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Demographically and economically, there is an ongoing global shift that has resulted in the uneven development and distribution of monetary, human and knowledge capital. This paper first examines and consolidates economic, social and urban theories of growth and decline and demonstrates how globalisation has conceptually shifted the spatial scale and trajectory of urban change theories. The examination of the population trajectories of the 100 largest American cities from 1980 to 2010 demonstrates that the majority either grew or shrank continuously. This trend counters early cyclical models and supports the argument that globalisation has altered population trajectories. Second, conceptualisations of urban shrinkage trajectories are reviewed and a two-dimensional trajectory typology encompassing both economic and demographic change is presented. The diversity of urban shrinkage experiences is demonstrated through the application of the typology to the 20 largest shrinking American cities, 12 of which experienced overall population loss and simultaneous economic growth. 在人口和经济层面，一项持续的全球转变导致了货币资本、人力资本和知识资本的不均衡 发展和分配。本文首先审视并统合了关于增长和衰退的经济、社会及城市理论，并证明了 全球化如何在概念层面改变了城市变革理论的空间尺度和轨迹。对美国100个大城市从1980到2010年的人口变化轨迹考查证明，大多数城市持续增长或持续衰退。这一趋势反 早期的周期循环模式，支持以下论点：全球化改变了人口变化轨迹。其次，我们考核了城 市收缩轨迹的概念表述，并提出了一种涵盖经济和人口变化的二维轨迹类型学。通过将该 类型学应用于美国前20大收缩城市（其中12个出现了总体人口收缩与经济增长同步发生 的现象），我们证明了城市收缩经验的多样性。

Do considerations that cause military spending increases symmetrically cause spending cuts? Models of military spending that estimate a single effect for major independent variables implicitly assume that this is the case. In reality, the mechanisms that cause military spending increases do not always imply symmetrical cuts, and vice versa. This article examines two considerations widely held to influence military spending: economic growth and international threats. In both cases, there are reasons to suspect asymmetric effects on military spending. While recessions always create pressure for cuts in military spending, which frequently constitutes a substantial share of national budgets, economic growth does not necessarily imply a symmetric need for spending increases. Similarly, while national security policymakers, including the military, are likely to call for spending increases when international threats worsen, they have self-interested reasons to minimize the budgetary implications of declining threats. A cross-national analysis of military spending since World War II shows that economic decline has a larger impact on military spending than economic growth. In regards to international threat, the findings are more complex. There is no evidence that international threat is related to changes in military spending in the short run, and little evidence of a long-run relationship. The threat variables appear to account for cross-sectional variation in military spending but not variation within each state over time. These results suggest military budgets require more time to recover from economic decline than benefit from economic growth as recessions can thus produce long deviations from the equilibrium relationship between the size of the economy and the military budget. This finding in military spending suggests consequences for our understanding of balance of power and power transitions.

This paper investigates very long-run preindustrial economic development. New annual GDP per capita data for six European countries over the last seven hundred years paint a clearer picture of the history of European economic development. We confirm that sustained growth has been a recent phenomenon, but reject the argument that there was no long-run growth in living standards before the Industrial Revolution. Instead, the evidence demonstrates the existence of numerous periods of economic growth before the nineteenth century—periods of unsustained, but raising GDP per capita. We also show that many of the economies experienced substantial economic decline. Thus, rather than being stagnant, pre-nineteenth century European economies experienced a great deal of change. Finally, we offer some evidence that, from the nineteenth century, these economies increased the likelihood of being in a phase of economic growth and reduced the risk of being in a phase of economic decline.

The majority of the shrinking cities literature focuses solely on instances of population loss and economic decline. This article argues that shrinking cities exist on a spectrum between prosperity and decline. Taking a wider view of population loss, I explore the possibility of prosperous shrinking cities: if they exist, where they exist, and under what conditions shrinking cities can thrive. Examining census place data from the 1980 to 2010 U.S. Census and American Community Surveys, 27 percent of 886 shrinking cities were found to have income levels greater than their surrounding regions. Shrinking and prosperous shrinking cities of all sizes were found across the United States. Shrinkage was most prevalent in the Rust Belt region and prosperous shrinkage in coastal regions. Prosperous shrinking cities were overwhelmingly found within megapolitan regions and were rarely principal cities. Multivariate regression analysis found that both population (city size) and the severity of shrinkage (magnitude of population loss) had no effect on economic prosperity. Talent (location quotient of education) was found to be the strongest predictor of prosperous shrinkage. Key Words: demographic change, economic prosperity, shrinking city, urban decline.

