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What motivates judges as decision makers? Political scientist Lawrence Baum offers a new perspective on this crucial question, a perspective based on judges' interest in the approval of audiences important to them. The conventional scholarly wisdom holds that judges on higher courts seek only to make good law, good policy, or both. In these theories, judges are influenced by other people only in limited ways, in consequence of their legal and policy goals. In contrast, Baum argues that the influence of judges' audiences is pervasive. This influence derives from judges' interest in popularity and respect, a motivation central to most people. Judges care about the regard of audiences because they like that regard in itself, not just as a means to other ends. Judges and Their Audiences uses research in social psychology to make the case that audiences shape judges' choices in substantial ways. Drawing on a broad range of scholarship on judicial decision-making and an array of empirical evidence, the book then analyzes the potential and actual impact of several audiences, including the public, other branches of government, court colleagues, the legal profession, and judges' social peers.

In recent years the American public has witnessed several hard-fought battles over nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court. In these heated confirmation fights, candidates' legal and political philosophies have been subject to intense scrutiny and debate.Citizens, Courts, and Confirmationsexamines one such fight--over the nomination of Samuel Alito--to discover how and why people formed opinions about the nominee, and to determine how the confirmation process shaped perceptions of the Supreme Court's legitimacy. Drawing on a nationally representative survey, James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira use the Alito confirmation fight as a window into public attitudes about the nation's highest court. They find that Americans know far more about the Supreme Court than many realize, that the Court enjoys a great deal of legitimacy among the American people, that attitudes toward the Court as an institution generally do not suffer from partisan or ideological polarization, and that public knowledge enhances the legitimacy accorded the Court. Yet the authors demonstrate that partisan and ideological infighting that treats the Court as just another political institution undermines the considerable public support the institution currently enjoys, and that politicized confirmation battles pose a grave threat to the basic legitimacy of the Supreme Court.

Almost since the beginning of the republic, America's rigorous separation of powers among Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches has been umpired by the federal judiciary. It may seem surprising, then, that many otherwise ordinary cases are not decided in court even when they include allegations that the President, or Congress, has violated a law or the Constitution itself. Most of these orphan cases are shunned by the judiciary simply because they have foreign policy aspects. In refusing to address the issues involved, judges indicate that judicial review, like politics, should stop at the water's edge--and foreign policy managers find it convenient to agree! Thomas Franck, however, maintains that when courts invoke the \"political question\" doctrine to justify such reticence, they evade a constitutional duty. In his view, whether the government has acted constitutionally in sending men and women to die in foreign battles is just as appropriate an issue for a court to decide as whether property has been taken without due process. In this revisionist work, Franck proposes ways to subject the conduct of foreign policy to the rule of law without compromising either judicial integrity or the national interest. By examining the historical origins of the separation of powers in the American constitutional tradition, with comparative reference to the practices of judiciaries in other federal systems, he broadens and enriches discussions of an important national issue that has particular significance for critical debate about the \"imperial presidency.\"

How did the federal judiciary transcend early limitations to become a powerful institution of American governance? How did the Supreme Court move from political irrelevance to political centrality?Building the Judiciaryuncovers the causes and consequences of judicial institution-building in the United States from the commencement of the new government in 1789 through the close of the twentieth century. Explaining why and how the federal judiciary became an independent, autonomous, and powerful political institution, Justin Crowe moves away from the notion that the judiciary is exceptional in the scheme of American politics, illustrating instead how it is subject to the same architectonic politics as other political institutions. Arguing that judicial institution-building is fundamentally based on a series of contested questions regarding institutional design and delegation, Crowe develops a theory to explain why political actors seek to build the judiciary and the conditions under which they are successful. He both demonstrates how the motivations of institution-builders ranged from substantive policy to partisan and electoral politics to judicial performance, and details how reform was often provoked by substantial changes in the political universe or transformational entrepreneurship by political leaders. Embedding case studies of landmark institution-building episodes within a contextual understanding of each era under consideration, Crowe presents a historically rich narrative that offers analytically grounded explanations for why judicial institution-building was pursued, how it was accomplished, and what--in the broader scheme of American constitutional democracy--it achieved.

In 1998, an Asian woman first joined the ranks of federal judges with lifetime appointments. It took ten years for the second Asian woman to be appointed. Since then, however, over a dozen more Asian women have received lifetime federal judicial appointments.   This book tells the stories of the first fifteen. In the process, it recounts remarkable tales of Asian women overcoming adversity and achieving the American dream, despite being the daughters of a Chinese garment worker, Japanese Americans held in internment camps during World War II, Vietnamese refugees, and penniless Indian immigrants. Yet The First Fifteen also explores how far Asian Americans and women still have to go before the federal judiciary reflects America as a whole.    In a candid series of interviews, these judges reflect upon the personal and professional experiences that led them to this distinguished position, as well as the nerve-wracking political process of being nominated and confirmed for an Article III judgeship. By sharing their diverse stories, The First Fifteen paints a nuanced portrait of how Asian American women are beginning to have a voice in determining American justice.

