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Unequal political participation increasingly challenges democracies. The turnout gap is particularly large among younger voters, with severe implications for future developments of democratic representation, legitimacy, and quality. This article focuses on the role of political efficacy beliefs in explaining unequal turnout among newly enfranchised citizens. We argue that internal political efficacy beliefs are particularly important for turnout among the newly enfranchised from lower-class backgrounds, as they lack alternative mobilizing factors such as politically aware and active parents, political knowledge, and mobilizing networks. Furthermore, we argue that once these voters successfully turn out in their first election, they are as likely as those from higher-class backgrounds to turn out in their second election. We empirically test these arguments using original longitudinal data on newly enfranchised citizens from three German federal states (Bundesländer). Overall, our results support the argument: Political efficacy beliefs are a stronger predictor of first turnout among young adults from disadvantaged backgrounds compared to those from more advantaged backgrounds, and those who do turn out are as likely as those with higher-class backgrounds to turn out in their second election. This highlights the relevance of political efficacy beliefs in the (re)production of persisting political inequality.

Habit is a frequently mentioned but understudied cause of political action. This article provides the first direct test of the hypothesis that casting a ballot in one election increases one's propensity to go to the polls in the future. A field experiment involving 25,200 registered voters was conducted prior to the November general election of 1998. Subjects were randomly assigned to treatment conditions in which they were urged to vote through direct mail or face-to-face canvassing. Compared to a control group that received no contact, the treatment groups were significantly more likely to vote in 1998. The treatment groups were also significantly more likely to vote in local elections held in November of 1999. After deriving a statistical estimator to isolate the effect of habit, we find that, ceteris paribus, voting in one election substantially increases the likelihood of voting in the future. Indeed, the influence of past voting exceeds the effects of age and education reported in previous studies.

Individuals who vote in one election are more likely to vote in the next. Yet modelling the causal relationship between past and current voting decisions is intrinsically difficult, as this positive association can exist due to habit formation or unobserved heterogeneity. This article overcomes this problem using longitudinal data from the British National Child Development Study (NCDS) to examine voter turnout across three elections. It distinguishes between unobserved heterogeneity caused by fixed individual characteristics and the initial conditions problem, which occurs when voting behavior in a previous, but unobserved, period influences current voting behavior. It finds that, controlling for fixed effects, unobserved heterogeneity has little impact on the estimated degree of habit in voter turnout; however, failing to control for initial conditions reduces the estimate by a half. The results imply that voting in one election increases the probability of voting in a subsequent election by 13%.

It is conventional to speak of voting as \"habitual.\" But what does this mean? In psychology, habits are cognitive associations between repeated responses and stable features of the performance context. Thus, \"turnout habit\" is best measured by an index of repeated behavior and a consistent performance setting. Once habit associations form, the response can be cued even in the absence of supporting beliefs and motivations. Therefore, variables that form part of the standard cognitive-based accounts of turnout should be more weakly related to turnout among those with a strong habit. We draw evidence from a large array of ANES surveys to test these hypotheses and find strong support.

Bendor, Diermeier, and Ting (2003) develop a behavioral alternative to rational choice models of turnout. However, the assumption they make about the way individuals adjust their probability of voting biases their model towards their main result of significant turnout in large populations. Moreover, the assumption causes individuals to engage in casual voting (sometimes people vote and sometimes they abstain). This result is at odds with a substantial literature that indicates most people engage in habitual voting (they either always vote or always abstain). I develop an alternative model to show how feedback in the probability adjustment mechanism affects the behavioral model. The version of this model without feedback yields both high turnout and habitual voting.

Habitual offender laws operate to increase the sentence of an individual if that person already has a felony conviction. At the same time, many people with felony convictions cannot vote or run for office due to felony disenfranchisement laws. Thus, habitual offender laws target a formally disenfranchised group—people with felony convictions. That creates an archetypal political process problem. As John Hart Ely argued, laws that target a formally disenfranchised group are tainted and deserve heightened constitutional scrutiny. When reviewing habitual offender laws under the Eighth Amendment, however, courts have applied the opposite of heightened scrutiny—they have applied an extreme form of deference for decades. This phenomenon of deference despite disenfranchisement creates a cruel democratic purgatory. It is the institutional equivalent of disenfranchising people with pre-existing health conditions, passing a health insurance law that excludes them, and then declining to hear their constitutional challenges out of deference to the democratic process. Or disenfranchising women, criminalizing abortion, and shutting the courthouse door. This Article describes this dysfunctional dynamic and offers a solution: if a court is reviewing a habitual offender law from a state with felony disenfranchisement, it should apply heightened scrutiny, not deference.

