination. Some religious employers and insurers, however, believe that the use of contraception is a sin and that assisting another person to commit a sin is a sin itself. They claim that contraceptive coverage laws inhibit their free exercise of religion in violation of the First Amendment. Out of respect for these employers and insurers, some legislatures included exemptions (also called \"conscience provisions\") for those entities that object to contraception on religious grounds. This article assesses the constitutionality of state contraceptive coverage laws under the Free Exercise Clause, examining both laws with exemptions for religious insurers and employers and laws without such exemptions.

Without addressing the issue of whether state insurance laws relating to disabled individuals and disability-based classifications should be supplemented by federal legislation, this Comment argues that Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act is designed not to regulate the terms of insurance but merely to require physical access to public accommodations. An overview of the regulatory framework of insurance is provided and the ADA provisions pertaining to insurance are summarized. The courts' conflicting interpretations of the scope of Title III as it relates to insurance are discussed. An alternative means of interpreting the ADA that focuses on the ADA's text, legislative history, and purpose is offered. It is concluded that Title III does not cover the substance of the goods and services offered by public accommodations and consequently does not cover the substance of insurance.