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Hyde draws on cross-national data on the global spread of election observation between 1960 and 2006 to show that observers can deter election-day fraud and otherwise improve the quality of elections.

There is widespread concern that foreign actors are using social media to interfere in elections worldwide. Yet data have been unavailable to investigate links between exposure to foreign influence campaigns and political behavior. Using longitudinal survey data from US respondents linked to their Twitter feeds, we quantify the relationship between exposure to the Russian foreign influence campaign and attitudes and voting behavior in the 2016 US election. We demonstrate, first, that exposure to Russian disinformation accounts was heavily concentrated: only 1% of users accounted for 70% of exposures. Second, exposure was concentrated among users who strongly identified as Republicans. Third, exposure to the Russian influence campaign was eclipsed by content from domestic news media and politicians. Finally, we find no evidence of a meaningful relationship between exposure to the Russian foreign influence campaign and changes in attitudes, polarization, or voting behavior. The results have implications for understanding the limits of election interference campaigns on social media. Here, using longitudinal survey and Twitter data, the authors examine the relationship between exposure to Russian Internet Research Agency activities on Twitter and voting behavior and attitudes in the 2016 US election.

Numerous studies have reported an increase in hate speech on X (formerly Twitter) in the months immediately following Elon Musk’s acquisition of the platform on October 27th, 2022; relatedly, despite Musk’s pledge to “defeat the spam bots,” a recent study reported no substantial change in the concentration of inauthentic accounts. However, it is not known whether any of these trends endured. We address this by examining material posted on X from the beginning of 2022 through June 2023, the period that includes Musk’s full tenure as CEO. We find that the increase in hate speech just before Musk bought X persisted until at least May of 2023, with the weekly rate of hate speech being approximately 50% higher than the months preceding his purchase, although this increase cannot be directly attributed to any policy at X. The increase is seen across multiple dimensions of hate, including racism, homophobia, and transphobia. Moreover, there is a doubling of hate post “likes,” indicating increased engagement with hate posts. In addition to measuring hate speech, we also measure the presence of inauthentic accounts on the platform; these accounts are often used in spam and malicious information campaigns. We find no reduction (and a possible increase) in activity by these users after Musk purchased X, which could point to further negative outcomes, such as the potential for scams, interference in elections, or harm to public health campaigns. Overall, the long-term increase in hate speech, and the prevalence of potentially inauthentic accounts, are concerning, as these factors can undermine safe and democratic online environments, and increase the risk of offline harms.

Money politics is one of the critical obstacles impairing the electoral contestation. If such an obstacle cannot be conquered, it jeopardizes the path of democratic consolidation. Using the Indonesian election experience, money politics has been the most prevalent issue in the electoral contest. As the public tolerates this issue, it has become a habit and, in turn, it is applied as customary law in society. This article sought to identify any obstacles to mitigating money politics and maps out studies on money politics issues in the Scopus database. The projected design is proposed to mitigate it. Thus, this article has a threefold question: How are obstacles in preventing money politics? What is a global trend in dealing with money politics studies? Which effective design is used to mitigate such an issue? Methodologically, it is qualitative research by applying a multiple case study approach. Hence, it relies on fieldwork focus group discussion and in-depth interviews with targeted respondents nationally. The findings revealed that obstacles could be identified in the regulation, Election Management Bodies and collective culture. Moreover, although scientists have contributed to disseminating money politics, the problems remain unsolved. As an upshot, the projected design is proposed: the regulation reform, a commitment to consolidate the EMBs' integrity, a sustainable political education and the application of participative-based technology information system against to money politics.

