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We model the dynamics of risk premia during crises in asset markets where the marginal investor is a financial intermediary. Intermediaries face an equity capital constraint. Risk premia rise when the constraint binds, reflecting the capital scarcity. The calibrated model matches the nonlinearity of risk premia during crises and the speed of reversion in risk premia from a crisis back to precrisis levels. We evaluate the effect of three government policies: reducing intermediaries borrowing costs, injecting equity capital, and purchasing distressed assets. Injecting equity capital is particularly effective because it alleviates the equity capital constraint that drives the model's crisis.

We investigate the effect of poor performance on financial intermediary reputation by estimating the effect of large-scale bankruptcies among a lead arranger's borrowers on its subsequent syndication activity. Consistent with reputation damage, such lead arrangers retain larger fractions of the loans they syndicate, are less likely to syndicate loans, and are less likely to attract participant lenders. The consequences are more severe when borrower bankruptcies suggest inadequate screening or monitoring by the lead arranger. However, the effect of borrower bankruptcies on syndication activity is not present among dominant lead arrangers, and is weak in years in which many lead arrangers experience borrower bankruptcies.

We propose a dynamic theory of financial intermediaries that are better able to collateralize claims than households, that is, have a collateralization advantage. Intermediaries require capital as they have to finance the additional amount that they can lend out of their own net worth. The net worth of financial intermediaries and the corporate sector are both state variables affecting the spread between intermediated and direct finance and the dynamics of real economic activity, such as investment, and financing. The accumulation of net worth of intermediaries is slow relative to that of the corporate sector. The model is consistent with key stylized facts about macroeconomic downturns associated with a credit crunch, namely, their severity, their protractedness, and the fact that the severity of the credit crunch itself affects the severity and persistence of downturns. The model captures the tentative and halting nature of recoveries from crises.

This paper examines whether there are efficiencies that benefit issuers and underwriters when a financial intermediary concurrently lends to an issuer while also underwriting its public securities offering. We find issuers, particularly noninvestment-grade issuers for whom informational economies of scope are likely to be large, benefit through lower underwriter fees and discounted loan yield spreads. Underwriters, both commercial banks as well as investment banks, engage in concurrent lending and provide price discounts, albeit in different ways. We find concurrent lending helps underwriters build relationships, increasing the probability of receiving current and future business.

Bank rescue programs are designed to provide assistance to struggling financial intermediaries during financial crises. A complicating factor is that participating banks are often stigmatized by accepting assistance from the government. This paper investigates stigma in two ways: (i) it examines how stigma changes a bank’s decision to seek assistance from the rescue program, and (ii) it analyzes how stigma affects a bank’s ability to operate as a financial intermediary using a joint model for bank-level application, approval, and lending decisions. The empirical results indicate that stigma hinders the objectives of the rescue program and slows the production of credit.

The present paper highlights the need to adopt sustainability strategies in the Romanian banking sector, from the perspective of the importance of the role of financial intermediary that commercial banks have, also reflecting the positive impact of these strategies on financial performance. The empirical study involved the use of linear regressions and processing by a program specialized in statistics and data science (Stata), and emphasizes the impact of environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors on Romanian banks and the opportunity to implement them in their own risk management strategies. For this purpose, were considered independent variables, at the microeconomic level: return on assets, the leverage multiplier, the credit-deposit ratio, the number of members of the management body, and at the macroeconomic level: the unemployment rate, the inflation rate and the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product. The dependent variable used was the dummy variable called ESG. The results of our research show that, as the return on assets or the leverage multiplier increases, the probability that the bank implements a risk management strategy associated with environmental, social and governance factors decreases, and the number of members of the management body positively impacts the decision to get involved in social responsibility activities. Through this research was assessed the opportunity to integrate the risks associated with sustainable development within the strategies of development and risk management at the level of financial intermediaries and the importance of standardizing sustainable practices throughout the entire banking system in Romania.

This Essay considers the role of bankruptcy law in the legal ecosystem that regulates banks and other financial intermediaries. It uses the recent spate of bank and crypto intermediary failures to consider the role of bankruptcy courts (and. other resolution institutions) in protecting both customers, and the stability of the financial system when the instability of a financial intermediary threatens to spread contagion throughout the financial system. It expands the definition of bankruptcy to comprise the various regimes for resolving the debts of financial intermediaries, and identifies common themes that operate (and should operate symmetrically) across those resolution regimes. The Essay develops three concepts-equitable realisation,\" constitutive priority and fiat priority - that together instantiate an affirmative and complementary role for bankruptcy courts in the regulation of financial intermediaries that I call constitutive equity.\" These principles seek to balance the imperatives of financial system stability, value preservation, and fair treatment of competing stakeholders.

We analyze the information content of a digital footprint—that is, information that users leave online simply by accessing or registering on a Web site—for predicting consumer default. We show that even simple, easily accessible variables from a digital footprint match the information content of credit bureau scores. A digital footprint complements rather than substitutes for credit bureau information and affects access to credit and reduces default rates. We discuss the implications for financial intermediaries’ business models, access to credit for the unbanked, and the behavior of consumers, firms, and regulators in the digital sphere.

How much capital should financial intermediaries hold? We propose a general equilibrium model with a financial sector that makes risky long-term loans to firms, funded by deposits from savers. Government guarantees create a role for bank capital regulation. The model captures the sharp and persistent drop in macro-economic aggregates and credit provision as well as the sharp change in credit spreads observed during financial crises. Policies requiring intermediaries to hold more capital reduce financial fragility, reduce the size of the financial and non-financial sectors, and lower intermediary profits. They redistribute wealth from savers to the owners of banks and non-financial firms. Pre-crisis capital requirements are close to optimal. Counter-cyclical capital requirements increase welfare.

Purpose This macroeconomic analysis chronicles the risk behavior of market-based financial intermediaries and traditional depository institutions from 1980 to 2010 and assesses the role that competition, financial innovation and regulation played in their evolving risk behaviors. The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach Using a two-part CAPM framework in line with Campbell et al. (2001), risk measures are constructed through the decomposition of industry-level risk and firm-level idiosyncratic risk. These constructed measures are used in a VAR model with a historical decomposition approach to assess the impact of the three factors on the relative risk behavior of these firms. Findings The results indicate that the market-based and traditional intermediaries exhibited a period of diverging relative average firm-level risk behavior followed by a period of converging risk behavior. Using the derived firm-level risk measures, the impact of competition, financial innovation and regulatory changes on explaining these changing risk behaviors is explored. The results suggest that regulatory changes (i.e. deregulation) can best explain the relative risk behavior over the divergence period through late 1999 relative to the other two variables. The period from November 1999 through the financial crisis marks the converging risk behaviors across these intermediaries. Over this period, the changing nature of competition played the most important role in driving these behaviors. Originality/value The key contribution of this analysis highlights the evolutionary changes in the risk behaviors of market-based and traditional financial intermediaries and the factors driving both their diverging and converging nature over time.