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Purpose To study the variations of delay discounting rates as a function of fluency, contents, and functions of future thoughts in healthy subjects. Background Delay discounting (DD) is a concept that can measure a frequent tendency toward smaller, yet immediate rewards, while a delayed reward is greater in value. DD describes people's choices in intertemporal decisions and is associated with self‐control. Future thinking (FT) and having a vivid imagination of the future can reduce individuals’ DD rates. However, constructing a specific episodic future representation was merely studied in relation to DD. Although fluency and contents of future thoughts have been reported related to various disorders and behaviors, their association with DD has not been previously addressed. Methods The present study applies a verbal fluency task named the personal future task (PFT), the functions of future thinking scale (FoFTS), and the 27‐item delay discounting questionnaire (DDQ) in order to assess fluency, contents, and functions of future thoughts, and delay discounting in healthy subjects (N = 114, Female = 64%, Male = 36%, Mage = 34.22, SDage = 7.15). Results Findings indicate that fluency of future thoughts is associated with DD. Among the contents of FT categories, financial contents (future thoughts about money and real estate matters), and regarding functions of FT, engaging in FT for planning are related to DD. Due to the final model, the above‐mentioned correlated variables can be considered as significant predictors of intertemporal choices when controlling for education and gender (R2 = 0.4, Adjusted R2 = 0.33, F = 5.186, p‐value = 0.001). Conclusion The frequency of future thoughts one can generate, specifically future thoughts about financial contents, is associated with less short‐sighted intertemporal decisions. The former relationship is enhanced for longer delays (e.g., 5–10 years). Besides, individuals who frequently engage in FT for planning (planning out sequences of actions) discount future rewards to a lesser extent. Graphical

The transition to a cooked diet represents an important shift in human ecology and evolution. Cooking requires a set of sophisticated cognitive abilities, including causal reasoning, self-control and anticipatory planning. Do humans uniquely possess the cognitive capacities needed to cook food? We address whether one of humans' closest relatives, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), possess the domain-general cognitive skills needed to cook. Across nine studies, we show that chimpanzees: (i) prefer cooked foods; (ii) comprehend the transformation of raw food that occurs when cooking, and generalize this causal understanding to new contexts; (iii) will pay temporal costs to acquire cooked foods; (iv) are willing to actively give up possession of raw foods in order to transform them; and (v) can transport raw food as well as save their raw food in anticipation of future opportunities to cook. Together, our results indicate that several of the fundamental psychological abilities necessary to engage in cooking may have been shared with the last common ancestor of apes and humans, predating the control of fire.

RationaleEpisodic future thinking (EFT) is a cognitive function that allows individuals to imagine novel experiences that may happen in the future. Prior studies show that EFT is impaired in different groups of substance users. However, there is no evidence regarding the neurobiological mechanisms of EFT in cannabis users.ObjectivesWe aimed to compare brain activations of regular cannabis users and non-using controls during an EFT fMRI task. Exploratory analyses were also conducted to investigate the association between EFT and cannabis use variables (e.g., duration of use, age onset, frequency of use).MethodsTwenty current cannabis users and 22 drug-naïve controls underwent an fMRI scanning session while completing a task involving envisioning future-related events and retrieval of past memories as a control condition. The EFT fMRI task was adapted from the autobiographical interview and composed of 20 auditory cue sentences (10 cues for past and 10 cues for future events). Participants were asked to recall a past or generate a future event, in response to the cues, and then rate their vividness after each response.ResultsWe found that cannabis users compared to non-user controls had lower activation within the cerebellum, medial and superior temporal gyrus, lateral occipital cortex, and occipital fusiform gyrus while envisioning future events. Cannabis users rated the vividness of past events significantly lower than non-users (P < 0.005). There were marginal group differences for rating the vividness of future events (P = 0.052). Significant correlations were also found between the medial and superior temporal gyrus activities and behavioral measures of EFT and episodic memory.ConclusionsCannabis users, compared to drug-naïve controls, have lower brain activation in EFT relevant regions. Thus, any attempts to improve aberrant EFT performance in cannabis users may benefit from EFT training.

Parenting is a crucial environmental factor in children’s social and cognitive development. This study investigated the association between parenting styles and future-oriented cognition skills in elementary school-aged children. Cross-sectional data were collected from parents of 200 Iranian elementary school aged children (6–13 years), 139 boys and 61 girls. Baumrind’s Parenting Styles Questionnaire and Children’s Future Thinking Questionnaire (CFTQ) were administered to parents. There was a significant positive association between authoritative parenting and children’s abilities in prospective memory, episodic foresight, planning, delay of gratification, and future-oriented cognition total score. In contrast, authoritarian parenting was negatively correlated with children’s abilities in planning, delay of gratification, and future-oriented cognition. Increases in authoritative parenting scores predicted better future-oriented cognition abilities in children.

