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(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2023 8(1), 131-147 | European Forum Insight of 30 May 2023 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduzione - II. Le incertezze sull'interpretazione della prima condizione della responsabilità - III. La sentenza nel caso JP c Ministre de la Transition écologique - III.1. Lo iato tra tutela sostanziale e tutela risarcitoria di interessi diffusi - III.2. La rigida separazione tra interessi generali e interessi individuali - Considerazioni conclusive. | (Abstract) This Insight takes the Court of Justice’s ruling in JP v Ministre de la Transition écologique and Premier Ministre (case C-61/21) as a starting point to reflect, more broadly, on the interpretation of the first condition of State liability for breaches of EU law, i.e. that the rule breached shall be intended to confer rights on individuals. Most notably, it focuses on the implications of such condition on the use of the Fran-covich remedy in defence of general or ‘diffuse’ interests and criticises the Court’s sharp distinction between general and individual interests in this context. It also observes how the Court’s recent case law traces a distinction between the scope of substantive protection and that of the action for damages: on the one hand, it ensures broad access to national courts to vindicate general or diffuse interests pro-tected by EU law; on the other hand, it excludes the right to damages when the provision in question is not aimed directly and specifically to protect the interests of the individual.

One of the basic principles of civil rights is that all human beings are born free andequal in dignity and rights. The life protection, liberty and property should be equallyguaranteed to citizens to exclude discrimination of minorities or other parts of thepopulation. These rights are an important part of civil liberties and are considered asan essential element for effective citizenship. Arbitrary arrest, terror, torture or otherserious and unlawful interference, both by state and private actors, significantly affectthe well-being of democracy as it affects the very essence of it. In liberal democracies,leaders legitimized by the people must be involved within the norms and principlesof the rule of law in order to establish a healthy relationship between the state andthe citizen. This relationship is considered to be damaged in non-liberal democraciesas it is affected by the suspension of individual freedoms and rights. This paper aimsto analyze whether these individual rights are guaranteed and protected in Albania,considering from the perspective of the legal framework as well as in the politicalreality. This study aims to analyze the development of human rights, judicial rights andtheir implementation in our country to come to the conclusion, whether our system isthat of a liberal democracy or not.

Defining the concept of an \"issuing judicial authority\" in European Arrest Warrant (EAW) proceedings is one of the starting points for formulating the principles of effective judicial protection in emerging \"European criminal procedure\". There is no potential for this concept to be homogeneous for all instruments of cross-border cooperation in criminal matters, as the EAW mechanism may result in consequences for the individual incomparably more severe than other instruments. The uniqueness of the EAW mechanism has not yet been properly addressed, both by EU legislative policy and in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. Given the deficiencies of effective judicial protection of the individual at the stage of issuing the EAW, the principle of mutual recognition seems to have taken too much priority in the approach adopted. The EAW procedure should be more individual-centred at the initial stage, otherwise the national courts executing an EAW will face an ongoing problem with imperfect assessment of the qualities necessary for an \"issuing judicial authority\". Removing the concept of an \"issuing judicial authority\" from the procedural autonomy of Member States, and placing it within the scope of the EU's minimum standards on effective judicial protection of the individual could be helpful in solving this problem.

The advent of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has opened many opportunities and, equally, has brought many challenges. This is also true for the banking sector, as the Schufa case attests. The purpose of this paper is to examine the CJEU’s decision in the Schufa case regarding AI use within the banking sector and its legal implications. This case questions recent practices concerning credit scoring and demands more robust protection of individual rights and a more accountable use of AI in the financial sector. Th e ongoing dependence of banks on automated decision-making to assess the creditworthiness of their clients raises important questions about transparency and fairness regarding the outcomes of such assessments. Th e paper offers an analysis of the GDPR, namely Article 22(1), and the criteria for automated decision-making clarified in the Schufa case, particularly in situations that fall outside the scope of the GDPR.

Aim: Not only is the coronavirus pandemic about science and facts, it also raises a number of ethical questions. Some of the most important questions in this context are related to responsibility. First, what is a government’s primary responsibility? Second, how should both the government and individuals consider personal moral responsibility in this context? Method: This paper uses conceptual and normative analysis to address responsibility in the context of the pandemic. The paper also refers to reports published by the German Ethics Council, the Malaysian Bioethics Community and the Swedish National Council on Medical Ethics. Results: The primary responsibility of governments is to create a balance between individual values and rights, one hand, and the health of the population, on the other. There are good reasons to conceive of individual responsibility as a virtue, having to do with the development of crucial character traits and habits. The responsibility of governments is connected to individual responsibility through the values of trust and solidarity. Conclusions: Governments need to communicate clearly (a) how they balance conflicts between collective health and individual rights and values and (b) what the chosen strategy entails in terms of collective and individual responsibility. Success requires attention to ethical values from all involved. Individuals will need to develop new character traits to help manage this pandemic and to prevent new ones. Governments must facilitate the development of such character traits by building trust and solidarity with and among citizens.