This article addresses the debate over the causes of urbanisation and counter-urbanisation in Zambia: Are urbanisation and counter-urbanisation caused mostly by net migration or are they caused mostly by the natural growth or decline of the urban population? Using population censuses, we apply the intercensal forward survival ratio method to measure net migration and the natural population growth of urban and rural areas in 1990, 2000 and 2010. The results show that the most important cause of urbanisation and counter-urbanisation was net migration rather than natural urban population growth or decline. Although natural urban population growth was roughly twice that of net migration, this had very little influence on urbanisation because it was matched by the natural growth of the rural population. We also address the causes of migration by examining employment trends. These results indicate that economic decline during the 1990s resulted in decreased urban employment and a dramatic rise in urban unemployment, which in turn caused migration from urban to rural areas. Conversely, during the 2000s, absolute employment grew and unemployment decreased, which corresponded with increased rural–urban migration (resulting in net urbanisation). Our findings also show that even during the period of net out-migration from urban areas and high urban unemployment levels, the resident urban-born workforce continued to grow strongly through natural increase. Thus, these results also show that urban population growth can increase substantially in the absence of urban economic growth, thereby increasing urban unemployment and urban–rural migration. 本文讨论了关于赞比亚城市化和反城市化原因的争论：城市化和反城市化主要是由净移民引起的还是主要由城市人口的自然增长或衰退造成的？基于人口普查资料，我们运用普查间前瞻性生存率法来衡量1990年，2000年和2010年的城市和农村地区的净迁移和人口自然增长。结果表明，城市化和反城市化的最重要原因是净迁移，而不是城市人口的自然增长或下降。尽管城市人口自然增长大约是净移民的两倍，但这对城市化的影响很小，因为它与农村人口的自然增长相当。我们还通过研究就业趋势来探讨移民的原因。结果表明，20世纪90年代的经济衰退导致城市就业率下降，城市失业率急剧上升，从而导致城市向农村地区迁移。相反，在2000年代期间，绝对就业增加，失业率下降，相应地，农村向城市的迁移增加（导致城市化进程）。我们的研究结果还表明，即使在城市地区净流出和高城市失业率的时期，城市出生的常住劳动力仍然通过自然增长保持强劲增长。因此，这些结果还表明，在没有城市经济增长的情况下，城市人口仍然可以大幅增加，从而增加城市失业和城市向乡村的迁移。

We construct the first time-series for Portugal’s per capita GDP for 1527–1850, drawing on a new database. Starting in the early 1630s there was a highly persistent upward trend which accelerated after 1710 and peaked 40 years later. At that point, per capita income was high by European standards, though behind the most advanced Western European economies. But as the second half of the eighteenth century unfolded, a phase of economic decline was initiated. This continued into the nineteenth century, and by 1850 per capita incomes were not different from what they had been in the early 1530s.

Globalization and automation have contributed to deindustrialization and the loss of millions of manufacturing jobs, yielding important electoral implications across advanced democracies. Coupling insights from economic voting and social identity theory, we consider how different groups in society may construe manufacturing job losses in contrasting ways. We argue that deindustrialization threatens dominant group status, leading some white voters in affected localities to favor candidates they believe will address economic distress and defend racial hierarchy. Examining three US presidential elections, we find white voters were more likely to vote for Republican challengers where manufacturing layoffs were high, whereas Black voters in hard-hit localities were more likely to vote for Democrats. In survey data, white respondents, in contrast to people of color, associated local manufacturing job losses with obstacles to individual upward mobility and with broader American economic decline. Group-based identities help explain divergent political reactions to common economic shocks.

As recently as the early 1990s, Americans living in rural and urban areas voted similarly in presidential elections, yet in the decades since, they have diverged sharply as rural people in all regions of the country have increasingly supported the Republican Party. We seek to explain the sources of this growing cleavage by examining two interrelated processes of change: political-economic transformation that elevated many urban areas and marginalized rural ones, and the nationalization of policy goals. Our analytical approach is developmental, probing the timing and sequencing of trends across more than four decades. It is also comprehensive, testing theories related to economic decline, the educational gap, organizational mobilization, and racism and racial and ethnic threat. Our analysis reveals that while rural and urban counties resembled each other in several respects in the 1970s, they have since moved apart. We examine how key trends relate to political change in presidential voting. We find that in the 1990s and early 2000s, rural dwellers in places experiencing population loss or economic stagnation began to support Republican candidates. Then from 2008 to 2020, those in areas with higher percentages of less-educated residents, a higher presence of evangelical congregations per capita, and higher levels of anti-Black racism, each more prevalent in rural areas than urban areas, shifted their support to Republicans. Through sequential processes of polarization, with political-economic forces leading the way and activating rural resistance to the nationalization of policy goals subsequently, the rural-urban political divide emerged as a major fault line in the nation’s politics.

We estimate a state-of-the-art DSGE model to study the natural rate of interest in the United States over the last 20 years. The natural rate is highly procyclical, and fell substantially below zero in each of the last three recessions. Although the drop was of comparable magnitude across the three recessions, the decline was considerably more persistent in the Great Recession. We discuss the usefulness and limitations, particularly due to the zero lower bound, of the natural rate for the conduct of monetary policy.

The COVID-19 pandemic brought sudden economic devastation and forced countries to respond with policies to counter the looming economic crisis. What policy response do citizens prefer to combat an economic decline due to a pandemic? We study the preferences of citizens regarding economic policy and changes in these preferences as the pandemic unfolded in Denmark. Denmark passed early and comprehensive legislation with broad support from all political parties to counter the economic crisis caused by the pandemic. We employ a large nationally representative two-wave panel of Danish citizens (N = 12,131) drawn from the administrative registers, from which data was collected at the onset of the economic shock and immediately prior to economic recovery. In both waves the same subjects describe their preferred economic solution to COVID-19 in open-text format. We generate a simple dictionary method to uncover a set of distinct laymen economic policy responses. First, we find that citizens formulated a diverse set of policy interventions. Second, citizens become markedly stronger proponents of economic intervention as the crisis unfolded. Finally, we show how differences in economic preferences across partisanship vanished during the crisis.