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[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0260080.].

This article critically examines the strategic decision of the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) to reframe the concept of misinformation as Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference. The EEAS, particularly its Strategic Communications Division, has been at the forefront of combating disinformation within the EU. Initially mandated by the European Council in 2015 to counter Russian disinformation campaigns, the EEAS pioneered the framing of this complex phenomenon as an external threat, significantly shaping subsequent European perceptions and policies. While the Covid-19 pandemic and the surge of accompanying disinformation originally shifted the EU focus towards a more regulatory approach, culminating in the approval of the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act, the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine soon after prompted a return to geopolitical considerations, reinstating both the disinformation-as-external-threat dimension and, therefore, the prominent role of the EEAS. This research argues that the EEAS, which recognizes the limitations of the EU in effectively countering the phenomenon of misinformation, adopted the framing of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference to both make the problem more manageable and align it with its mandate. Through this reframing, the EEAS has addressed disinformation similarly to traditional security threats, such as cyberattacks, thereby aligning with existing security paradigms and the competencies and limitations granted by the EU.