Catalogue Search | MBRL
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
{{itemTitle}}
15,296
result(s) for
"contract theory"
Sort by:
Why resource-based theory's model of profit appropriation must incorporate a stakeholder perspective
Research Summary: Using arguments derived from transactions cost economics and incomplete contract theory, this article shows that the assumption that shareholders are a firm's only residual claimants is logically inconsistent with resource‐based theory's model of profit generation. It follows from this conclusion that resource‐based theory's model of profit appropriation must incorporate a stakeholder perspective. Some theoretical and empirical implications of this conclusion for resource‐based theory's model of profit generation, profit appropriation, the role of managers and entrepreneurs in resource‐based theory, and how conflicting interests among stakeholders can be resolved are all discussed. Finally, some continuing differences between stakeholder theory and incorporating a stakeholder perspective into resource‐based theory's model of profit appropriation are also discussed. Managerial Summary: Some argue that since shareholders are the only stakeholder who have a claim on a firm's profits, managers should focus only on maximizing shareholder wealth. Not only will this satisfy shareholders, it will also satisfy a firm's other stakeholders, since—in principle—these other stakeholders get paid before shareholders. This article shows that this logic is deeply flawed. In particular, it shows that if the only stakeholder who has a claim on a firm's economic profits is shareholders, then—in most competitive settings—a firm will not be able to attract the kinds of resources it needs to generate these profits. To attract the kinds of resources that can generate profits, managers must recognize that stakeholders, besides shareholders, have claims on the profits that their resources help generate. This, in turn, suggests that managers seeking to generate economic profits must adopt a stakeholder perspective in how they manage their firm. This article explores the managerial implications of this conclusion.
Journal Article
Evolution of the social contract
\"In this new edition of Evolution of the Social Contract, Brian Skyrms uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the genesis of social contracts and investigates social phenomena including justice, communication, altruism, and bargaining. Featuring new material on evolution and information transfer, and including recent developments in game theory and evolution literature, his book introduces and applies appropriate concepts of equilibrium and evolutionary dynamics, showing how key issues can be modelled as games and considering the ways in which evolution sometimes supports, and sometimes does not support, rational choice. He discusses topics including how bargaining with neighbours promotes sharing of resources, the diversity of behavior in ultimatum bargaining in small societies, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and an investigation into signalling games and the spontaneous emergence of meaningful communication. His book will be of great interest to readers in philosophy of science, social science, evolutionary biology, game and decision theory, and political theory\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
Behavioral Contract Theory
This review provides a critical survey of psychology-and-economics (\"behavioraleconomics\") research in contract theory. First, I introduce the theories of individual decision making most frequently used in behavioral contract theory, and formally illustrate some of their implications in contracting settings. Second, I provide a more comprehensive (but informal) survey of the psychology-and-economics work on classical contract-theoretic topics: moral hazard, screening, mechanism design, and incomplete contracts. I also summarize research on a new topic spawned by psychology and economics, exploitative contracting, that studies contracts designed primarily to take advantage of agent mistakes.
Journal Article
The Social License to Operate
This article proposes a way to zoom in on the concept of the social license to operate (SLO) from the broader normative perspective of contractarianism. An SLO can be defined as a contractarian basis for the legitimacy of a company's specific activity or project. \"SLO\", as a fashionable expression, has its origins in business practice. From a normative viewpoint, the concept is closely related to social contract theory, and, as such, it has a political dimension. After outlining the contractarian normative background to the SLO, we will show how academic concepts such as legitimacy and stakeholder management have a tendency to provide the intellectual underpinning for the business case for securing an SLO. While business case perspectives on the SLO may well be in line with the use of the term in business practice, we will highlight certain difficulties and ambiguities related to the instrumental use of the expression. In the final section, we briefly introduce the articles of this Special Issue to the reader and explain how they relate to the topic.
Journal Article
PERFECT COMPETITION IN MARKETS WITH ADVERSE SELECTION
This paper proposes a perfectly competitive model of a market with adverse selection. Prices are determined by zero-profit conditions, and the set of traded contracts is determined by free entry. Crucially for applications, contract characteristics are endogenously determined, consumers may have multiple dimensions of private information, and an equilibrium always exists. Equilibrium corresponds to the limit of a differentiated products Bertrand game. We apply the model to establish theoretical results on the equilibrium effects of mandates. Mandates can increase efficiency but have unintended consequences. With adverse selection, an insurance mandate reduces the price of low-coverage policies, which necessarily has indirect effects such as increasing adverse selection on the intensive margin and causing some consumers to purchase less coverage.
