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Research summary: Prior theory suggests that the performance effects of a firm's diversification strategy depend on a firm's individual resources and capabilities and the setting within which it is operating. However, prior tests of this theory have examined the average diversification-performance relationship across all firms, instead of estimating the diversification-performance relationship at the individual firm level. Efforts to estimate this average relationship are inconsistent with a central assumption of much of strategic management theory—that firms maximize value by choosing strategies that exploit their heterogeneous resources and individual situation. By adopting an approach that allows an evaluation of the diversification-performance relationship for individual firms, this article shows that firms, both focused and diversified, tend to choose that diversification strategy—focus, related diversification, or unrelated diversification—that maximizes value. Managerial summary: Instead of a universal diversification discount or premium, this article shows that the effect of diversification on performance is heterogeneously distributed across firms and that firms tend to be rational in their diversification decisions.

The resource-based view on firm diversification, subsequent to Penrose (1959), has focused primarily on the fungibility of resources across domains. We make a clear analytical distinction between scale free capabilities and those that are subject to opportunity costs and must be allocated to one use or another, thereby shifting the discourse back to Penrose's (1959) original argument regarding the stock of organizational capabilities. The existence of resources and capabilities that must be allocated across alternative uses implies that profit-maximizing diversification decisions should be based upon the opportunity cost of their use in one domain or another. This opportunity cost logic provides a rational explanation for the divergence between total profits and profit margins. Firms make profit-maximizing decisions to increase total profit via diversification when the industries in which they are currently competing become relatively mature. Due to the spreading of these capabilities across more segments, we may observe that firms' profit-maximizing diversification actions lead to total profit growth but lower average returns. The model provides an alternative explanation for empirical observations regarding the diversification discount. The self-selection effect noted in recent work in corporate finance may not be indicative of inferior capabilities of diversifying firms but of the limited opportunity contexts in which these firms are operating.

Despite the current trend toward refocusing on the core business, the empirical results on the conglomerate discount are conflicting and provide opposing implications to managers as to whether they should pursue diversification or not. Prior literature has employed various research designs, all of which have the potential to impact results. In this study, we analyze which design choices affect the conglomerate discount. We analyze a sample of approximately 6000 German firm-years between 2000 and 2019 and find a conglomerate discount of 7.9–11.5%. Our findings reveal that design choices related to self-selection have the highest impact on the results. Using a 2SLS approach, we find no causal relationship between diversification and market value despite testing various sets of instruments and excess values. Our results inform practitioners and researchers regarding the impact of design choices on the magnitude and existence of the conglomerate discount.

This article investigates how securities analysts help investors understand the value of diversification. By studying the research that analysts produce about companies that have announced corporate spin-offs, we gain unique insights into how analysts portray diversified firms to the investment community. We find that while analysts' research about these companies is associated with improved forecast accuracy, the value of their research about the spun-off subsidiaries is more limited. For both diversified firms and their spun-off subsidiaries, analysts' research is more valuable when information asymmetry between the management of these entities and investors is higher. These findings contribute to the corporate strategy literature by shedding light on the roots of the diversification discount and by showing how analysts' research enables investors to overcome asymmetric information.

Purpose The purpose of this study was to explore the motives (especially the agency motives) for corporate diversification from the perspective of corporate executives who make such strategic decisions and manage the diversified firms daily. Design/methodology/approach A qualitative research approach was adopted, and 12 chief executive officers (CEOs) of diversified firms in Nigeria were interviewed for their perspectives on the motives for corporate diversification. Findings Stewardship motives – diversification to use excess capacities in assets and resources to exploit opportunities in the market and defend against adverse environmental developments – were the most cited reasons for diversification. The relevant agency problem related to corporate diversification motive in Nigeria is the principal–principal (majority shareholder-minority shareholder) one. CEOs with substantial holdings in their firms indicated that they use diversification to reduce their investment risk and retain control of their portfolio. Practical implications The findings suggest that in corporate environments such as Nigeria that feature blockholding prominently, the corporate strategy-related agency problem that policymakers should pay greater attention to is the principal–principal conflict rather than the traditional agent–principal problem that has influenced corporate governance over the years. There is also a need to revise the dominant view that diversification is a value-destroying strategy motivated by the self-seeking behavior of managers who have little or no shares in the companies they manage. Originality/value The few studies on motives for corporate diversification that incorporated the perspectives of corporate executives did not address the agency motives of diversification. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that has done so.

