Explore the vast range of titles available.

With the expanding awareness of worldwide governments to ecological issues, the idea of protecting the environment has been initiated into the supply chain. The role of government in green supply chain management has become especially significant. This paper proposes a green supply chain model with a duopoly structure, in which two manufacturers separately produce green and non-green items sold through a common retailer. The government looks for social advantages and decides subsidies for the green item and taxes for non-green items. Using a centralized and decentralized model, two cases of government interference and no government interference are analyzed with customer green preference. This study focuses on exploring the pricing strategy, greening strategy and comparing the optimal decisions in all the cases to maximize the overall profitability of the supply chain. Numerical results and sensitivity analysis illustrate how the government subsidy on green products and tax policy in non-green products can influence the profitability of supply chain members. The research finding can give valuable experiences to channel members of the supply chain to settle optimum choices with and without government interference by enhancing the green and non-green item market competition. Among the competitive duopoly structure, the centralized model makes more profit and leads to manufactured eco-friendly items.

The development of the sustainable economy has gradually become a consensus, and corporate social responsibility (CSR) is the key to achieving the sustainable development. However due to the implementation of CSR will increase the cost burden of enterprises, some companies are even unwilling to fulfill CSR. At this time, the government often encourages companies to fulfill CSR through subsidies, and consumers are willing to pay a higher price for CSR products. Therefore, this article focuses on the supply chain decision-making analysis problem in the sustainable supply chain. Based on consumer preference for CSR products, considering CSR and government subsidies, some relevant models are constructed to analyze decisions under different power structures and different subsidy situations, then the article compares them and finally draws relevant conclusions. The study found that the higher the consumer's preference, the higher the product sales and CSR level. In addition, government subsidies to manufacturers or consumers have the same effect. Among the three power structures, the overall benefit of supply chain is the highest in VN (Vertical Nash) power structure, so the government should play a leading role and try to narrow any possible gap of channel power.

As an effective mode for resource recovery, remanufacturing has been widely recognized in practice and academia. However, coordination is needed and multi-uncertainties exist in a remanufacturing supply chain (RSC). Under a retailer collection mode, this paper extends the existing studies on a revenue-sharing mechanism for a forward supply chain to examine how to coordinate a RSC between a remanufacturer and a retailer by developing a mathematical model. This model considers two types of uncertainties, they are, the stochastic remanufacturability rate from the supply side of used products and the random demand occurring in remarketing of remanufactured products. This study fills the research gap on RSC coordination under the multi-uncertainty environment. Moreover, it introduces an iterative algorithm (the Newton–Raphson Method) to deal with difficulty in solving the implicit function of the payment to consumers under the non-uniform demand distribution by finding the approximate value. The research results show that a revenue-sharing contract for a RSC with multi-uncertainties can increase profit for the whole RSC as well as the remanufacturer and the retailer by eliminating double marginalization. Besides, the government subsidy to the remanufacturer can motivate the retailer to collect more used products under a revenue-sharing case since the retailer can share benefits of the whole RSC. A case study of remanufactured truck engines demonstrates benefits of the proposed revenue-sharing mechanism and the profit increase for the whole RSC with the government subsidy.

This paper investigates a green supply chain (GSC) consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer who possesses private demand forecast information. To promote green consumption, the government may provide subsidies to consumers. Within a dynamic game where the manufacturer serves as the leader and the retailer acts as the follower, three cases are examined: centralized decision, decentralized decision with and without demand forecast information sharing between the retailer and the manufacturer. We mainly examine the value of information sharing on the decisions of a GSC in the context of government subsidies for consumers. We find that: (i) demand forecast information sharing benefits the manufacturer but damages the retailer; (ii) if the predicted value is higher than the determinate part of the demand, the manufacturer is willing to choose a higher green degree of products in the case with information sharing compared with that without information sharing; otherwise, the manufacturer is willing to choose a lower green degree of products; (iii) a two-part tariff contract is appropriate to coordinate the GSC and it is effective in increasing the green degree of products; (iv) information sharing benefits the GSC if the green production efficiency is high enough; (v) the ex-ante social welfare always increases with information accuracy. Finally, numerical analyses are conducted to verify the above findings.

Promoting the development of new energy vehicles is one of the important measures to ensure energy security and deal with global warming. Technological innovation is an inexhaustible driving force for the development of the new energy vehicle industry. This study considered listed enterprises in China’s new energy vehicle industry as research samples and used the fixed effect model to study the impact of government subsidies on the quantity and quality of technological innovation in the new energy vehicle industry. The empirical results show that government subsidies have a significant positive impact on the quantity of technological innovation in the new energy vehicle industry; however, government subsidies have no significant impact on the quality of technological innovation. Government subsidies increase the quantity of technological innovation in the new energy vehicle industry by increasing R&D investment, mitigating financing constraints, and improving the external attention of enterprises. Compared to downstream enterprises in the industrial chain, government subsidies have a better incentive effect on the technological innovation of upstream enterprises, which increases the number of patents and enhances the quality of utility model patents. Government subsidies have a better effect on promoting the quantity of technological innovation in large enterprises.