Journal Article
Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years?
Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart used the theory of incomplete contracts to develop answers to the question “What is a firm, and what determines its boundaries?” in their path-breaking paper on “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration” (Journal of Political Economy, 1986, vol. 94, no. 4). Perhaps the central issue is that economic actors are only boundedly rational and cannot anticipate all possible contingencies. It might well be that certain states of nature or actions cannot be verified by third parties after they arise, like certain qualities of a good to be traded in the future, and thus cannot be written into an enforceable contract. When contracts are incomplete, and consequently not all uses of an asset can be specified in advance, any contract negotiated in advance must leave some discretion over the use of the assets; and the “owner” of the firm is the party to whom the residual rights of control have been allocated at the contracting stage. The optimal allocation of property rights—or governance structure—is one that minimizes efficiency losses. This produces a theory of ownership and vertical integration as well as a theory of the firm. First we spell out Grossman and Hart's argument using a simple numerical example. Then we show how the incomplete contracts approach can be used to analyze the firms' internal organization; the firms' financial decisions; the costs and benefits from privatization; and the organization of international trade between inter- and intrafirm trade. We discuss several criticisms of the incomplete contracts/property rights methodology and review recent developments of the incomplete contracts approach.
Journal Article
Capital Versus Performance Covenants in Debt Contracts
Building on contract theory, we argue that financial covenants control the conflicts of interest between lenders and borrowers via two different mechanisms. Capital covenants control agency problems by aligning debt holder-shareholder interests. Performance covenants serve as trip wires that limit agency problems via the transfer of control to lenders in states where the value of their claim is at risk. Companies trade off these mechanisms. Capital covenants impose costly restrictions on the capital structure, while performance covenants require contractible accounting information to be available. Consistent with these arguments, we find that the use of performance covenants relative to capital covenants is positively associated with (1) the financial constraints of the borrower, (2) the extent to which accounting information portrays credit risk, (3) the likelihood of contract renegotiation, and (4) the presence of contractual restrictions on managerial actions. Our findings suggest that accounting-based covenants can improve contracting efficiency in two different ways.
Journal Article
Achieving Top Performance While Building Collegiality in Sales: It All Starts with Ethics
While previous literature provides evidence of the positive relationship between ethical climate and job satisfaction, the possible mechanisms of this relationship are still underexplored. This study aims to enhance scholars' and practitioners' understanding of the ethical climatejob satisfaction relationship by identifying and testing two of the possible mechanisms. More specifically, this study fills an existing research gap by examining social and interpersonal mechanisms, referred to in this study as workplace isolation of colleagues and salesperson's teamwork, of the ethical climate-job satisfaction relationship. This is vital for the selling profession because job satisfaction is known to drive higher levels of salespeople's performance. The arguments for such mechanisms are built on the foundations of social/psychological contract theory and ethical climate literature. Empirical testing using a large sample of salespeople shows higher levels of ethical climate to decrease workplace isolation and increase teamwork. Findings support hypothesized model where ethical climate positively relates to job satisfaction as partially mediated by workplace isolation and teamwork. Ethical climate is negatively related to workplace isolation and positively to teamwork. Further, findings indicate negative effect of workplace isolation on teamwork and sales performance. Job satisfaction is found to be key factor in driving performance of salespeople.
Journal Article
The Crucial Role of Turnover Intentions in Transforming Moral Disengagement Into Deviant Behavior at Work
Organizational deviance represents a costly behavior to many organizations. While some precursors to deviance have been identified, we hope to add to our predictive capabilities. Utilizing social cognitive theory and psychological contract theory as explanatory concepts, we explore the role of moral disengagement and turnover intentions, testing our hypotheses using two samples: a sample of 44 nurses from a hospital system in the Southwestern United States (Study 1), and a sample of 52 working adults collected from an online survey system (Study 2). Results strongly supported our hypotheses in both samples, indicating that the self-regulatory deactivation inherent in moral disengagement led to increased organizational deviance; effects that were much more pronounced when turnover intentions were high. Our findings support the increased role of cognition in determining behavior when environmental pressures stemming from the psychological contract have been altered, leading to a number of theoretical and practical implications, particularly in industries with high turnover rates.
Journal Article