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Focusing particularly on the work of Ernst Mach, this paper explores some of the epistemological ground shared between Ludwig Boltzmann and Mach, and offers an account of links between Mach’s published work in psychophysical investigations of the relations between physical and physiological phenomena and his unpublished lectures in physics, to indicate that Mach’s understanding of the scope of the sciences and philosophy – and his intent to move between inner and outer – was as expansive as Wittgenstein’s, and that both aimed to develop a thoroughly consistent approach.

This commentary responds to Gade in 'When is it justified to claim that a practice or policy is evidence-based? Reflections on evidence and preferences'

IntroductionThe deployment of opaque machine learning (ML) models in clinical settings raises a critical problem of epistemic justification. Standard approaches like explainability often fail, as they rely on a ”factive assumption” requiring access to a model’s internal mechanisms. This paper challenges this assumption, investigating an alternative foundation for justification.Materials and MethodsThis paper employs conceptual analysis, drawing on epistemology and explainable AI (xAI). We critique access-based justification via Gettier-style problems and synthesise Catherine Elgin’s non-factive theory of understanding with recent work on clinical AI. This involves analysing critiques of intelligibility (Fleisher, 2022) and the proposal for interactive Toy Surrogate Models (TSMs) (Páez, 2024).ResultsThe factive assumption sets an unattainable standard, leading to fragile, artefactual understanding. Treating post-hoc explainability tools as analogous to scientific idealisations is shown to be flawed. A non-factive account of understanding—the ability to ”grasp” and reason with model outputs via tools like TSMs—provides a more robust epistemic warrant. Justification is thus relocated from model fidelity to the clinician’s structured, counterfactual reasoning within norm-governed practices.ConclusionFactive standards of explainability are neither attainable nor necessary for justifying opaque clinical AI. A more philosophically sustainable approach grounds justification in non-factive, practice-based understanding. This framework reorients responsibility from the model to the clinician’s cognitive engagement, aligning the use of AI with existing professional norms for managing uncertainty.

History is a human science that allows us to understand the foundations that trigger a present, as well as the establishment of the foundations for the construction of a future. In the case of business history, studies of this branch of history date back to the twenties of the twentieth century in the United States. As is tradition in the sciences, in the case of history, and, therefore, business history, different currents of thought have been developed that allow us to explain business phenomena; Thus, this article aims to interpret the epistemological paradigms that can guide scientific work in this field. In the bibliographic review of this article, scientific articles published in indexed and recognized journals, doctoral theses and books were used. Among the epistemological paradigms or currents of thought proposed in history are: the Marxist historical current, positivism, pragmatism, Chandlerian, Schumpeterian, cliometrics, the current of the annals, hermeneutics, social constructivism, post-structuralism, organizational ecology, phenomenology. Rhetoric is not included.

In this book symposium contribution, I raise a question about Correia and Rosenkranz’s version of the Growing Block Theory: Is it meant to be a Four-Dimensionalist theory (with a commitment to temporal parts), or a Three-Dimensionalist theory (according to which an object is wholly present whenever it is present)? I argue that a downside of giving the first answer to this question (that the theory is committed to temporal parts) is that in that case their theory will be vulnerable to the Epistemic Objection to the Growing Block Theory. I further argue that an important advantage of giving the second answer to my question (that the theory does not come with a commitment to temporal parts) is that the Three-Dimensionalist version of the Growing Block Theory is not susceptible to the Epistemic Objection. And I also suggest that an apparent disadvantage of saying that their theory is a Three-Dimensionalist theory, namely, that in that case they will have difficulty answering questions about the properties of non-present objects (such as parrots from the distant past), can be dealt with in a way that does not commit them to either zombie parrots or bare particulars.

The companion Ibn Masʿūd (d. 32/652-653) has long been recognised for the variance of his Qur'anic qirāʾa ('reading', or 'recitation') from the canonical ʿUthmānī codex. His reading continued to enjoy popularity for at least a century within Kufa, the place of origin for much of the Hanafī madhhab's jurisprudential corpus. This article analyses Masʿūdian variants with legal implications in the doctrine of the early jurist Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī (d. 96/715), the seminal writings ascribed to Muhammad b. al-Hasan al-Shaybānī (d. 189/805), as well as the furūʿ and uṣūl works of key Hanafī figures from the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries: al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/981), al-Qudūrī (d. 428/1036-1037) and al-Sarakhsī (d. 483/1090). Close study of these figures' use of Masʿūdian variants indicates that while their non-canonicity demanded a compelling solution, their quasi-Qur'anic status presented opportunities within the arena of juristic debate. Furthermore, the manner in which they were ultimately accommodated within the practical and theoretical toolkit of the Hanafī school illustrates broader developments in its epistemology of revelation, abrogation and transmission.

This thesis evaluates Alvin Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology through his major works—God and Other Minds (1967), Reason and Belief in God (1983), and the Warrant Trilogy (1993–2000)—and argues that it ultimately fails to secure the proper basicality of belief in God. It offers a modest yet original contribution by proposing (i) that a Phenomenally Conservatist Reformed Epistemology can address the key shortcomings of Plantinga’s religious epistemology and (ii) that this Phenomenally Conservatist approach, while a natural evolution of Plantinga’s epistemology, represents a neglected and timely development in the Reformed Epistemological discourse.

Abstract Epistemic externalism offers one of the most prominent responses to the sceptical challenge. Externalism has commonly been interpreted (not least by externalists themselves) as postulating a crucial asymmetry between the actual-world agent and their brain-in-a-vat (biv) counterpart: while the actual agent is in a position to know she is not envatted, her biv counterpart is not in a position to know that she is envatted, or in other words, only the former is in a position to know whether or not she is envatted. In this paper, I argue that there is in fact no such asymmetry: assuming epistemic externalism, both the actual world agent and their biv counterpart are in a position to know whether or not they are envatted. After an introduction (§i), I present the main argument (§ii). I examine to what extent the argument survives when one accepts additional externalist-friendly commitments: semantic externalism, a sensitivity condition on knowledge, and epistemic contextualism (§iii). Finally, I discuss the implications of my conclusion to a variety of debates in epistemology (§iv).

This paper seeks to show how historiographical categories that place philosophies within schools of thought entail accepting a high theoretical cost: the category circumscribes a general framework for interpretation, but at the same time conceals what makes a particular thought unique and sometimes original. If they are only Leibnizian or Newtonian, why give them a place in the corpus? In order to establish the limits and challenges of this categorisation, this paper coins the category of ‘Leibnizo-Newtonianism’, not in order to identify a paradoxical school of thought, but rather to question this reading of the history of philosophy. On the other hand, it proposes to use the analysis of epistemological practices (the relationship between hypothesis and experience, the status of principle etc.) to identify the problem Émilie du Châtelet set out to answer: how can one establish the certainty of our knowledge of nature?