This paper aims to deliver experimental evidence on the dispute between two behavioral models of electoral turnout. Both models share the idea that the subjects' voting propensities are updated from their past propensities, aspirations, and realized payoffs. However, they differ in the exact specification of the feedback mechanism. The first model has a strong feedback mechanism toward 50 percent, while the other has only moderate feedback. This difference leads to two distinct distributions of voter types: the first model generates more casual voters who vote and abstain from time to time. The latter generates more habitual voting behavior. Thus far, the latter model seemed to be better supported empirically because survey data reveal more habitual voters and abstainers than casual voters. Given that the two models differ in their propensity updating mechanism in dynamic processes, a more direct test of their assumptions as well as implications with survey data is still pending. We designed a laboratory experiment in which subjects repeatedly make turnout and voting decisions. The result from experimental data is mixed, but more supportive of the second model with habitual voters and abstainers.

Does asking people about their future behavior increase or decrease the likelihood that they will repeat their past behavior? In two laboratory and two field experiments, we find that behavior prediction strengthens behavior repetition, making people more likely to do what they normally do, when personal norms regarding engaging in a behavior are weak or not easily accessible. However, when personal norms are strong or made accessible at the time of the prediction request, behavior prediction weakens behavior repetition and increases the likelihood that people do what they think they should do—even if it’s not what they normally would do. These findings provide new tools for influencing behavior repetition, reconcile some seemingly contradictory past findings, and contribute to the debate regarding the relative importance of habits and intentions in guiding behavior.

