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PurposeExport manufacturing firms from emerging markets can better meet customer needs by providing customization, which leads to competitive advantages. Although both practice and academic research have deeply discussed customization, the question of whether customization promotes export manufacturing firms' product innovation in the global B2B market is largely unexplored. The purpose of this paper is to address this issue.Design/methodology/approachThis paper collects survey data from 2,248 export manufacturing firms in China and uses hierarchical moderated regression to explore the relationship between customization and product innovation in the global B2B market and their boundary conditions.FindingsThis research shows that customization positively affects export manufacturing firms' product innovation in the context of the global B2B market, and it shows that internal governance structure (contract governance and relationship governance) and external governance structure (legal enforceability) can be used as boundary conditions that affect the relationship. Specifically, contract governance has an inverted U-shaped moderating effect on the relationship between customization and product innovation; moreover, relationship governance and legal enforceability can strengthen the positive relationship between customization and product innovation.Originality/valueThe study explores the relationship between customization and product innovation in the global B2B market and examines the moderating effect of internal and external governance structures. In addition, the study enriches the research related to customization and product innovation in the context of the global B2B market and provides essential practical insight into the survival of export manufacturing firms from emerging markets.

PurposeThis paper aims to examine the nature of corporate governance systems in Ghanaian Family-owned Businesses (FOBs). Specifically, the study investigates the nature of boardroom decisions structures, sources of governance regulations and family roles in corporate governance.Design/methodology/approachDrawing on Bourdieusian perspectives of the field, capital, habitus and doxa, a case study design is used to gather detailed insights about the phenomena. Purposively, the study conducts 20 interviews with participants from 15 FOBs in Ghana. The interview data are complemented with secondary sources, such as FOB handbooks, website information, legal documents and scriptures. Subsequently, data gathered were thematically analysed.FindingsThe study finds that human actors blended traditionally tacit and legally expressed boardroom decisions structures in FOBs governance. Again, traditional values, social acceptance of religious sociology and regulatory frameworks of the field dictate corporate governance practices in FOBs. In multiple family ownerships, orthodoxy of doxa is challenged; hence, power struggles and family roles in governance depend on capital possessed by social actors.Practical implicationsTo continue as a going concern, FOBs must be mindful of traditional, religious sociology of family and regulatory frameworks within the field in which they operate. This is because, without this, the going concern of FOBs becomes suspicious and highly unlikely, especially where there are multiple family ownership and generations.Originality/valueThe previous literature predominantly focussed on formal boardroom structures in addressing FOBs' corporate governance issues. Notwithstanding, family governance risk of domineering and distrust associated with traditional and relational governance mechanisms remain under-represented and inconclusive, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Through interviews and comparison of practices in two Chinese cities, this article argues that local governments are forced to shift some of their excessive responsibilities to new actors. This produces a limited kind of pluralism: government organizations remain in charge of community governance.

The objective of this study is to analyze the choice between internal and external supplier at the manufacturing stage in the Brazilian pharmaceutical industry. We developed a structural equation model with hypotheses on experience, diversification, asset specificity, and vertical integration. We collected data for 1566 drugs registry, including its pharmaceutical form, therapeutic class and operation time of the firm and group. We found that the higher the experience, the lower the vertical integration in the manufacturing stage and a clear mediating effect of experience on the relationship between diversification and vertical integration. As firms advance in experience and the spread of the capabilities throughout the industry, agents concentrate activities on the relevant stages in value creation and strategically outsource the manufacturing. As the firm increases the diversification in the product portfolio, the experience favours the building of capabilities to manage the production lines and strategies for outsourcing. This result suggests a low risk for strategic alliances at the manufacturing stage.

Objective: The objective of the article is to determine the effect of governance structure components (audit committee presence, board size adequacy, and board leadership) on SMEs’ performance and the moderating effect of chief executive officer (CEO) tenure on the influence of governance structure on SMEs’ performance in Ghanaian context. Research Design Methods: We sampled 145 respondents from selected SMEs in the Ghanaian manufacturing, telecommunication, and financial sectors for the study. All selected participants completed questionnaires on governance structure and shared their informed perception of the enterprises’ performance. The data gathered were analysed using multiple regression analysis and Hayes’ process macro. Findings: The results indicated that board leadership, the presence of an audit committee, and board size adequacy do not significantly influence SMEs’ performance. The results further revealed that CEO tenure is a significant negative moderator to the influence of the governance structure on SMEs’ performance. Implications Recommendations: Future studies must focus on how SMEs in Ghana can put CEOs and board succession plans in place so as to ensure creativity/innovation. Contribution Value Added: This study contributes to the body of knowledge relating to the governance structure’s influence on various indicators of business performance of SMEs in Ghana. Therefore, this study sought to assess the contribution of corporate governance structures to the performance of SMEs in Ghana. This would help SMEs to know which aspects of their governance structure should be strengthened to effectively contribute to their success.

Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD+) requires harmonizing different policy sectors and interests that have impacts on forests. However, these elements have not been well-operationalized in environmental policy-making processes of most developing countries. Drawing on five cases—Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Papua New Guinea, and Vietnam, this article aims to determine whether emerging governance arrangements help REDD+ development by delivering participatory mechanisms for policy coordination. Building upon literature on environmental governance and stakeholder participation, the article examines national governance structures for REDD+ and identifies who participates where, and what decision-making powers they have. Despite structural differences between the countries, our analysis illustrates that REDD+ potentially encourages a new form of environmental governance promoting a cross-sectoral approach and stakeholder participation. Cohesiveness of the structures within a broader governance system is key to defining the capacity of REDD+ governance. The result also poses a question as to the inclusiveness of the state actors involved in order to tackle the different pressure on forests. Considering structural inequalities, the analysis further suggests a need of policy support for those who are affected by REDD+ to ensure that their voices could be heard in decision-making processes.

Governance structures are described as a spectrum with the market and vertical integration as its poles. During the past decades, the theoretical and empirical work aligned with New Institutional Economics sought to understand the factors that determine which transactions will run through the market and which will run within the firms. However, the existence of plural forms of institutional arrangements in the same productive chain defies logic theories that study the vertical borders of the firms. Thus, the goal of this article is to investigate these plural forms in the Free Contracting Environment of the Brazilian Electricity Industry. We used a qualitative approach and resorted to a case study strategy in order to understand the adoption of distinct governance structures within a single transaction. Our analysis suggests five propositions that can be tested. Theses propositions are related to manager's background, market price volatility, legal delays, type of ownership and institutional environment, and effects of innovation on the governance structure.

There are three main drivers of economic globalization in the latter half of the 20th century: investment by transnational corporations, international trade, and the Internet. Whereas producer-driven and buyer-driven commodity chains characterize the phases of investment-based and trade-based globalization, respectively, the emergence of the Internet in the mid-1990s heralds a new age of digital globalization. The explosion in connectivity that is enabled by the Internet has launched an e-commerce revolution that is beginning to transform the structure of business-to-business (B2B) as well as business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions in global industries. New infomediaries that navigate access to rich information and greater reach by businesses and consumers are prominent in B2C digital networks. The Internet's most significant impact to date, however, has been in B2B markets, where e-commerce is reshaping the competitive dynamics and power alignments in traditional producer-driven and buyer-driven commodity chains such as automobiles and apparel.

This study aims to enrich our understanding of the relationship between political connections and the adoption of environmental corporate socially responsible (ECSR) investments. In addition to the individual-level political connections, i.e., entrepreneurs' personal ties to government officials, we propose in China the creation of Communist Party of China (CPC) branches in privately owned firms serve as organizational and institutionalized dimensions of political connection building. Drawing on the social exchange theory, this paper details how CPC branches function in privately owned firms and how entrepreneurs are motivated by the reciprocal logic to engage in ECSR. We also supplement this main effect by examining the boundary conditions of it at the firm and regional level. Using a dataset with 17,690 firm observations in China, we find that the existence of CPC branches gives rise to the ECSR investments and the firm-level contingencies such as centralized governance and financial constraints, and the regional-level contingencies such as the development of the market system, are important moderators that shape the association of political links and ECSR investments. These findings have ample implications to understand the ECSR activities and extend social exchange theory beyond the individual level on which it is typically applied.

PurposeChallenging the static view of family business governance, we propose a model of owner–manager relationships derived from the configurational analysis of managerial behavior and change in governance structure.Design/methodology/approachStemming from social exchange theory and building on the 4C model proposed by Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005), we consider the evolving owner–manager relationship in four main configurations. On the one hand, we account for family businesses shifting from a generalized to a restricted exchange system, and vice versa, according to whether a family manager misbehaves in a stewardship-oriented governance structure or a nonfamily manager succeeds in building a trusting relationship in an agency-oriented governance structure. On the other hand, we consider that family firms will strengthen a generalized exchange system, rather than a restricted one, according to whether a family manager contributes to the stewardship-oriented culture in the business or a nonfamily manager proves to be driven by extrinsic rewards. Four scenarios are analyzed in terms of the managerial behavior and governance structure that characterize the phases of the relationship between owners and managers.FindingsVarious factors trigger managerial behavior, making the firm deviate from or further build on what is assumed by stewardship and agency theories (i.e. proorganizational versus opportunistic behavior, respectively), which determine the governance structure over time. Workplace deviance, asymmetric altruism and patriarchy on the one hand, and proorganizational behavior, relationship building and long-term commitment on the other, are found to determine how the manager behaves and thus characterize the owner's reactions in terms of governance mechanisms. This enables us to present a dynamic view of governance structures, which adapt to the actual attitudes and behaviors of employed managers.Research limitations/implicationsAs time is a relevant dimension affecting individual behavior and triggering change in an organization, one must consider family business governance as being dynamic in nature. Moreover, it is not family membership that determines the most appropriate governance structure but the owner–manager relationship that evolves over time, thus contributing to the 4C model.Originality/valueThe proposed model integrates social exchange theory and the 4C model to predict changes in governance structure, as summarized in the final framework we propose.