In the context of increasing global macroeconomic policy uncertainty, the effectiveness of Chinese government subsidies in promoting the business resilience of electric vehicle (EV) enterprises and the sustainable development of the EV industry has attracted significant attention. This paper utilizes panel data from Chinese listed EV companies from 2013 to 2022 to examine the impact of government subsidies on the business resilience of these enterprises. It also analyzes the moderating roles of corporate ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) performance and technological capability. This study finds that government subsidies significantly enhance business resilience, particularly for companies with a high ESG performance and a strong technological capability, which can better leverage these subsidies to further enhance their resilience amidst market fluctuations and uncertainties. Moreover, as an external support measure, government subsidies complement internal corporate factors like ESG performance and technological capability, promoting the sustainable development of the industry. Policymakers should consider corporate ESG performance and technological capability when designing subsidy programs to maximize their effectiveness.

This study examines the incentive effects of government subsidies on the R&D activities of listed companies of new energy vehicle (NEV)s from the perspective of the industrial chain. Our research contributes to a better understanding of the impact of government subsidies on the R&D activities of NEV companies. The main empirical results have three aspects. Firstly, government subsidies are effective in promoting R&D investments and non-inventive patent output in the NEV industry, but their impact on more challenging inventive patent output is not significant. Secondly, the efficiency of the impact of government subsidies on different stages of the NEV industry chain varies. The subsidies have a small and statistically insignificant impact on R&D investment and output of upstream enterprises, and there is a slight crowding out effect on patent output. The subsidies have the greatest incentive effect on the R&D investment of midstream enterprises, which is 2.5 times that of upstream enterprises and 1.7 times that of downstream enterprises. However, the impact of subsidies on the patent output of midstream enterprises is not significant. Thirdly, further analysis shows that there is a threshold for government subsidies on enterprise patent applications, which is 21.5438. When the subsidies are less than the threshold, they have no significant impact on innovation output. Only when the subsidies exceed the threshold will subsidies significantly increase innovation output. In conclusion, we suggest that the government considers the different characteristics of the upstream, midstream, and downstream enterprises and the threshold effect when subsidizing the NEV industry.

Purpose This paper aims to explore the effect of different government subsidy decisions and the differences between the consequences of these decisions when supply chain members engage in cooperative green innovation through cost-sharing arrangements. Design/methodology/approach This paper investigates the optimal decisions for green supply chains under two types of subsidies, including subsidies for green innovation research and development (R&D) costs and subsidies for consumers, by integrating game theory with numerical simulation. Findings The optimal R&D cost-sharing ratio is found to be 2/3 for manufacturers and 1/3 for retailers. Under any subsidy policy, the supply chain can achieve maximum total profit. When the supply chain adopts the optimal R&D cost-sharing ratio, subsidies for green innovation R&D costs prove to be the most effective in increasing the supply chain’s profit. However, from the perspective of total social welfare, the analysis reveals that government subsidies to consumers are more beneficial for promoting overall social welfare. Originality/value Previous studies on green supply chain decisions have primarily focused on either government subsidies or corporate cost sharing in isolation. In contrast, this study combines both government subsidies and cost sharing within a unified framework for a more comprehensive analysis. Additionally, this paper examines the impact of government subsidies on supply chain cost-sharing decisions and their effect on overall social welfare while considering the presence of cost sharing and using the combination of theoretical modeling and simulation analysis.

The influence of online and offline dual recycling channels in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) is investigated in our work. The CLSC models of three recycling modes (single online recycling, single offline recycling, and dual recycling channels of online and offline) are established, respectively, and the impact of government subsidies on the pricing decision-making and recycling mode selection of channel members is therefore researched. The study found that the remanufacturer sets appropriate recycling price and transfer price to coordinate online and offline recycling channels and maximize its profits in the dual recycling modes; collector’s offline recycling faces the competitive threat of remanufacturers’ online recycling under the dual recycling modes, so the collector prefers a single offline recycling mode; the relationship between the collection quantities of the three modes depends on consumers’ preference of the online recycling channel. In the meanwhile, it is illustrated that government subsidy plays a positive role in promoting the recycling and remanufacturing willingness of remanufacturers and collectors. This work provides practical insights for the CLSC system to make recycle decisions.

PurposeBuild-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts are widely used in the construction and operation of charging piles for new energy vehicles worldwide and stipulate that governments grant charging pile operators franchises for a certain period of time to invest in the construction and operation of the charging piles. The charging piles are then transferred to governments when the concession expires. To encourage charging pile operators to build and operate charging piles, governments usually provide two kinds of subsidies, namely construction and operating subsidies.Design/methodology/approachThe authors establish a typical game model to study the optimal BOT contract between a government and a charging pile operator and their preferences for the two kinds of subsidies.FindingsFirst, the authors show that there are substitution and complementarity effects between the concession period and the subsidy level. Second, the operator prefers the construction subsidy (operating subsidy) when the additional operating cost is low (high). The government prefers the operating subsidy (construction subsidy) when consumer sensitivity to the number of charging piles is low (high) and the concession period is short or long (moderate). Finally, the adjusted joint subsidy can not only improve social welfare but also that the charging pile operator can obtain the same profit as under the operating subsidy at a lower subsidy amount.Originality/valueThis work develops the first analytical model to study two subsidies in the construction and operation of charging piles and investigate the optimal BOT contract and subsidy preferences. The insights are compelling not only for the charging pile operator but also for policymakers in practice from a circular economy perspective.