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J'aime pas ta robe
\"« J'aime pas ta robe! ». « Moi, j'aime pas tes souliers! » Voilà qui amorce une joute verbale surprenante et attendrissante entre les personnages ( à qui nous n'avons pas donnée de noms). Alors que la fillette se proclame reine de la lune, le garçon, lui, devient un monstre dont la collation préférée n'est nulle autre que les reines lunaires ! La compétition se corse alors que l'un dit posséder un chien aux multiples records du monde et l'autre un ornithorynque si savant qu'il a gagné le prix Nobel de TOUT! À travers leurs échanges aux allures de « mon père est plus fort que le tien !», fille et garçon découvriront qu'ils partagent des imaginaires complémentaires ainsi qu'une belle complicité. C'est alors que, sous l'influence de l'honnêteté, leur rivalité se transformera en amitié. Dans, J'aime pas ta robe, nous suivons les détours souvent empruntés pour démontrer de l'intérêt envers l'autre. Lorsque la timidité et la maladresse s'en mêlent, il peut s'avérer difficile d'identifier et de communiquer ses sentiments. Voilà pourquoi, dans le labyrinthe de nos émotions, un « veux-tu jouer avec moi? » devient un « j'aime pas ta robe! ». J'aime pas ta robe célèbre aussi l'imagination propre aux enfants, leur inventivité, leur sens de la répartie et de l'exagération\"--Publisher's website.
Book
\The International Power Struggle over the Arabian Gulf during the period (1871 CE - 1913 CE): \Competition between the Ottoman Empire and Britain over Qatar as a model
If the Ottoman Empire began to appear in the Gulf by reaching Basra in 1541, its actual impact on the Gulf and Qatar did not begin until the late nineteenth century, specifically since the arrival of the Al-Ahsa campaign in 1871, and until the signing of the 1913 agreement between Britain and the Ottoman Empire, which led to the Ottoman Empire withdrawing from competition for Qatar and the Gulf, leaving Britain to act alone in the region.This research study will focus on the struggle of international powers over the Arabian Gulf in a specific period between 1871 and 1913, where the study will concentrate on the competition between the Ottoman Empire and Britain over Qatar as a model for this conflict.The study indicates that the studied period witnessed intense competition between the two states regarding the Arabian Gulf region, especially the strategic importance of Qatar for both parties.The study reveals that the Ottoman Empire sought to regain its influence in the area and achieve economic gains through maritime trade, while Britain aimed to establish its colonial rule over the region and control the vital waterway of the Arabian Gulf for its trade.In this context, the study will investigate Britain's use of the policy of differentiation and control over the local sheikhs in Qatar, and how it was able to sign agreements with them to achieve its goal of controlling the region, while the Ottoman Empire during this period was unable to confront those policies and challenges. Additionally, this conflict was not only between the Ottoman Empire and Britain but also included competition between other European countries such as France for resources and trade routes in the region.The importance of this study lies in analyzing the events and linking them to the contemporary reality, to understand current conflicts and their impact on the region. Moreover, it highlights the importance of understanding these conflicts to comprehend current and future international policies in the region. In general, studying the struggle of international powers over the Arabian Gulf in a specific period is a crucial task to understand regional and international history, and it reveals many reasons and challenges faced by the region during that time.
Journal Article
Some Considerations Regarding the Application of the EU Competition
In the EU the concept of services of general economic interest covers different types of services with an economic nature, the provision of which can be considered to be in the general interest, such as energy supply, telecommunication, postal services, transport, water and waste management services. The Member States are primarily responsible for defining what they regard as services of general economic interest and will designate the public or private undertakings responsible for providing these types of services. The provisions of EU competition law will prevail over any other contrary national regulations and should be respected by all the public or private undertakings activating on the internal market. One of the most important exceptions from this general rule regards the provision of services of general economic interest. The EU primary law, confirmed by the jurisprudence of the EU Courts provides that EU competition rules do not apply when the proper provision of a service of general economic interest (SGEI) requires such a measure. The exact conditions in which the above-mentioned exception applies in practice, were clarified by the ECJ case law. The article at hand defines the concept of services of general economic interest and the different related concepts, briefly presents the EU legislation applicable in the field, exemplifies the way EU competition rules find their applicability in the context of the provision of the mentioned services and presents some of the most important ECJ caselaw related to the provision of SGEI in the EU Member States.
