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Performance is everything : the why, what, and how of designing compensation plans
Compensation is the largest expense that a firm incurs. And yet, few firms really manage it well. The trick is realizing it is more complex than just splitting the pie. The crucial issues of compensation and performance are inextricably linked. In this important resource, experts August Aquila and Coral Rice offer a unique perspective on how you can align your compensation and performance management plans in order to boost performance, maximize profits, and keep both your staff and clients happy. This companion to Aquila and Rice s successful AICPA publication, Compensation as a Strategic Asset, will pick up where that guide left off, offering readers the Why, What, and How for compensation plans filtered through the lens of performance management.
Book
Handbook of Work Disability
?This book addresses the developing field of Work Disability Prevention. Work disability does not only involve occupational disorders originating from the work or at the workplace, but addresses work absenteeism originating from any disorder or accident. This topic has become of primary importance due to the huge compensation costs and health issues involved. For employers it is a unique burden and in many countries compensation is not even linked to the cause of the disorder. In the past twenty years, studies have accumulated which emphasize the social causes of work disability. Governments and NGOs such as the World Bank, the International Labor Organization, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development have produced alarming reports on the extent of this problem for developed and developing countries. However, no comprehensive book is presently available to help them address this emerging field where new knowledge should induce new ways of management.?
eBook
A Corporate Beauty Contest
We provide new evidence that the subjective “look of competence” rather than beauty is important for CEO selection and compensation. Our experiments, studying the facial traits of CEOs using nearly 2,000 subjects, link facial characteristics to both CEO compensation and performance. In one experiment, we use pairs of photographs and find that subjects rate CEO faces as appearing more “competent” than non-CEO faces. Another experiment matches CEOs from large firms against CEOs from smaller firms and finds large-firm CEOs look more competent. In a third experiment, subjects numerically score the facial traits of CEOs. We find competent looks are priced into CEO compensation, more so than attractiveness. Our evidence suggests this premium has a behavioral origin. First, we find no evidence that the premium is associated with superior performance. Second, we separately analyze inside and outside CEO hires and find that the competence compensation premium is driven by outside hires—the situation where first impressions are likely to be more important.
This paper was accepted by Lauren Cohen, finance
.
Journal Article
Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay
We investigate the economic role of proxy advisors (PAs) in the context of mandatory \"say on pay\" votes, a novel and complex item requiring significant firm-specific analysis. PAs are more likely to issue an Against recommendation at firms with poor performance and higher levels of CEO pay and do not appear to follow a \"one-size-fits-all\" approach. PAs' recommendations are the key determinant of voting outcome but the sensitivity of shareholder votes to these recommendations varies with the institutional ownership structure, and the rationale behind the recommendation, suggesting that at least some shareholders do not blindly follow these recommendations. More than half of the firms respond to the adverse shareholder vote triggered by a negative recommendation by engaging with investors and making changes to their compensation plan. However, we find no market reaction to the announcement of such changes, even when material enough to result in a favorable recommendation and vote the following year. Our findings suggest that, rather than identifying and promoting superior compensation practices, PAs' key economic role is processing a substantial amount of executive pay information on behalf of institutional investors, hence reducing their cost of making informed voting decisions. Our findings contribute to the literature on shareholder voting and the related policy debate.
Journal Article
Financial Distress Risk and New CEO Compensation
We examine how ex ante financial distress risk affects CEO compensation. To disentangle the joint effects of performance on compensation and distress risk, we focus our analyses on new CEOs. Our results indicate that financial distress risk affects compensation through two channels. First, new CEOs receive significantly more compensation when financial distress risk is higher. This finding is consistent with CEOs receiving a compensation premium for bearing this risk since CEOs experience large personal costs if their firms later become financially distressed. Second, financial distress risk is associated with the incentives provided to new CEOs; distress risk is positively associated with pay-performance sensitivity and equity-based compensation and is negatively associated with cash bonuses. Further, financial distress risk is positively associated with pay-risk sensitivity for new CEOs. These findings suggest that financial distress risk alters the nature of the agency relationship in ways that lead firms to provide CEOs with more equity-based incentives. We also build on research that finds a positive relation between forced turnover risk and CEO compensation. Our analyses suggest the compensation effects of forced turnover risk appear to be mainly attributable to financial distress risk. Overall, our results indicate financial distress risk is an economically important determinant of new CEO compensation packages.
This paper was accepted by Mary Barth, accounting
.
Journal Article
The Effect of the Say-on-Pay Vote in the United States
The Dodd–Frank Act mandated advisory shareholder votes on executive compensation. To isolate the effect of holding a Say-on-Pay vote we use an exemption provided to a group of firms based on their public float. We find that the regulation increased the level of CEO pay and the fraction of performance-linked pay in the companies that had to comply with the new rule. This increase was larger for CEOs with higher ownership and longer tenure. Moreover, the market reacted negatively to the exemption from the Say-on-Pay rule suggesting general support for holding the Say-on-Pay votes. These effects are not present in placebo specifications in previous years or in different groups.
This paper was accepted by Lauren Cohen, finance.
Journal Article