When do children acquire a propositional attitude folk psychology or theory of mind? The orthodox answer to this central question of developmental ToM research had long been that around age 4 children begin to apply \"belief\" and other propositional attitude concepts. This orthodoxy has recently come under serious attack, though, from two sides: Scoffers complain that it over-estimates children's early competence and claim that a proper understanding of propositional attitudes emerges only much later. Boosters criticize the orthodoxy for underestimating early competence and claim that even infants ascribe beliefs. In this paper, the orthodoxy is defended on empirical grounds against these two kinds of attacks. On the basis of new evidence, not only can the two attacks safely be countered, but the orthodox claim can actually be strengthened, corroborated and refined: what emerges around age 4 is an explicit, unified, flexibly conceptual capacity to ascribe propositional attitudes. This unified conceptual capacity contrasts with the less sophisticated, less unified implicit forms of tracking simpler mental states present in ontogeny long before. This refined version of the orthodoxy can thus most plausibly be spelled out in some form of 2-systems-account of theory of mind.

A number of convergent recent findings with adults have been interpreted as evidence of the existence of two distinct systems for mindreading that draw on separate conceptual resources: one that is fast, automatic, and inflexible; and one that is slower, controlled, and flexible. The present article argues that these findings admit of a more parsimonious explanation. This is that there is a single set of concepts made available by a mindreading system that operates automatically where it can, but which frequently needs to function together with domain-specific executive procedures (such as visually rotating an image to figure out what someone else can see) as well as domain-general resources (including both long-term and working memory). This view, too, can be described as a two-systems account. But in this case one of the systems encompasses the other, and the conceptual resources available to each are the same.

This paper argues that mind-reading hypotheses (MRHs), of any kind, are not needed to best describe or best explain basic acts of social cognition. It considers the two most popular MRHs: one-ToM and two-ToM theories. These MRHs face competition in the form of complementary behaviour reading hypotheses (CBRHs). Following Buckner (Mind Lang 29:566–589, 2014), it is argued that the best strategy for putting CBRHs out of play is to appeal to theoretical considerations about the psychosemantics of basic acts of social cognition. In particular, need-based accounts that satisfy a teleological criterion have the ability to put CBRHs out of play. Yet, against this backdrop, a new competitor for MRHs is revealed: mind minding hypothesis (MMHs). MMHs are capable of explaining all the known facts about basic forms of social cognition and they also satisfy the teleological criterion. In conclusion, some objections concerning the theoretical tenability of MMHs are addressed and prospects for further research are canvassed.

Over the last several decades, there has been a wealth of illuminating work on processes implicated in social cognition. Much less has been done in articulating how we learn the contours of particular concepts deployed in social cognition, like the concept MENTALISTIC AGENT. Recent developments in learning theory afford new tools for approaching these questions. In this article, I describe some rudimentary ways in which learning theoretic considerations can illuminate philosophically important aspects of the MENTALISTIC AGENT concept. I maintain that MENTALISTIC AGENT is an essentialized concept (cf. Gelman, in The essential child, 2003; Keil, in Concepts, kinds, and cognitive development, 1992) and that learning-theoretic considerations help explain why the concept is not tied to particular traits.

The concept of empathy has received much attention from philosophers and also from both cognitive and social psychologists. It has, however, been given widely conflicting definitions, with some taking it primarily as an epistemological notion and others as a social one. Recently, empathy has been closely associated with the simulationist approach to social cognition and, as such, it might be thought that the concept's utility stands or falls with that of simulation itself. I suggest that this is a mistake. Approaching the question of what empathy is via the question of what it is for, I claim that empathy plays a distinctive epistemological role: it alone allows us to know how others feel. This is independent of the plausibility of simulationism more generally. With this in view I propose an inclusive definition of empathy, one likely consequence of which is that empathy is not a natural kind. It follows that, pace a number of empathy researchers, certain experimental paradigms tell us not about the nature of empathy but about certain ways in which empathy can be achieved. I end by briefly speculating that empathy, so conceived, may also play a distinctive social role, enabling what I term 'transparent fellow-feeling'.

The debate about direct perception encompasses different topics, one of which concerns the richness of the contents of perceptual experiences. Can we directly perceive only low-level properties, like edges, colors etc. (the sparse-content view), or can we perceive high-level properties and entities as well (the liberal-content view)? The aim of the paper is to defend the claim that the content of our perceptual experience can include emotions and also person impressions. Using these examples, an argument is developed to defend a liberal-content view for core examples of social cognition. This view is developed and contrasted with accounts which claim that in the case of registering another person's emotion while seeing them, we have to describe the relevant content not as the content of a perceptual experience, but of a perceptual belief. The paper defends the view that perceptual experiences can have a rich content yet remain separable from beliefs formed on the basis of the experience. How liberal and enriched the content of a perceptual experience is will depend upon the expertise a person has developed in the field. This is supported by the argument that perceptual experiences can be systematically enriched by perceiving affordances of objects, by pattern recognition or by top-down processes, as analyzed by processes of cognitive penetration or predictive coding.