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Background The difficulties in defining hate crime, hate incidents and hate speech, and in finding a common conceptual basis constitute a key barrier toward operationalisation in research, policy and programming. Definitions disagree about issues such as the identities that should be protected, the types of behaviours that should be referred to as hateful, and how the ‘hate element’ should be assessed. The lack of solid conceptual foundations is reflected in the absence of sound data. These issues have been raised since the early 1990s (Berk, 1990; Byers & Venturelli, 1994) but they proved to be an intractable problem that continues to affect this research and policy domain. Objectives Our systematic review has two objectives that are fundamentally connected: mapping (1) original definitions and (2) original measurement tools of hate crime, hate speech, hate incidents and surrogate terms, that is, alternative terms used for these concepts (e.g., prejudice‐motivated crime, bias crime, among many others). Search Methods We systematically searched over 19 databases to retrieve academic and grey literature, as well as legislation. In addition, we contacted 26 country experts and searched 211 websites, as well as bibliographies of published reviews of related literature, and scrutiny of annotated bibliographies of related literature. Inclusion Criteria This review included documents published after 1990 found in academic literature, grey literature and legislation. We included academic empirical articles with any study design, as well as theoretical articles that focused specifically on defining hate crime, hate speech, hate incidents or surrogate terms. We also reviewed current criminal or civil legislation that is intended to regulate forms of hate speech, hate incidents and hate crimes. Eligible countries included Canada, USA, UK, Ireland, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Australia and New Zealand. For documents to be included in relation to research objective (1), they had to contain at least one original definition of hate speech, hate incidents or hate crimes, or any surrogate term. For documents to be included in relation to research objective (2), they had to contain at least one original measurement tool of hate speech, hate incidents or hate crimes, or any surrogate term. Documents could be included in relation to both research objectives. Data Collection and Analysis The systematic search covered 1 January 1990 to 31 December 2021, with searches of academic databases conducted between 8th March and 12th April 2022 yielding 35,191 references. We carried out country‐specific searches for grey literature published in the same time period between 27th August and 2nd December 2021. These searches yielded a total of 2748 results. We coded characteristics of the definitions and measurement tools, including the protected characteristics, the approaches to categorise the ‘hate element’ and other variables. We used univariate and bivariate statistical methods for data analysis. We also carried out a social network analysis. Main Results We provide as annex complete lists of the original definitions and measurement tools that met our inclusion criteria, for the use of researchers and policy makers worldwide. We included 423 definitions and 168 measurement tools in academic and grey literature, and 83 definitions found in legislation. To support future research and policy work in this area, we included a synthetic assessment of the (1) the operationalisability of each definition and (2) the theoretical robustness and transparency of each measurement tool. Our mapping of the definitions and measurement tools revealed numerous significant trends, clusters and differences between and within definitions and measurement tools focusing on hate crime, hate speech and hate incidents. For example, definitions and measurement tools tend to focus more on ethnic and religious identities (e.g., racism, antisemitism, Islamophobia) compared to sexual, gender and disability‐related identities. This gap is greater in the definitions and measurement tools of hate speech than hate crime. Our analysis showed geographical patterns: hate crime definitions and measurement tools are more likely to originate from Anglophonic countries, especially the USA, but hate speech definitions and measurement tools are more likely to originate from continental Europe. In terms of disciplinary fragmentation, our social network analysis revealed that the collaboration and exchange of conceptual frameworks and methodological tools between social sciences and computer science is limited, with most definitions and measurement tools clustering along disciplinary lines. More detailed findings are presented in the results section of the report. Authors' Conclusions There is an urgent need to close the research and policy gap between the protections of ‘ethnic and religious identities’ and other (less) protected characteristics such as gender and sexual identities, age and disability. There is also an urgent need to improve the quality of methodological and reporting standards in research examining hate behaviours, including transparency in methodology and data reporting, and discussion of limitations (e.g., bias in data). Many of the measurement tools found in the academic literature were excluded because they did not report transparently how they collected and analysed the data. Further, 41% of documents presenting research on hate behaviours did not provide a definition of what they were looking at. Given the importance of this policy domain, it is vital to raise the quality and trustworthiness of research in this area. This review found that researchers in different disciplinary areas (e.g., social sciences and computer science) rarely collaborate. Future research should attempt to build on existing definitions and measurement tools (instead of duplicating efforts), and engage in more interdisciplinary collaborations. It is our hope that that this review can provide a solid foundation for researchers, government, and other bodies to build cumulative knowledge and collaboration in this important field.

