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We show that a two-sided matching platform can successfully compete by limiting the number of choices it offers to its customers, while charging higher prices than platforms with unrestricted choice. We develop a stylized model of online dating where agents with different outside options match based on how much they like each other. Starting from these microfoundations, we derive the strength and direction of indirect network effects and show that increasing the number of potential matches has a positive effect due to larger choice, but also a negative effect due to competition between agents on the same side. Agents resolve the trade-off between these competing effects differently, depending on their outside options. For agents with high outside options, the choice effect is stronger than the competition effect, leading them to prefer an unrestricted-choice platform. The opposite is the case for agents with low outside options, who then have higher willingness to pay for a platform restricting choice, as it also restricts the choice set of their potential matches. Moreover, since only agents with low outside options self-select into the restricted choice platform, the competition effect is mitigated further. This allows multiple platforms offering different number of choices to coexist without the market tipping. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.

This paper examines the relative importance of platform quality, indirect network effects, and consumer expectations on the success of entrants in platform-based markets. We develop a theoretical model and find that an entrant's success depends on the strength of indirect network effects and on the consumers' discount factor for future applications. We then illustrate the model's applicability by examining Xbox's entry into the video game industry. We find that Xbox had a small quality advantage over the incumbent, PlayStation 2, and the strength of indirect network effects and the consumers' discount factor, while statistically significant, fall in the region where PlayStation 2' s position is unsustainable.

Two-sided markets are composed of platform owners and two distinct user networks that either buy or sell applications for the platform. The authors focus on multihoming—the choice of an agent in a user network to use more than one platform. In the context of the video game console industry, they examine the conditions affecting seller-level multihoming decisions on a given platform. Furthermore, they investigate how platform-level multihoming of applications affects the sales of the platform. The authors show that increased platform-level multihoming of applications hurts platform sales, a finding consistent with literature on brand differentiation, but they also show that this effect vanishes as platforms mature or gain market share. The authors find that platform-level multihoming of applications affects platform sales more strongly than the number of applications. Furthermore, among mature platforms, an increasing market share leads to more seller-level multihoming, while among nascent platforms, seller-level multihoming decreases as platform market share increases. These findings prompt scholars to look beyond network size in analyzing two-sided markets and provide guidance to both (application) sellers and platform owners.

AsbstractWe model the value chain of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) by focusing on the decisions taken by actors involved in either capture, transport or storage of CO2. Plants emitting CO2 are located apart. If these invest in carbon capture facilities, the captured CO2 is transported to terminals, which again transport the received amount of CO2 to a storage site. Because of network effects, we may have three equilibria: one with no CCS, one with low investments in CCS, and one with high investments in CCS. In a numerical specification of the model, we find that the market for CCS may be in a state of excess inertia, i.e., even if the social cost of carbon is sufficiently high to justify investment from a social point of view, the market actors may not succeed in coordinating their efforts to reach the equilibrium with high investment. The government should then consider offering economic incentives to investments. In addition to the network effect, several other market imperfections exist, such as market power, economics of scale and the environmental externality from CO2 emissions. We identify policy instruments—in addition to a correctly set carbon tax—that will correct for the remaining market imperfections and bring private investments in line with the first-best levels. Without correction, too many terminals are set up and too few plants invest in capture facilities in our reference market structure.

The market for plug-in electric vehicles (EVs) exhibits indirect network effects due to the interdependence between EV adoption and charging station investment. Through a stylized model, we demonstrate that indirect network effects on both sides of the market lead to feedback loops that could alter the diffusion process of the new technology. Based on quarterly EV sales and charging station deployment in 353 metro areas from 2011 to 2013, our empirical analysis finds indirect network effects on both sides of the market, with those on the EV demand side being stronger. The federal income tax credit of up to $7,500 for EV buyers contributed to about 40% of EV sales during 2011–13, with feedback loops explaining 40% of that increase. A policy of equal-sized spending but subsidizing charging station deployment could have been more than twice as effective in promoting EV adoption.

In the context of two-sided markets, we propose hardware lifecycle as a key moderator of the impact of superstar and non-superstar software on hardware adoption. A hardware’s earlier adopters are less price sensitive and have a higher preference for exciting and challenging software. In contrast, later adopters are more price sensitive and prefer simplicity in software. Superstar software tend to be more expensive and more complex compared to non-superstars. Therefore, earlier (later) adopters prefer superstars (non-superstars), which leads to higher impact of superstars (non-superstars) on hardware adoption in the early (later) stages of the hardware lifecycle. Using monthly data over a 12-year timeframe (1995–2007) from the home video game industry, we find that both superstar and non-superstar software impact hardware demand, but they matter at different points in the hardware lifecycle. Superstars are most influential when hardware is new, and this influence declines as hardware ages. In contrast, non-superstar software has a positive impact on hardware demand later in the hardware lifecycle, and this impact increases with hardware age. Findings reveal that eventually the amount of available non-superstar software impacts hardware adoption more than the amount of available superstar software. We provide several managerial implications based on these findings.