Journal Article
Mechanisms of plant competition for nutrients, water and light
1. Competition for resources has long been considered a prevalent force in structuring plant communities and natural selection, yet our understanding of the mechanisms that underlie resource competition is still developing. 2. The complexity of resource competition is derived not only from the variability of resource limitation in space and time and among species, but also from the complexity of the resources themselves. Nutrients, water and light each differ in their properties, which generates unique ways that plants compete for these resources. 3. Here, we discuss the roles of supply pre-emption and availability reduction in competition for the three resources when supplied evenly in space and time. Plants compete for nutrients by pre-empting nutrient supplies from coming into contact with neighbours, which requires maximizing root length. Although water is also a soil resource, competition for water is generally considered to occur by availability reduction, favouring plants that can withstand the lowest water potential. Because light is supplied from above plants, individuals that situate their leaves above those of neighbours benefit directly from increased photosynthetic rates and indirectly by reducing the growth of those neighbours via shade. In communities where juveniles recruit in the shade of adults, traits of the most competitive species are biased towards those that confer greater survivorship and growth at the juvenile stage, even if those traits come at the expense of adult performance. 4. Understanding the mechanisms of competition also reveals how competition has influenced the evolution of plant species. For example, nutrient competition has selected for plants to maintain higher root length and light competition plants that are taller, with deeper, flatter canopies than would be optimal in the absence of competition. 5. In all, while more research is needed on competition for heterogeneous resource supplies as well as for water, understanding the mechanisms of competition increases the predictability of interspecific interactions and reveals how competition has altered the evolution of plants.
Journal Article
The New Goliaths
An approach to reinvigorating economic competition that
doesn't break up corporate giants, but compels them to share their
technology, data, and knowledge \"Bessen is a
master of unpacking the nuances of a complex array of interrelated
trends to build a coherent story of how the promise of the
democratized Internet ended up under the control of just a few.
Read The New Goliaths to see how the forest came to have
only room for a few tall trees with the rest of us in the
undergrowth.\"-Joshua Gans, coauthor of Prediction Machines: The
Simple Economics of Artificial Intelligence
Historically, competition has powered progress under capitalism.
Companies with productive new products rise to the top, but sooner
or later, competitors come along with better innovations and
disrupt the threat of monopoly. Dominant firms like Walmart,
Amazon, and Google argue that this process of \"creative
destruction\" prevents them from becoming too powerful or
entrenched. But the threat of competition has sharply decreased
over the past twenty years, and today's corporate giants have come
to power by using proprietary information technologies to create a
tilted playing field. This development has increased economic
inequality and social division, slowed innovation, and allowed
dominant firms to evade government regulation. In the face of
increasing calls to break up the largest companies, James Bessen
argues that a better way to restore competitive balance and
dynamism is to encourage or compel these companies to share
technology, data, and knowledge.
eBook
Health Care Market Concentration Trends In The United States: Evidence And Policy Responses
Policy makers and analysts have been voicing concerns about the increasing concentration of health care providers and health insurers in markets nationwide, including the potential adverse effect on the cost and quality of health care. The Council of Economic Advisers recently expressed its concern about the lack of estimates of market concentration in many sectors of the US economy. To address this gap in health care, this study analyzed market concentration trends in the United States from 2010 to 2016 for hospitals, physician organizations, and health insurers. Hospital and physician organization markets became increasingly concentrated over this time period. Concentration among primary care physicians increased the most, partially because hospitals and health care systems acquired primary care physician organizations. In 2016, 90 percent of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) were highly concentrated for hospitals, 65 percent for specialist physicians, 39 percent for primary care physicians, and 57 percent for insurers. Ninety-one percent of the 346 MSAs analyzed may have warranted concern and scrutiny because of their concentration levels in 2016 and changes in their concentrations since 2010. Public policies that enhance competition are needed, such as stricter enforcement of antitrust laws, reducing barriers to entry, and restricting anticompetitive behaviors.
Journal Article
Hybrid competitive strategy, strategic capability and performance
This research examines how strategic capabilities impact hybrid competitive strategies and the effect on organizational performance. The target population of this study was 475 3 to 5-star hotels in Malaysia. Questionnaires were sent by mail and email to all the targeted 3 to 5-star hotels’ managers. Multiple regressions were used to analyse the relationship of hybrid competitive strategy, strategic capability and organizational performance. The outcomes indicate that hybrid competitive strategy has a significant impact on performance and strategic capability. Similarly, strategic capability has a significant impact on performance. Specifically, it establishes that strategic capability partially mediates the association of hybrid competitive strategy and performance. This study found hoteliers that executing hybrid competitive strategy should simultaneously use strategic capability to attain better performance. It fills in some of the gap and showing the importance of hybrid competitive strategy and strategic capability in the Malaysia hotel industry which has received little empirical attention.
Journal Article
Drug company Aspen may pay NHS £8m after investigation alleges illegal deal to hike drug price
The drug company Aspen may have to pay the NHS £8m (€8.7m; $9.7m) after an investigation by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) into an arrangement it made with two rival companies, which left it as the sole supplier of a drug and therefore able to set prices without competition.1 The CMA suspected that the 2016 arrangement had broken competition law, as Aspen was believed to have paid competitors to stay out of the market. [...]of the ongoing investigation Aspen approached the CMA and offered to resolve the issue by putting certain actions in place, including a payment of £8m to be divided among England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The CMA said that the offer includes Aspen admitting that “it was party to an illegal, anti-competitive agreement, by way of settlement”; committing to paying the compensation without the government needing to launch court proceedings; committing to ensuring fair competition with a least two suppliers of fludrocortisone in the UK; and agreeing to pay a maximum fine of £2.1m once the investigation has concluded.
Journal Article