This Article reports the results of a survey of a diverse group of forty-two federal appellate judges concerning their approaches to statutory interpretation. The study reveals important differences between their approaches and the approach that the Supreme Court purports to take. It also helps to substantiate the irrelevance of the enduring, but nowboring, textualism-versus-purposivism debate. None of the judges we interviewed was willing to associate himself or herself with \"textualism\" without qualification. All consult legislative history. Most eschew dictionaries. All utilize at least some canons of construction, but for reasons that range from \"window dressing,\" to the use of canons to assist in opinion writing, to a view that they are useful decision tools. Most of the judges we interviewed are not fans of Chevron, except for the judges on the D.C. Circuit, which hears the bulk of Chevron cases. Some of the judges interviewed believe that understanding Congress is important to a judge's work, while others do not see how judges can use such understanding to decide cases. Most express doubt that the Supreme Court's interpretive methodology binds the lower courts. The younger judges, who attended law school and practiced during the ascendance of textualism, are generally more formalist and accepting of the canons of construction, regardless of political affiliation. The older judges are less focused on canons, take a broader view of their delegated authority, and appear to grapple more with questions of judicial legitimacy. The approach that emerged most clearly from our interviews might be described as intentional eclecticism. Most of the judges we spoke to are willing to consider many different kinds of argument and evidence, and defend that approach as the only democratically legitimate one. Yet at the same time many observe a gap between how they actually decide cases and how they write opinions, a gap they attribute to the disconnect between the expectations of the public and the realities of judicial decisionmaking.

U. S. Supreme Court justices and other federal judges are, effectively, appointed for life, with no built-in check on their cognitive functioning as they approach old age. There is about a century of research on aging and intelligence that shows the vulnerability of processing speed, fluid reasoning, visual-spatial processing, and working memory to normal aging for men and women at all levels of education; even the maintained ability of crystallized knowledge declines in old age. The vulnerable abilities impact a person’s decision-making and problem solving; crystallized knowledge, by contrast, measures a person’s general knowledge. The aging-IQ data provide a rationale for assessing the key cognitive abilities of anyone who is appointed to the federal judiciary. Theories of multiple cognitive abilities and processes, most notably the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) model, provide a well-researched blueprint for interpreting the plethora of findings from studies of IQ and aging. Sophisticated technical advances in test construction, especially in item-response theory and computerized-adaptive testing, allow for the development of reliable and valid theory-based tests of cognitive functioning. Such assessments promise to be a potentially useful tool for evaluating federal judges to assess the impact of aging on their ability to perform at a level their positions deserve, perhaps to measure their competency to serve the public intelligently. It is proposed that public funding be made available to appoint a panel of experts to develop and validate an array of computerized cognitive tests to identify those justices who are at risk of cognitive impairment.

A major legacy of the Obama presidency was the mark he left on the federal courts with respect to increasing judicial diversity. In particular, President Obama's appointments of women to the federal judiciary exceeded all previous presidents in terms of both absolute numbers and as a share of all judges; he also appointed a record-setting number of women of color to the lower federal courts. In this Article, I take an intersectional approach to exploring variation in the professional backgrounds, qualifications, and Senate confirmation experiences of Obama's female appeals court appointees, comparing them with George W. Bush and Bill Clinton appointees. These data reveal that women of color appointed by Obama differ from both white women and minority men in terms of ABA ratings, the types of professional experiences they bring with them, and whether they were confirmed by a roll call vote.

This Note explores the persistent differences in status among federal district judges in U.S. territories. Beginning with Congress's decision to extend life tenure to federal judges in Puerto Rico in 1966, the Note traces the evolution of local and federal courts in U.S. territories over the past half century. Although universally counted within the ninety-four districts of the Article III system, the federal district courts in Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands are not staffed by Article III judges. In some cases, these federal district judges can be replaced at any moment. This regime, once defended on account of the distinguishing jurisdictional features of federal courts overseas, has outgrown its prevailing justifications. Divorced from its once-plausible logic of necessity and institutional development, the present status of federal district judges in the territories is an emerging problem in federal judicial independence that exposes the federal courts to charges of exceptionalism and political interference. Focusing on judicial administration, this Note challenges the notion that all federal district judges are created equal, highlighting an underinterrogated space in the discourse on U.S. empire: the Judicial Conference of the United States.

The federal judiciary today takes certain things for granted. Political actors will not attempt to remove Article III judges outside the impeachment process; they will not obstruct federal court orders; and they will not tinker with the Supreme Court's size in order to pack it with like-minded Justices. And yet a closer look reveals that these \"selfevident truths\" of judicial independence are neither self-evident nor necessary implications of our constitutional text, structure, and history. This Article demonstrates that many government officials once viewed these court-curbing measures as not only constitutionally permissible but also desirable (and politically viable) methods of \"checking\" the judiciary. The Article tells the story of how political actors came to treat each measure as \"out of bounds\" and thus built what the Article calls \"conventions of judicial independence.\" But implicit in this story is a cautionary tale about the fragility of judicial independence. Indeed, this account underscores the extent to which judicial independence is politically constructed and historically contingent. Particularly at a time when government officials seem willing to depart from other longstanding norms, federal judges should take none of their current protections for granted.