International organizations are widely believed to undermine domestic democracy. Our analysis challenges this conventional wisdom, arguing that multilateral institutions can enhance the quality of national democratic processes, even in well-functioning democracies, in a number of important ways: by restricting the power of special interest factions, protecting individual rights, and improving the quality of democratic deliberation, while also increasing capacities to achieve important public purposes. The article discusses conflicts and complementarities between multilateralism and democracy, outlines a working conception of constitutional democracy, elaborates theoretically the ways in which multilateral institutions can enhance constitutional democracy, and discusses the empirical conditions under which multilateralism is most likely to have net democratic benefits, using contemporary examples to illustrate the analysis. The overall aim is to articulate a set of critical democratic standards appropriate for evaluating and helping to guide the reform of international institutions.

In the late 1970s, when Karel Vasak offered his concept of the three generations of rights, it was inclusive enough to embrace the whole spectrum of existing human rights. Forty years later, this paper explores the nature of contemporary human rights discourse and questions to what extent Vasak’s categorization is still relevant. Our work discusses the evolution of the concept of human rights, the changing dichotomies of national and international, individual and collective, and positive and negative rights. This paper uses qualitative methods of content analysis and quantitative frequency analysis method to explore the nature of scholarly discourse presented in human rights journals. Our research findings highlight the dynamic evolution of contemporary human rights discourse. The paper specifically illustrates the increasing emphasis on collective and internationalist rights and the enhancement of human rights matters that are difficult to categorize using Vasak’s approach. In doing so, the paper calls for the clarification of the language of contemporary human rights.

This paper aims to examine the various cultural practices that apply to widows vis à vis their constitutional rights. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the constitution) outlines inalienable human rights that do not prescribe their attainment requirements. This paper is part of a more extensive study conducted in the Gauteng province of South Africa. The research tools were piloted in Makapan village. The aim of this paper is to explain how cultural practices interact with constitutional rights and affect the lives of Black widows in Makapanstad village. The objective of the study is to describe the intersections in widowhood cultural practices, which are often not aligned with the constitution of South Africa. Qualitative research was used. Three widows were sampled in this paper. The research question that is addressed by this paper is the following: “What cultural processes in widowhood are still practiced by the community of Makapanstad that can be analyzed in line with the constitutional imperatives for the South African context?” The intersectionality theory was used in this study. Findings reveal that widowhood rites are gendered. Some Black cultural practices are embedded in culture and religion, and they undermine the constitution and human rights of widowed women.

In order to highlight the unprecedented character of Enlightenment toleration theories and their decisive role in the intellectual history of modern freedoms, these theories are often depicted as principled, based on individual rights, and aimed at doctrinal pluralism. In contrast, earlier defenses of toleration are usually portrayed as pragmatic, based on reason of state, and aimed at doctrinal consensus. This article challenges the notion that Enlightenment thinkers advocated toleration primarily in the name of pluralism and individual freedom. Instead, it suggests that most of them drew the line between what should and should not be tolerated based on pragmatic considerations aimed at advancing the common interest of political communities, strengthening the state’s power over religious authority, and reuniting societies divided by theological quarrels and wars of religion.

When the Supreme Court in 2003 struck down a Texas law prohibiting homosexual sodomy, it cited the right to privacy based on the guarantee of \"substantive due process\" embodied by the Constitution. But did the court act undemocratically by overriding the rights of the majority of voters in Texas? Scholars often point to such cases as exposing a fundamental tension between the democratic principle of majority rule and the liberal concern to protect individual rights.Democratic Rightschallenges this view by showing that, in fact, democracy demands many of these rights. Corey Brettschneider argues that ideal democracy is comprised of three core values--political autonomy, equality of interests, and reciprocity--with both procedural and substantive implications. These values entitle citizens not only to procedural rights of participation (e.g., electing representatives) but also to substantive rights that a \"pure procedural\" democracy might not protect. What are often seen as distinctly liberal substantive rights to privacy, property, and welfare can, then, be understood within what Brettschneider terms a \"value theory of democracy.\" Drawing on the work of John Rawls and deliberative democrats such as Jürgen Habermas, he demonstrates that such rights are essential components of--rather than constraints on--an ideal democracy. Thus, while defenders of the democratic ideal rightly seek the power of all to participate, they should also demand the rights that are the substance of self-government.