\"64 Since the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court has extended the Eighth Amendment to cover less traditional cruel and unusual punishments three times.65 The first case adjudging a punishment to be cruel and unusual punishment occurred when a man was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment for falsifying a public and official document.66 The Court chose to administer a modern interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.67 The second case adjudicating a punishment to be within the confines of cruel and unusual punishment occurred when a United States Army private was convicted of desertion, and sentenced to three years hard labor, loss of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge.68 Trop later applied for a passport but was denied under Section 401(g) of the amended 1940 Nationality Act.69 The Court extended the Eighth Amendment, finding the punishment to be cruel and unusual.70 The third case declaring a punishment falls under the cruel and unusual punishment clause involved a state statute making addiction of narcotics a criminal offense.71 The Court determined that laws imprisoning people afflicted with narcotic addictions constituted cruel and unusual punishment.72 The Court provided that if addiction was criminal, then \"to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease\" also had the potential to be criminalized.73 Felon disenfranchisement does not neatly fit into any of the previously mentioned cases where the Court identified cruel and unusual punishment.74 Generally, felon disenfranchisement matches closest with Trop v. Dulles and the punishment of expatriation.75 However, depriving felons of voting rights is often not viewed as a punishment, but rather a non-penal exercise of the state's power to regulate the franchise.76 The legislature and the states, alternatively, find that evidence would exist if the framers considered disenfranchisement laws punishment.77 Because a majority of the states exclude felons from voting, courts refuse to consider these statutes cruel and unusual punishment.78 III. \"88 Even when a person has challenged a felon disenfranchisement law in Pennsylvania, the courts have denied the claims as being unconstitutional because clearly the disenfranchisement laws were so limited a court could not consider them excessive.89 Pennsylvania's lenient felon disenfranchisement laws allow an ex-felon to regain his voting rights the moment he completes his sentence, unlike Florida and Tennessee.90 The only way Pennsylvania could implement more lenient felon disenfranchisement laws would be to have no restrictions whatsoever on a felon's voting rights during incarceration.91 Since its first ratification in 1776, the Pennsylvania Constitution has allowed the state to create disenfranchisement laws so long as it resides within the framework of the Pennsylvania Constitution.92 The United States Supreme Court has argued that because felon disenfranchisement laws have existed throughout united States' history, the founders must have considered these laws constitutional and within a state's power to regulate.93 However, the Court has ignored that other states, like Pennsylvania, were choosing to implement these laws in a less restrictive manner.94 While the law requires some rights to be given during a prison sentence, a mass majority of the states recognize that voting rights do not have to be provided during a prison sentence.95 However, states like Tennessee and Florida choose to continue to suppress a felon's right to vote long after he or she has been released.96 Unlike Florida and Tennessee, Pennsylvania also has chosen to provide this previously restricted right back to an exfelon at the first opportunity available.97 After all, the United States Supreme Court has held that the right to vote freely is the essence of a democratic society and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of a representative government.98 Unlike Tennessee and Florida, Pennsylvania recognizes that the denial of voting rights to felons should only be used in the most limited of circumstances.99 Despite recognizing that some suppression of voting rights for felons is constitutional, Pennsylvania courts have been quick to revoke felon disenfranchisement laws that place unnecessary burdens on felons, which is significantly different than other states.100 When faced with the Pennsylvania Voting Rights Act that required a waiting period for exfelons to regain their rights back, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth court chose to overrule it.101 The court reiterated that it made no sense to install a waiting period on some but not all felons.102 Pennsylvania's felon disenfranchisement laws are ideal, as Pennsylvania recognizes the importance of voting but also acknowledges that under certain circumstances, the right to vote should be denied.103 Pennsylvania's laws serve as a stark contrast when compared against Florida and Tennessee's felon disenfranchisement laws.104 Florida boasts the most disenfranchised group of voters in America with nearly 1.5 million disenfranchised felons.105 Tennessee only disenfranchises 421,277 ex-felons; however, this still accounts for over eight percent of its adult population.106 Combined, both Florida and Tennessee disenfranchise nearly two million ex-felons.107 Both Florida and Tennessee enacted laws denying those convicted of infamous crimes from voting.108 Currently, no person convicted of any infamous crime in Florida is allowed to vote until the governor restores his civil rights.109 This greatly contrasts with Tennessee, where those convicted of the infamous crimes of murder, rape, treason, or voter fraud are permanently disenfranchised.110 Unlike Pennsylvania, where felons must merely finish their prison sentence, both Florida and Tennessee place their felons into categories that determine when voting rights can be restored, if ever.111 Permanently disenfranchising a felon who committed murder or rape is far less of an injustice than permanently disenfranchising a felon who committed an astronomically less morally offensive crime, such as a non-violent drug felony.112 While Tennessee denies a felon the right to vote because he has committed a horrendous crime like rape or murder, Florida denies felons who commit crimes, such as a non-violent drug offense or bribery, from voting almost permanently.113 This partially accounts for the high amount of disenfranchised felons in Florida.114 The Florida courts have consistently chosen to ignore the astronomical amount of disenfranchised felons despite having a clear record that these types of laws are racially discriminative.115 Florida courts have reasoned that the denial of voting rights following a felony conviction is a longstanding and quite common practice.116 While this reasoning is true, even Pennsylvania recognizes that placing insurmountable barriers that result in a complete and permanent denial of a voter's rights does not create a better society.117 In order to maintain their 1.5 million disenfranchised voters in Florida, a waiting period of five to seven years is often required after the completion of incarceration, probation, and parole before a felon can even begin the process of restoring his voting rights.118 However, even if a felon waits the required minimum five years, a governor, with the help of his Clemency Board, may decide to give him back the right to vote discretionally.119 This discretion, in addition to the mandatory waiting period, prevents most felons in Florida from ever gaining their right to vote back.120 Although Tennessee does not have a mandatory waiting period, Tennessee requires felons not convicted of the infamous crimes of rape, murder, treason, or voter fraud to apply for a court order to restore voting rights.121 While Tennessee's felon disenfranchisement laws seem to require a simple process for an ex-felon to follow, its application is far more complicated.122 Like in Florida, a court in Tennessee retains the right to restore an ex-felon's voting rights discretionally.123 Unlike in Pennsylvania, a series of complex exceptions make it difficult for convicted felons in both Tennessee and Florida to ascertain when a felon might regain his right to vote.124 Specifically, the felon disenfranchisement laws in Tennessee require that those convicted before 1986 petition to the court while prosecutors are given an opportunity to object; those convicted after 1996 are subject to the same rules but those convicted of infamous crimes are permanently disenfranchised; and those convicted between 1986 and 1996 may petition for administrative restoration of rights.125 Tennessee's requirements easily confuse felons in that state, potentially accounting for why so few felons have regained their right to vote.126 Additionally, Tennessee's laws require that an ex-felon pay his courtordered restitution and child support obligations before becoming eligible for voting rights, which also greatly hinders a felon's ability to quickly restore his voting rights.127 If a felon fails to comply, the court can deny a certificate of restoration.128 However, eligibility is not freely given, even if a felon meets these requirements.129 A state election coordinator will look at the eligibility of a felon and communicate to the administrator of elections whether or not a felon is truly eligible to gain back his voting rights; this act, too, is done discretionally.130 While Pennsylvania courts have recognized that restricting an incarcerated felon's rights is within their constitutional power, Pennsylvania has chosen not to implement laws that confuse and hinder any felons right to vote after being released from prison.131 Alternatively, both Florida and Tennessee have multiple requirements that both confuse and hinder the process.132 Court ordered restoration and Governor approved restoration results in only a small amount of felons restoring their rights after a period of nearly twe

The federal “Second Chance Act of 2005” calls for expanding reentry services for people leaving prison, yet existing policies restrict access to needed services for those with criminal records. We examined the interaction between individual-level characteristics and policy-level restrictions related to criminal conviction, and the likely effects on access to resources upon reentry, using a sample of prisoners with Axis I mental disorders (n=3073). We identified multiple challenges related to convictions, including restricted access to housing, public assistance, and other resources. Invisible punishments embedded within existing policies were inconsistent with the call for second chances. Without modification of federal and state policies, the ability of reentry services to foster behavioral health and community reintegration is limited.