Systems are composed of complementary products (e.g., video game systems are composed of the video game console and video games). Prior literature on indirect network effects has argued that in system markets, sales of the primary product (often referred to as \"hardware\") largely depend on the availability of complementary products (often referred to as \"software\"). Mathematical and empirical analyses have almost exclusively operationalized software availability as software quantity. However, though not substantiated with empirical evidence, case illustrations show that certain high-quality, \"superstar\" software titles (e.g., Super Mario 64) may have disproportionately large effects on hardware unit sales (e.g., Nintendo N64 console sales). In the context of the U.S. home video game console market, the authors show that the introduction of a superstar increases video game console sales by an average of 14% (167,000 units) over a period of five months. One in every five buyers of a superstar software title also purchases the hardware required to use the software. Software type does not consistently alter this effect. The findings imply that scholars who study the relationship between software availability and hardware sales need to account for superstar returns and their decaying effect over time, beyond a mere software quantity effect. Hardware firms should maintain a steady flow of superstar introductions because the positive effect of a superstar lasts only five months and, if need be, make side payments to software firms because superstars dramatically increase hardware sales. Hardware firms' exclusivity over superstars does not provide an extra boost to their own sales, but it takes away an opportunity for competing systems to increase their sales.

This paper develops a framework for measuring \"tipping\"-the increase in a firm's market share dominance caused by indirect network effects. Our measure compares the expected concentration in a market to the hypothetical expected concentration that would arise in the absence of indirect network effects. In practice, this measure requires a model that can predict the counterfactual market concentration under different parameter values capturing the strength of indirect network effects. We build such a model for the case of dynamic standards competition in a market characterized by the classic hardware/software paradigm. To demonstrate its applicability, we calibrate it using demand estimates and other data from the 32/64-bit generation of video game consoles, a canonical example of standards competition with indirect network effects. In our example, we find that indirect network effects can lead to a strong, economically significant increase in market concentration. We also find important roles for beliefs on both the demand side, as consumers tend to pick the product they expect to win the standards war, and on the supply side, as firms engage in penetration pricing to invest in growing their networks.

This paper investigates the importance of network effects in the demand for ethanol-compatible vehicles and the supply of ethanol fuel. An indirect network effect, or positive feedback loop, arises in this context due to spatially-dependent complementarities in the availability of ethanol fuel and the installed base of ethanol-compatible vehicles. Marketers and social planners are interested in whether these effects exist, and if so, how policy might accelerate adoption of the ethanol fuel standard within a targeted population. To measure these feedback effects, I develop an econometric framework that considers the simultaneous determination of ethanol-compatible vehicle demand and ethanol fuel supply in local markets. The demand-side model considers the automobile purchase decisions of consumers and fleet operators; the supply-side model considers the ethanol market entry decisions of competing fuel retailers. The framework extends extant market entry models by endogenizing the market size shifting fuel retailer profits. I estimate the model using zip code panel data from four states over a nine-year period. The model estimates provide evidence of a network effect. Under typical market conditions, entry of an additional ethanol fuel retailer leads to a 6% increase in the probability of ethanol-compatible vehicle purchase. The entry model estimates imply that the first entrant requires a local installed base of approximately 300 ethanol-compatible vehicles to be profitable. As an application, I demonstrate that subsidizing fuel retailers to offer ethanol in selective geographic markets can be an effective policy to indirectly increase ethanol-compatible vehicle sales.

Nintendo lost its dominant position in the video game industry during the console war between its Nintendo 64 and Sony's PlayStation. However, Nintendo could have made several different strategic decisions to change the outcome. This article develops a structural model and investigates these alternative strategies through policy simulations. In particular, the author provides a framework to study firms' optimal pricing strategies under network effects, consumer heterogeneity, and oligopolistic competition. Consumer heterogeneity provides an incentive for a durable goods manufacturer to price skim, while network effects lead to an opposite motive for penetration pricing. The proposed framework incorporates these two competing motives under oligopolistic competition. The author estimates a demand system that allows for indirect network effects and consumer heterogeneity and then numerically solves for the Markov perfect equilibrium in firms' dynamic pricing game. Policy simulations indicate that Nintendo could have won the console war either with 10% more games or with a \"head start\" of one million units in installed base at the time of the PlayStation introduction.