We find that firm value is reduced via industrial diversification and this reduction in value depends upon a firm’s technology intensity. We consider that asymmetric information problems are more severe in technology intensive industries and find that high tech industry firms present distinctly larger value reduction when compared to low tech industry firms. The negative valuation effect is greater for firms that have a relatively larger amount of intangible assets and greater R&D capital. We determine that our findings are robust to different estimation methods and alternative excess value measures.

Previous empirical studies have found that global diversification results in 18% shareholder loss. In this paper, we examine the sources behind the global diversification shareholder value loss in a contingent claims framework. This postulates that the risk-reduction effects of global diversification should decrease the value of shareholder equity (call option), whereas they should increase bondholder value. Consequently, near-all equity globally diversified firms should not experience a shareholder value loss. Consistent with the risk-reduction effects of global diversification, using cross-border acquisitions data we find three major results. First, shareholder value loss to global diversification is directly related to firms' leverage. Second, near-all equity firms do not trade at a discount. Third, the use of book value debt in estimating excess value produces a downward bias in globally diversified firms. Our findings confirm that increased foreign involvement increases bondholder value while it decreases shareholder value. This is consistent with the contingent claims view predicting that global diversification has a positive impact on bondholders' wealth while it has a negative influence on shareholder value (i.e., global diversification discount). Overall, our results reveal that global diversification does not destroy firm value.

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to compare two theories that relate the proportion of diversified firms in the economy and the implied discount for diversified firms: the first is a real-options model predicting a positive relationship between the discount and management’s choice to operate a diversified firm; the second is based on catering theory, in which a negative relationship is predicted, as management is attentive to investor preference concerning diversified firms.Design/methodology/approachThis study proposes a new aggregate measure of the diversification discount. The authors’ measure allows for decomposition of the discount into firm-level mispricing, industry-level mispricing and long-run fundamental value components.FindingsResults support a catering theory of diversification. The discount appears to be the result of firm-level mispricing. Thus, providing an explanation for why, in light of the observed discount, a large number of diversified firms persist.Originality/valueTo the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to provide evidence that firm-level mispricing may drive the observed diversification discount.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of corporate diversification on firm value in a sample of nine emerging markets including Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey. For the purpose of this study, a company is classified as diversified when it is operating in two or more lines of business defined by the two-digit SIC codes. Design/methodology/approach – Employing panel data from 1,568 companies for the period 2005-2010, this paper estimates both a fixed effects model and a dynamic generalized method of moments model. Data are collected both at company level and segment level within each firm. Findings – Overall, analysis results suggest that, for the period from 2005 to 2010, diversified firms in emerging markets are valued more compared to single-segment firms operating in similar industries, providing support for diversification premium. Originality/value – The effect of diversification on company value in emerging markets is an important managerial and public policy concern. Although the literature on developed country diversified firms is rich, only a few studies have examined diversification-value relationship in the context of developing countries. Furthermore, most previous research on the value effects of corporate diversification in emerging markets has taken the form of case studies within countries and concentrated on the 1990s. This paper tries to fill these gaps by using a larger sample and more recent data and methodology.

This paper investigates whether the desire to achieve higher equity valuations induces conglomerates to manipulate their segment earnings. I extend the Stein (Q J Econ 104:655–669, 1989 ) model to a multi-segment setting and show that conglomerates have incentives to transfer profits from segments operating in industries with lower valuation multiples to those with higher multiples, even if the market is not fooled in equilibrium. If companies engage in such manipulation, segments with relatively high (low) valuations should report abnormally high (low) profits. The empirical tests confirm this prediction and further show that the relation is stronger for firms with more dispersed segment valuations. This paper also demonstrates that the simple sum-of-the-parts valuation with multiples tends to overestimate the enterprise values for conglomerates and that the measurement errors increase with segment valuation dispersion.