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The share of electricity generation from Variable Renewable Energy Sources (VRES) has increased over the last 20 years. Despite promoting the decarbonization of the energy mix, these sources bring negative characteristics to the energy mix, such as power ramps, load mismatch, unpredictability, and fluctuation. One of the ways to mitigate these characteristics is the hybridization of power plants. This paper evaluates the benefits of hybridizing a plant using an AI-based methodology for optimizing the wind–solar ratio based on the Brazilian regulatory system. For this study, the hybrid plant was modeled using data collected over a period of 10 months. The measurements were obtained using two wind profilers (LIDAR and SODAR) and a sun tracker (Solys 2) as part of the EOSOLAR R&D project conducted in the state of Maranhão, Brazil. After the power plant modeling, a Genetic Algorithm (GA) was used to determine the optimal wind–solar ratio, considering costs with transmission systems. The algorithm achieved a monthly profit increase of more than 39% with an energy curtailment inferior to 1%, which indicates economic complementarity. Later, the same methodology was also applied to verify the wind–solar ratio’s sensitivity to solar energy pricing. The results show that a price increase of 15% would change the power plant’s optimal configuration.

The National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) is a large-scale mathematical model that computes equilibrium fuel prices and quantities in the U.S. energy sector and is currently in use at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). At present, to generate these equilibrium values, NEMS iteratively solves a sequence of linear programs and nonlinear equations. This is a nonlinear Gauss-Seidel approach to arrive at estimates of market equilibrium fuel prices and quantities. In this paper, we present existence and uniqueness results for NEMS-type models based on a nonlinear complementarity/variational inequality problem format. Also, we document mathematically, for the first time, how the inputs and the outputs for each NEMS module link together.

Why do some advanced capitalist democracies experience relatively higher economic growth rates? In this paper, it is argued that complementarities between varieties of coordination and systems of social protection can help explain differences in long-run economic performance. Testing the explanatory power of the original varieties of capitalism (VoC) model and the welfare production regime (WPR) model, the article finds that long-run economic growth is conditioned by the extent to which systems of social protection are complementary to varieties of coordination. Using time-series cross-section data on 17 OECD countries from 1974 to 2009, the article finds strong support for the hypothesis that coordinated market economies with decommodified welfare states achieve relatively higher economic growth rates in the long run. The WPR model moreover seems better at explaining economic growth compared with the classical VoC model. The welfare state is therefore argued to be crucial in understanding the economic effects of varieties of coordination.

A large literature identifies unique organizational capabilities as a potent source of competitive advantage, yet our knowledge of why capabilities fail to diffuse more rapidly—particularly in situations in which competitors apparently have strong incentives to adopt them and a well-developed understanding of how they work—remains incomplete. In this paper we suggest that competitively significant capabilities often rest on managerial practices that in turn rely on relational contracts (i.e., informal agreements sustained by the shadow of the future). We argue that one of the reasons these practices may be difficult to copy is that effective relational contracts must solve the twin problems of credibility and clarity and that although credibility might, in principle, be instantly acquired, clarity may take time to develop and may interact with credibility in complex ways so that relational contracts may often be difficult to build.

This paper examines conceptual issues and reviews empirical results bearing on the relationship between research approaches emphasizing organizational capabilities and those based in transaction cost economics (TCE)—or in organizational economics more generally. Following a review of conceptual fundamentals—what capability is and why organizations differ in capability—it assesses recent progress toward an integration of the capabilities and transaction cost approaches, primarily in the context of the analysis of vertical structure and related phenomena. This review suggests that progress has been substantial and that the key elements of a promising dynamic synthesis have been identified. The paper then considers issues that call for attention if further progress is to be achieved. The first of these is the role of agency, which must be seen in expansive terms (relative to standard economic rationality) if its evolutionary significance is to be fully appreciated. The second is the role of structure, or more specifically, industry architecture, which affects capability development by way of its effect on the feedback that firms receive. After drawing on the recent financial crisis for an illustration of these ideas, this paper considers the rise of interest in business models as a useful field of application, and it concludes with a discussion of the role of organizational economics (beyond TCE). We argue that, whatever the theoretical perspective at the level of the firm, analyses must reach beyond that level to grasp the important causal forces affecting capability development, firm boundaries, and structural features more generally.

