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This paper provides the first empirical assessment of the impact of life expectancy assumptions on the liabilities of private U.S. defined benefit (DB) pension plans. Using detailed actuarial and financial information provided by the U.S. Department of Labor, we construct a longevity variable for each pension plan and then measure the impact of varying life expectancy assumptions across plans and over time on pension plan liabilities. The results indicate that each additional year of life expectancy increases pension liabilities by about 3 to 4 percent. This effect is not only statistically highly significant but also economically: each year of additional life expectancy would increase private U.S. DB pension plan liabilities by as much as 84 billion.

The effect of the tax treatment of IRA/401(k)s on U.S. personal saving is examined using household survey data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. The results suggest that the tax treatment of IRA/401(k)s encouraged households to increase the share of assets held in the form of pension savings, at the expense of saving in the form of housing equity. Some evidence also was found to suggest that the tax treatment of pension savings similarly affected the flow of saving. In particular, the data appeared to reject the hypothesis that the tax treatment of IRA/401(k)s increased total personal saving.

Occupational defined benefit (DB) pensions today are outmoded and increasingly costly corporate burdens and are now in decline. However, the transformation of DB is found to be contingent on the institutional setting in which transformation occurs. In this article we offer a modest conceptualization of the interplay between global pressures for change and convergence, particularly accounting harmonization, and the local institutional environment and geography that filter these forces in the context of DB pensions. We demonstrate this behavior through analyses of DB transformation and decline in the UK and the Netherlands.

Measuring the extent to which a firm is financially constrained is critical in assessing capital structure. Extant measures of financial constraints focus on macro firm characteristics such as age and size, variables highly correlated with other firm attributes. We parse 10-K disclosures filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) using a unique lexicon based on constraining words. We find that the frequency of constraining words exhibits very low correlation with traditional measures of financial constraints and predicts subsequent liquidity events, such as dividend omissions or increases, equity recycling, and underfunded pensions, better than widely used financial constraint indexes.

The paper discusses the limits to market-based risk transfer in the financial system and the implications for the management of systemic long-term financial risks. Financial instruments or markets to transfer and better manage these risks across institutions and sectors are, as yet, either nascent or nonexistent. As such, the paper investigates why these markets remain \"incomplete.\" It also explores a range of options by which policymakers may encourage the development of these markets as part of governments' role as a risk manager.

As of December 2008, state governments had approximately$1.94 trillion set aside in pension funds for their employees. How does the value of these assets compare to the present value of states' pension liabilities? Just as future Social Security and Medicare liabilities do not appear in the headline numbers of the U.S. federal debt, the financial liability from underfunded public pensions does not appear in the headline numbers of state debt. If pensions are underfunded, then the gap between pension assets and liabilities is off-balance-sheet government debt. We show that government accounting standards require states to use procedures that severely understate their liabilities. We then discuss the true economic funding of state public pension plans. Using market-based discount rates that reflect the risk profile of the pension liabilities, we calculate that the present value of the already-promised pension liabilities of the 50 U.S. states amount to $ 5.17 trillion, assuming that states cannot default on pension benefits that workers have already earned. Net of the$1.94 trillion in assets, these pensions are underfunded by $ 3.23 trillion. This “pension debt” dwarfs the states' publicly traded debt of $0.94 trillion. And we show that even before the market collapse of 2008, the system was economically severely underfunded, though public actuarial reports presented the plans' funding status in a more favorable light.

Nearly all state and local pension defined benefit pensions plans compute the present value of their future liabilities using the expected return on the assets held in the pension trust. This practice contrasts sharply with finance theory, which is unambiguous that the appropriate discount rate is one that reflects the riskiness of the liabilities, not the assets. This paper notes that the strong constitutional and other legal benefit protections make many defined benefit pension obligations virtually risk free. Were governments to discount liabilities in this way, it would reveal that state and local pensions are more underfunded than is generally reported.

This article assesses the impact of a dramatic reform of the Dutch pension system on the mental health of workers nearing retirement age. The reform means that public sector workers born on 1 January 1950 or later face a substantial reduction in their pension rights while, for workers born before 1950 nothing changes. We employ a unique-matched survey and administrative dataset comprising male public sector workers born in 1949 and 1950 and find a strong deterioration in mental health for workers affected by the reform. These effects are stronger for married workers whose partner has no pension income.

Though widely used in executive compensation, inside debt has been almost entirely overlooked by prior work. We initiate this research by studying CEO pension arrangements in 237 large capitalization firms. Among our findings are that CEO compensation exhibits a balance between debt and equity incentives; the balance shifts systematically away from equity and toward debt as CEOs grow older; annual increases in pension entitlements represent about 10% of overall CEO compensation, and about 13% for CEOs aged 61-65; CEOs with high debt incentives manage their firms conservatively; and pension compensation influences patterns of CEO turnover and cash compensation.

This article examines the capital structure implications of defined benefit corporate pension plans. The magnitude of the liabilities arising from these pension plans is substantial. We show that leverage ratios for firms with pension plans are about 35% higher when pension assets and liabilities are incorporated into the capital structure. We estimate that the tax shields from pension contributions are about a third of those from interest payments. Pension contributions have a modest effect in lowering firms' marginal corporate tax rates. Once pensions are considered, firms are less conservative in their choice of leverage than has been previously thought. We show that firms incorporate the magnitude of their pension assets and liabilities into their capital structure decisions.