It's almost impossible to sue a foreign government in U.S. courts. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the court-created \"act of state\" doctrine, and other common-law immunities shield foreign officials and governments from most lawsuits. For instance, courts have dismissed claims against China, Cuba, Venezuela, and Russia over allegations of torture, detentions, and election interference. Yet foreign governments have unfettered access to U.S. courts as plaintiffs. And foreign dictatorships—including Russia, China, Turkey, and Venezuela—have leveraged this access to harass political dissidents, critics, and even newspapers in the United States. These doctrines create an asymmetry at the heart of this Article: foreign dictators and their proxies can access our courts as plaintiffs to harass their opponents, but their regimes are, in turn, immune from lawsuits here. This Article exposes that asymmetry and argues that U.S. courts and Congress should make it harder for foreign dictators to abuse our legal system. This Article offers three novel contributions. First, this Article provides the first systematic assessment of foreign dictatorships in U.S. courts. While much of the literature is siloed by area of substantive law—focusing on contexts like human rights or property expropriations—this Article treats dictators as a transsubstantive category of litigants, worthy of special analysis. Second, this Article exposes how foreign dictators are increasingly taking advantage of U.S. courts and comity doctrines, especially as plaintiffs. In a misguided effort to promote harmonious foreign relations, courts have provided foreign dictators an array of protections and privileges, which dictators are eagerly exploiting. Finally, this Article demonstrates that there is no historical, constitutional, or statutory obligation on U.S. courts to give foreign dictators these legal protections and unfettered access to our courts. Because of that, I offer four concrete proposals to both stymie dictators' access to U.S. courts as plaintiffs—through a proposed foreign sovereign anti-SLAPP statute—and weaken the protections that dictators enjoy as defendants. Simply stated, U.S. courts should not be instruments of foreign authoritarian oppression.

In response to the Trump trade war, China, the EU, and other countries enacted politically-targeted trade retaliation (PTTR) against swing states and Republican strongholds in the United States. We argue that PTTR increases public concerns about foreign election interference and assess the effects of such retaliation across partisan affiliations. We test our predictions using a national survey experiment in the United States fielded before the 2020 election. In contrast to findings about sanctions and foreign endorsements, we find strong evidence that PTTR increases fears of election interference among both Republicans and Democrats. Partisan double standards in reaction to PTTR were strongest for retaliation targeting swing states and smaller for retaliation targeting the President’s base. Overall, the evidence shows that economic policies which are not primarily intended to influence elections may nevertheless come to be viewed by the public as foreign election interference.

Rural American elections, without fundamental protection to occupy the offices that citizens have been elected to, are at risk of losing the soul of democracy. The Voting Rights Act preserved the most fundamental power given to every citizen of this country-the right to vote-to choose who has the power to effect and create change and defend the principles endowed by the United States Constitution. However, there is an enforcement gap. While Congress has created federal protections, how can those particular protections protect rural citizens from election subversion without similar state law protections? This article highlights the story of Patrick Braxton and the town of Newbern in rural Alabama. While scholars and Congress have been concerned with the \"right\" solution to prevent election subversion on a national level, Patrick Braxton 's story proves that the greatest place in need of protection from subversion is the local level. Patrick was the only named candidate for Mayor of his majority black town and by default won the election. However, he was not allowed to occupy office. This article aims to highlight specific remedies available at a local and national level applicable to cases like Braxton 's. However, those particular protections also come with weaknesses that should be taken into consideration. Part I will discuss Patrick Braxton's story to give an example of local election subversion. Part II will discuss the legal conversation surrounding different approaches to rectify election subversion and what remedies are currently available. Part Ш will discuss the legal conversations on judicial interference in elections to provide remedies without explicit legislative guidance. Part 1V will analyze the four equitable remedies for enforcing the results of a free and fair election. Part V will evaluate how the Alabama Supreme Court has handled the most likely option to enforce the results ofa free and fair election.

Scholars have found that election interference by a foreign power can increase political partisanship in a targeted state and can be an effective tool for throwing weight behind a candidate. We know less about how domestic political actors respond to election interference and how this affects the intervener's strategies over time. Since Taiwan held its first direct presidential election in 1996, China has used numerous tactics to influence Taiwan's elections. Taiwan's political parties have adapted to China's interference, with targeted candidates campaigning on election interference, and non-targeted candidates seeking to play a mediating role with Beijing. In response, China's tactics have shifted: the broad threats of earlier elections have been replaced with narrowly targeted efforts to mobilize Beijing-friendly segments of Taiwan's population.

The salience of the debate over Russian political interference in the USA has increased significantly during the Trump administration. However, there is no consensus over how to respond to the interference of this openly illiberal power. This paper argues that we need to reconceptualize our understanding of Russian influence to understand this high level of contestation. While the current understanding of Russian influence is characterized as a problem of unwanted information flows, we argue that we also need to take seriously the ideological influence that the Russia regime has in the USA—that the appeal of the Russian regime’s conservative and populist ideology can help to explain this division. By taking ideological attraction seriously, we can explain why it is currently difficult for the USA to respond to this threat and why solutions to Russian interference based on the information flow models need to be reconsidered.