Religious hate propaganda, which is sustained communication by an authority that attempts to guide an audience towards persecuting others based on religion, is a speech crime. Yet, it is one of the least understood and most difficult speech crimes to prosecute. This is due to misunderstandings and epistemic gaps regarding how persecutory language, which would otherwise have little significance for prosocial religious adherents, becomes meaningful for a religious community. Drawing from the cognitive science of religion (CSR), this article develops and explores the hypothesis that for some religious communities, discursive attacks on others become meaningful when they center on dangerous accusations. Dangerous accusations portray the other as capable of mystical harm and, when made by cultural authorities, become socially accepted truths if repeated during rituals of veridiction. This article shows that dangerous accusations are at the heart of religious hate propaganda and exploit cognitive biases for threat perception, coalitional psychology, and costly signaling. Moreover, dangerous accusations can reinforce the social order and maintain social cohesion. Together, an analysis of speech crimes and dangerous accusations shed light on how religious hate propaganda works, how it can offer meaning to religious communities, and how it can justify persecution in certain environments.

This article focuses on the development of the crime of incitement to genocide and the prohibition of hate propaganda. It first examines the conflict which exists between these and the right to freedom of speech and concludes that a limitation of this right through prohibition of hate propaganda and criminalization of incitement to genocide is justifiable. The article then analyses how the crime of incitement to genocide and the prohibition of hate propaganda first developed historically, focusing on judgments by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the Genocide Convention, on the one hand, and on international conventions and case law by the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights, on the other. Next, recent ICTR decisions are examined, in which the ICTR has considerably clarified and extended the concept of incitement to genocide. The tribunal has brought it closer to encompassing vicious hate propaganda by acknowledging that in order to incite individuals to commit genocide, incitement in the sense of instigation is insufficient; it requires the prior creation of a certain climate in which the commission of such crimes is possible. Hate propaganda leads to the creation of such a climate. It is argued that, for several reasons, virulent hate propaganda must be accorded the status of an international crime. Genocide could be prevented more effectively if such speech were criminalized. Several efforts to outlaw hate propaganda internationally in the past are examined. The article concludes that it can be regarded as a crime punishable under the Genocide Convention if a purposive interpretative approach is used, and that hate propagandists should be prosecuted for direct and public incitement to genocide if their hate speech is engaged in with the specific intent to commit genocide, and creates a substantial danger of genocide.

Resumen: El 21 de diciembre de 1965, la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas emitía una señal de alarma ante las constantes manifestaciones de discriminación racial y por las políticas gubernamentales basadas en la superioridad y el odio racial. De aquella asamblea surgió un Convenio por el que se condenaba toda la propaganda y toda organización basada en la superioridad de una raza o grupo de personas de un determinado color u origen étnico; declarando ilegales las actividades organizadas de propaganda, y cualquiera que promoviese la discriminación racial e incitara a ella. Un año después, el 16 de diciembre de 1966, la misma asamblea anunciaba otro pacto internacional por el que se prohibía toda propaganda en favor de la guerra, toda apología del odio nacional, racial o religioso que incitara a la discriminación, la hostilidad o la violencia. Ambos fueron aceptados y ratificados ampliamente en el panorama internacional, sin embargo, pasadas más de cuatro décadas continuamos entre cenit y nadir. Desde entonces, el panorama helvético no ha sido ajeno a las manifestaciones de superioridad y odio. Su constatable histórica hospitalidad se ha visto doblegada en los últimos años; facilitada por un lado, por el escepticismo helvético en la aceptación del Derecho Internacional, y, por otro más influyente, ante la escalada de partidos políticos ultra conservadores, que a través de sus discursos y propaganda han logrado en numerosas ocasiones doblegar la voluntad del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos y el propio nacional en contra de las minorías que consideran que desafían los valores histórico-culturales helvéticos. Abstract: On December 21 of 1965, the General Assembly of the United Nations sent out an alarm signal because of the constant manifestations of racial discrimination and because of the governmental policies based on racial superiority or hatred. Result of that assembly was an agreement which condemned all propaganda and all organisations based on the superiority of one race or groups of persons of a specific skin colour or ethnic origin. It declared as illegal all organised propaganda activities, and anyone that would promote the racial discrimination and incite to it. One year later, on December 16 of 1966, the same assembly announced another international agreement by which it prohibited any propaganda for war, any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that incites discrimination, hostility or violence. Both were widely accepted and internationally ratified. However, more than four decades later, we still stand between Zenith and Nadir. Also Switzerland was not immune to these manifestations of superiority and hatred. Its famous historical hospitality has been affected in recent years; on one hand, due to Swiss skepticism in accepting international law, and on the other, because of the rise of ultra conservative political parties, which, through their speeches and propaganda, have managed in numerous occasions, to incite against minorities by breaking the international law of human rights and the national law. Minorities, who they consider threatening to the Swiss cultural and historical values .