This paper attempts to bridge a gap between organizational economics and strategy research through an analysis of knowledge and communication in organizations. We argue that organizations emerge to achieve the intensive use of the knowledge that is acquired to perform specific tasks and to integrate dispersed knowledge that is embodied in different human minds. The attributes of the tasks undertaken determine the optimal acquisition and distribution of knowledge. Depending on the codifiability of knowledge, different communication modes arise as a coordination mechanism to deepen the division of labor, leverage managerial talent, and exploit the increasing returns to knowledge. Organizational processes can be adapted through codes and culture to facilitate coordination; organizational structure can be designed to complement the limitations of human ability. We stress that organizational process and structure construct the core of organizational capital, which generates rent and sustains organizational growth. From the analysis, we draw implications for the strategic management of knowledge and human resources in organizations.

Does the content of what economies export matter for development? And, if it does, can governments improve on the export basket that the market generates through the shaping of industrial policy? This book considers these questions by reviewing relevant literature and taking stock of what is known from conceptual, empirical, and policy viewpoints. A large literature answers affirmatively to the first question and suggests the characteristics that distinguish desirable exports. More prosaically, but no less controversially, goods which are intensive in unskilled labor are thought to promote 'pro-poor' or 'shared growth,' whereas those which are skilled-labor intensive are thought to generate positive externalities for society as a whole. Concerns about macroeconomic stability have led to a focus on the overall composition of the export basket. This book revisits many of these arguments conceptually and, wherever possible, imports heuristic approaches into frameworks where, as more familiar arguments, they can be held up to the light, rotated, and their facets examined for brilliance or flaws. Second, the book examines what emerges empirically as a basis for policy design. Specifically, given certain conceptual arguments in favor of public sector intervention, do available data and empirical methods allow for actually doing so with a high degree of confidence? In asking this question, the book assumes that policy makers are competent and seek to raise the welfare of their citizens. This assumption permits sidestepping the debate about whether government failures trump market failures generically: In this sense, the book attempts to 'give industrial policy a chance.'

Product innovation often hinges on technological changes in underlying components and architectures, requiring extensive coordination between upstream component development tasks and downstream product development tasks. We explore how differences in the ways in which firms are organized with respect to components affect their ability to manage technological change. We consider how firms are organized in terms of both division of labor and division of knowledge. We categorize product innovations according to whether they are enabled by changes in components or by changes in architectures. We test our predictions in the context of the global dynamic random access memory industry from 1974 to 2005, during which it transitioned through 12 distinct product generations. We find that vertically integrated firms had, on average, a faster time to market for new product generations than nonintegrated firms. The performance benefit that firms derived from vertical integration was greater when the new product generation was enabled by architectural change than when it was enabled by component change. We also find that although many nonintegrated firms extended their knowledge boundaries by developing knowledge of outsourced components, the performance benefits from such knowledge mostly accrued to “fully nonintegrated” firms (i.e., those that did not vertically integrate into any upstream component), rather than “partially integrated” firms (i.e., those that vertically integrated into some components but not others). Our study makes a strong case for the value of integrating the knowledge- and governance-based theoretical perspectives to broaden our examination of how firms organize for innovation and to uncover the technological and organizational sources of performance heterogeneity.

China’s economic ascendance over the past two decades has generated ripple effects in the world economy. Its search for natural resources to satisfy the demands of industrialization has led it to Sub-Saharan Africa. Trade between China and Africa in 2006 totaled more than $50 billion, with Chinese companies importing oil from Angola and Sudan, timber from Central Africa, and copper from Zambia. Demand from China has contributed to an upward swing in prices, particularly for oil and metals from Africa, and has given a boost to real GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa. Chinese aid and investment in infrastructure are bringing desperately needed capital to the continent. At the same time, however, strong Chinese demand for oil is contributing to an increase in the import bill for many oil-importing Sub- Saharan African countries, and its exports of low-cost textiles, while benefiting African consumers, is threatening to displace local production. China poses a challenge to good governance and macroeconomic management in Africa because of the potential Dutch disease implications of commodity booms. China presents both an opportunity for Africa to reduce its marginalization from the global economy and a challenge for it to effectively harness the influx of resources to promote poverty-reducing economic development at home.

Whereas capability differences are known to impact governance decisions, what drives heterogeneity in firm capabilities? We propose that capability differences may arise from governance choices related to the focal activity and study how firms accumulate capabilities in the firm-specific, industry-specific, and occupational human capital necessary to perform knowledge work. We theorize that prior outsourcing decisions influence the development of firm- and industry-specific human capital and that buyer–supplier differences in the management of skilled employees can produce systematic differences in capabilities based on occupational human capital. Additionally, we explore some contingencies in the development of these types of human capital and their impacts on outsourcing knowledge work. These propositions are tested with a unique data set on the outsourcing of legal work involved in filing patents (i.e., patent prosecution).