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This article evaluates the effectiveness of the Jordan Security Management system by exploring four elements: institutional design, inter-institution relationships, policy coordination, and democratic supervision. An article based on quantitative survey 368 National Security Procedures in Jordan shows that centralized architecture leads to strategic cohesion but suffers from weak and sometimes fragmented coordination between agencies. The results emphasize a significant gap in the field of training, with less than half (48.64%) providers achieve satisfactory operating efficiency and minority (58.15%) of them trained with specific specialties. In addition, the results show that there is a continued digitization of protection because 47.01% of respondents receive artificial intelligence systems into their company structures. This study contributes to a better understanding of hybrid proceedings in the Middle East and North Africa region (Mena) and sets the basis for informing regional security strategies with international partners, in particular, the European Union.

The good governance of military and security forces is essential for the effective defense of a nation or alliance and for fostering their democratic evolution. This article explores NATO and partner countries' initiatives over the past three decades to enhance good governance, distinguishing five waves of focus: civil-military relations and democratic control of armed forces, defense institution building, security sector reform, building integrity and reducing corruption, and strengthening democratic resilience. The authors review the research and educational activities of the Partnership for Peace Consortium and other organizations in support of these initiatives, concluding with a proposal to establish a working group on democratic resilience within the Consortium.

For many years, the lives of animals used for research in Canadian universities have been hidden from public view due both to physical concealment (e.g., security procedures and impenetrable labs) and administrative concealment (non-disclosure of information). Their lives unfold out of sight both physically and discursively, unavailable to the Canadian public for ethical consideration and democratic oversight. Recently, in response to calls by the public to end this secrecy, Canadian universities and the Canadian Council on Animal Care have embraced the language of “transparency” and have begun releasing documentation about animal research practices and procedures. This paper argues that this new “transparency” acts as its own kind of concealment practice, obscuring and displacing meaningful information while constructing highly selective ways of seeing animals in science, and manufacturing acquiescence/consent on the part of the public.

The informalization of the ordinary legislative procedure of the European Union has been topic of empirical research over the past decades. Scholars have examined different aspects of this very procedure. The research of scholars coming from political sciences did not find any consideration in different fields, like in the field of law. At the same time, the informalization gives rise to many legal questions regarding the democratic deficit. Seclusion of democratically elected representatives from participation in the legislative procedures is a particular issue. This article seeks to address some of the issues arising from the informalization of the ordinary legislative procedure.

Engaging democratically elected assemblies in national decision-making over the extraterritorial use of force seemingly provides a secure check on executive abuses of power. Many liberal democracies therefore maintain constitutional requirements that their elected national assembly must authorize decisions to use military force. By comparison, the UK Parliament has historically played a limited and often indirect role in authorizing the use of force. From the vote on the Iraq War in 2003 onwards, however, the UK Parliament's role has increased to the point where, in August 2013, the defeat of a Government motion seeking approval for the use of force undermined efforts to build an international coalition to intervene in the ongoing Syrian conflict. Whilst debate regarding this shift has hitherto concentrated on the degree to which parliamentary oversight of the war prerogative is desirable, in this article we consider what Parliament's evolving role heralds for the general relationship between domestic and UN mechanisms. We challenge the underlying assumption that Parliament's interventions mark an indisputably positive development in constraining the use of force. When coupled with the focus upon the doctrine of humanitarian intervention which has accompanied many controversial exercises of UK military force since the end of the Cold War, the involvement of Parliament in the decision-making process risks hollowing out UN Charter safeguards. Successive UK Governments have acquiesced to the extension of Parliament's role, with the effect of shifting the locus for legitimating uses of force away from UN institutions, where the UK cannot control the actions of other States, and into a domestic sphere which is susceptible to executive influence.

Constitutional political economy has focused heavily on designing constitutional rules sufficient to constrain governmental power. More attention has been devoted to designing rules that are effective constraints than on the institutions that would be required to enforce them. One problem is that rules are interpreted and enforced by the political elite, who tend to interpret and enforce them in ways that favor their interests over those of the masses. Democratic oversight is ineffective because voters realize they have no influence over public policy, and are therefore rationally ignorant. A system of checks and balances within government is necessary for enforcing constitutional constraints because it divides power among elites with competing interests and enables one group of elites to check the power of others. Checks and balances within governmental institutions are necessary to constrain the government from abusing its power.

The unfolding market crisis reveals evasions of regulatory controls and frauds that were less visible in buoyant markets. International networking of regulators and those they regulated resulted in convergence of regulatory standards—and creation of common ‘blind spots’—corresponding to private sector assumptions, ‘models’, data and mood. Moving forward, this paper suggests that the literature on security governance can be used to re-frame market regulation. Going against calls for a tightening of convergence between regulatory regimes, the paper argues for regulatory diversity as a means for reducing market ‘herding’ and the consequent systemic risks. Regulatory diversity would correspond to a political strategy of democratic steering of regulatory agencies, diluting, if not displacing, the currently dominant notion of financial market regulation as a purely ‘technical’ discourse. In concrete terms, this implies shifting systemic regulatory oversight responsibilities away from ‘independent’ agencies, to government bodies and/or departments that are held accountable to their parliaments and electorates.

The unfolding market crisis reveals evasions of regulatory controls and frauds that were less visible in buoyant markets. International networking of regulators and those they regulated resulted in convergence of regulatory standards—and creation of common 'blind spots'—corresponding to private sector assumptions, 'models', data and mood. Moving forward, this paper suggests that the literature on security governance can be used to re-frame market regulation. Going against calls for a tightening of convergence between regulatory regimes, the paper argues for regulatory diversity as a means for reducing market 'herding' and the consequent systemic rish. Regulatory diversity would correspond to a political strategy of democratic steering of regulatory agencies, diluting, if not displacing, the currently dominant notion of financial market regulation as a purely 'technical' discourse. In concrete terms, this implies shifting systemic regulatory oversight responsibilities away from 'independent' agencies, to government bodies and/or departments that are held accountable to their parliaments and electorates.

This study explores the factors influencing national security effectiveness by examining structure and functionality, interagency coordination, policy alignment, and democratic governance. It also identifies key areas for improvement. The aim is to evaluate how these elements impact national security outcomes. The study surveyed 470 officials across the Palace of Justice, achieving a 78% response rate. Using SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences), the study demonstrates that structure and functionality, interagency coordination, policy alignment, and democratic governance significantly impact national security. It further shows that improvements in key areas have a substantial positive effect. The article contributes original insights into enhancing national security strategies through targeted structural and oversight mechanisms, offering practical recommendations for policy and operational improvements.

What difference is the operation of local authority health scrutiny making to the oversight and democratisation of decision making by health bodies? This article provides an insight into how a group of local authorities in England tackled the operation of a specific joint health scrutiny committee. This example highlights building relations with associated health bodies and other local authorities, choice of health scrutiny agenda, ways of working, capacity of committees, ambiguities within the policy itself, and the difficulties and challenges of adding meaningful democratic oversight to the decision-making processes of NHS bodies. This review highlights some of the benefits of health scrutiny, but suggests that engaging more fully with patients and the public in such reviews could result in a more influential and inclusive process.