The popular encrypted messaging and chat app WhatsApp played a key role in the election of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro in 2018. The present study builds on this knowledge and showcases how the app continued to be used in a governmental operation spreading false and misleading information popularly known in Brazil as the Office of Hatred (OOH). By harnessing in-depth expert interviews with documentarians of the office’s daily operations—researchers, journalists, and fact-checkers (N = 10)—this study draws up a chronology of the OOH. Via this methodological approach, we trace and chronologize events, actions, and actors associated with the OOH. Specifically, findings (a) document the rise of antipetismo and disinformation campaigns associated with attacks on the Brazilian Worker’s party from 2012 until the election of Bolsonaro in 2018, (b) describe the emergence of the OOH at the heels of the election and subsequent radicalization in WhatsApp groups, (c) provide an overview of the types of disinformation that are spread on the app by the OOH, and (d) illustrate how the OOH operates by mapping key actors and places, communicative strategies, and audiences. These findings are discussed in light of ramifications that government-sponsored forms of disinformation might have in other antidemocratic polities marked by strongman populist leadership.

Today’s youth have extensive access to the internet and frequently engage in social networking activities using various social media platforms and devices. This is a phenomenon that hate groups are exploiting when disseminating their propaganda. This study seeks to better understand youth exposure to hateful material in the online space by exploring predictors of such exposure including demographic characteristics (age, gender, and race), academic performance, online behaviors, online disinhibition, risk perception, and parents/guardians’ supervision of online activities. We implemented a cross-sectional study design, using a paper questionnaire, in two high schools in Massachusetts (USA), focusing on students 14 to 19 years old. Logistic regression models were used to study the association between independent variables (demographics, online behaviors, risk perception, parental supervision) and exposure to hate online. Results revealed an association between exposure to hate messages in the online space and time spent online, academic performance, communicating with a stranger on social media, and benign online disinhibition. In our sample, benign online disinhibition was also associated with students’ risk of encountering someone online that tried to convince them of racist views. This study represents an important contribution to understanding youth’s risk factors of exposure to hateful material online.

The first in-depth philosophical analysis of personal hate and group hate, Hatred: Understanding Our Most Dangerous Emotion explores how personal hatred can foster domestic violence and emotional abuse; how hate-proneness is a main contributor to the aggressive tendencies of borderlines, narcissists and psychopaths; how seemingly ordinary people embark on some of history's worst hate crimes; and how cohesive groups, subjected to spontaneous forces of group polarization, can develop extremist viewpoints of the sort that motivate hate crimes, mass shootings, and terrorism.

What explains online radicalization and support for ISIS in the West? Over the past few years, thousands of individuals have radicalized by consuming extremist content online, many of whom eventually traveled overseas to join the Islamic State. This study examines whether anti-Muslim hostility might drive pro-ISIS radicalization in Western Europe. Using new geo-referenced data on the online behavior of thousands of Islamic State sympathizers in France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Belgium, I study whether the intensity of anti-Muslim hostility at the local level is linked to pro-ISIS radicalization on Twitter. The results show that local-level measures of anti-Muslim animosity correlate significantly and substantively with indicators of online radicalization, including posting tweets sympathizing with ISIS, describing life in ISIS-controlled territories, and discussing foreign fighters. High-frequency data surrounding events that stir support for ISIS—terrorist attacks, propaganda releases, and anti-Muslim protests—show the same pattern.

The 2016 Trump campaign held more than 300 rallies. Our research examines whether these rallies and Trump’s rhetoric served as opportunities for the spread of hate. We measured the number of reported white-supremacist propaganda, anti-Semitic incidents, and extremist behaviors that occurred both leading up to and directly following these campaign events. We contend that Trump’s rhetoric and rallies increased the perceived threat facing white Americans, heightening their white identity, all while justifying violence and extralegal methods to address their grievances and thereby increasing reported bias incidents. We find that counties that hosted a Trump rally experienced an increase in hate-motivated events. We systematically show that Trump political rallies were associated with a limited size but significant rise in the likelihood of reported hate and bias incidents.

Henry Ford is remembered in American lore as the ultimate entrepreneur-the man who invented assembly-line manufacturing and made automobiles affordable. Largely forgotten is his side career as a publisher of antisemitic propaganda. This is the story of Ford's ownership of theDearborn Independent, his involvement in the defamatory articles it ran, and the two Jewish lawyers, Aaron Sapiro and Louis Marshall, who each tried to stop Ford's war. In 1927, the case of Sapiro v. Ford transfixed the nation. In order to end the embarrassing litigation, Ford apologized for the one thing he would never have lost on in court: the offense of hate speech. Using never-before-discovered evidence from archives and private family collections, this study reveals the depth of Ford's involvement in every aspect of this case and explains why Jewish civil rights lawyers and religious leaders were deeply divided over how to handle Ford.