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The other invisible hand
2008,2007,2009
How can we ensure high-quality public services such as health care and education? Governments spend huge amounts of public money on public services such as health, education, and social care, and yet the services that are actually delivered are often low quality, inefficiently run, unresponsive to their users, and inequitable in their distribution. In this book, Julian Le Grand argues that the best solution is to offer choice to users and to encourage competition among providers. Le Grand has just completed a period as policy advisor working within the British government at the highest levels, and from this he has gained evidence to support his earlier theoretical work and has experienced the political reality of putting public policy theory into practice. He examines four ways of delivering public services: trust; targets and performance management; \"voice\"; and choice and competition. He argues that, although all of these have their merits, in most situations policies that rely on extending choice and competition among providers have the most potential for delivering high-quality, efficient, responsive, and equitable services. But it is important that the relevant policies be appropriately designed, and this book provides a detailed discussion of the principal features that these policies should have in the context of health care and education. It concludes with a discussion of the politics of choice.
Zero lower bound term structure modeling : a practitioner's guide
2015
Nominal yields on government debt in several countries have fallen very near their zero lower bound (ZLB), causing a liquidity trap and limiting the capacity to stimulate economic growth. This book provides a comprehensive reference to ZLB structure modeling in an applied setting.
Finance : a quantitative introduction
\"By providing a solid theoretical basis, this textbook introduces modern finance to readers, including students in science and technology, who already have a good foundation in quantitative skills. It combines the classical, decision oriented approach and the traditional organization of corporate finance books with a quantitative approach that is particularly well suited to students with backgrounds in engineering and the natural sciences. This combination makes finance much more transparent and accessible than the definition-theorem-proof pattern that is common in mathematics and financial economics. The book's main emphasis is on investments in real assets and the real options attached to them, and it also includes extensive discussion of topics such as portfolio theory, market efficiency, capital structure and derivatives pricing. Finance: A Quantitative Introduction equips readers as future managers with the financial literacy necessary either to evaluate investment projects themselves or to engage critically with the analysis of financial managers\"-- Provided by publisher.
Game-theoretic foundations for probability and finance
by
Shafer, Glenn
,
Vovk, Vladimir
in
Agile software development
,
Black-Scholes-Modell
,
Equity-Premium-Puzzle
2019
Game-theoretic probability and finance come of age Glenn Shafer and Vladimir Vovk's Probability and Finance , published in 2001, showed that perfect-information games can be used to define mathematical probability.
How States Pay for Wars
2016
Armies fight battles, states fight wars. To focus solely on
armies is to neglect the broader story of victory and defeat.
Military power stems from an economic base, and without wealth,
soldiers cannot be paid, weapons cannot be procured, and food
cannot be bought. War finance is among the most consequential
decisions any state makes: how a state finances a war affects not
only its success on the battlefield but also its economic stability
and its leadership tenure. In How States Pay for Wars ,
Rosella Cappella Zielinski clarifies several critical dynamics
lying at the nexus of financial and military policy.
Cappella Zielinski has built a custom database on war funding
over the past two centuries, and she combines those data with
qualitative analyses of Truman's financing of the Korean War,
Johnson's financing of the Vietnam War, British financing of World
War II and the Crimean War, and Russian and Japanese financing of
the Russo-Japanese War. She argues that leaders who attempt to
maximize their power at home, and state power abroad, are in a
constant balancing act as they try to win wars while remaining in
office. As a result of political risks, they prefer war finance
policies that meet the needs of the war effort within the
constraints of the capacity of the state.
Armies fight battles, states fight wars. To focus solely on
armies is to neglect the broader story of victory and defeat.
Military power stems from an economic base, and without wealth,
soldiers cannot be paid, weapons cannot be procured, and food
cannot be bought. War finance is among the most consequential
decisions any state makes: how a state finances a war affects not
only its success on the battlefield but also its economic stability
and its leadership tenure. In How States Pay for Wars ,
Rosella Cappella Zielinski clarifies several critical dynamics
lying at the nexus of financial and military policy.Cappella
Zielinski has built a custom database on war funding over the past
two centuries, and she combines those data with qualitative
analyses of Truman's financing of the Korean War, Johnson's
financing of the Vietnam War, British financing of World War II and
the Crimean War, and Russian and Japanese financing of the
Russo-Japanese War. She argues that leaders who attempt to maximize
their power at home, and state power abroad, are in a constant
balancing act as they try to win wars while remaining in office. As
a result of political risks, they prefer war finance policies that
meet the needs of the war effort within the constraints of the
capacity of the state.