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According to our survey about climate risk perceptions, institutional investors believe climate risks have financial implications for their portfolio firms and that these risks, particularly regulatory risks, already have begun to materialize. Many of the investors, especially the long-term, larger, and ESG-oriented ones, consider risk management and engagement, rather than divestment, to be the better approach for addressing climate risks. Although surveyed investors believe that some equity valuations do not fully reflect climate risks, their perceived overvaluations are not large.

We survey institutional investors to better understand their role in the corporate governance of firms. Consistent with a number of theories, we document widespread behind-the-scenes intervention as well as governance-motivated exit. These governance mechanisms are viewed as complementary devices, with intervention typically occurring prior to a potential exit. We further find that long-term investors and investors that are less concerned about stock liquidity intervene more intensively. Finally, we find that most investors use proxy advisors and believe that the information provided by such advisors improves their own voting decisions.

We examine the impact of foreign institutional investors on firms' voluntary disclosure practices measured by management forecasts. In a sample of 32 non-U.S. countries, we find that, on average, foreign institutional investments lead to improved voluntary disclosure, and their impact is larger than that of domestic institutional investors. These results are more pronounced when foreign institutional investors (1) are unfamiliar with the firm's home country, (2) have longer investment horizons, and (3) are from countries with stronger investor protection and disclosure requirements than the firm's home country. However, we also find some evidence of voluntary disclosure deterioration in firms with foreign institutional investors from countries with inferior disclosure requirements and securities regulations and with concentrated foreign institutional ownership. Overall, our results suggest that the relation between foreign institutional investors and voluntary disclosure is much richer and more complex than what has been documented for domestic institutional investors in the literature.

Many natural competitors are jointly held by a small set of large institutional investors. In the U.S. airline industry, taking common ownership into account implies increases in market concentration that are 10 times larger than what is \"presumed likely to enhance market power\" by antitrust authorities.¹ Within-route changes in common ownership concentration robustly correlate with route-level changes in ticket prices, even when we only use variation in ownership due to the combination of two large asset managers. We conclude that a hidden social cost—reduced product market competition—accompanies the private benefits of diversification and good governance.

Existing global ESG models are limited in terms of applicability and predictability, especially in countries with an unstable environment. On the other hand, utilizing internally made or privately sourced ESG models have caused issues relating to generalizability, comparability, and continuity. In our research, we present an ESG framework that is specific to South Korea, which has both global and country-specific factors in all three categories. The AHP model is used to determine how the three categories' materiality would be viewed by institutional investors as well as how country-specific factors rank against global factors. The results of this study show that institutional investors place more importance on environmental and governance factors compared to social factors. Factors including shareholders' rights, pollution and waste, greenhouse gas emissions, and risk and opportunity management are found to have greater influences on investors' investment decisions. In addition, it was confirmed that both of the country-specific variables for South Korea, partnership with subcontractor and CEO reputation, have a significant influence on investment decisions. By having the ESG model validated by institutional investors, who are the main users of ESG disclosures of corporations, our methodology of presenting a country-specific model can be benchmarked by studies on other emerging markets with a variety of country-level specificities.

We propose a direct measure of abnormal institutional investor attention (AIA) using news searching and news reading activity for specific stocks on Bloomberg terminals. AIA is highly correlated with institutional trading measures and related to, but different from, other investor attention proxies. Contrasting AIA with retail attention measured by Google search activity, we find that institutional attention responds more quickly to major news events, leads retail attention, and facilitates permanent price adjustment. The well-documented price drifts following both earnings announcements and analyst recommendation changes are driven by announcements to which institutional investors fail to pay sufficient attention.

We analyze whether the growing importance of passive investors has influenced the campaigns, tactics, and successes of activists. We find activists are more likely to seek board representation when a larger share of the target company’s stock is held by passively managed mutual funds. Furthermore, higher passive ownership is associated with increased use of proxy fights, settlements, and a higher likelihood the activist achieves board representation or the sale of the targeted company. Our findings suggest that the recent growth of passive institutional investors mitigates free-rider problems and facilitates activists’ ability to engage in costly, value-enhancing forms of monitoring.

This study investigates the role of foreign institutional investors (FIIs) in restraining earnings management activities of firms under varying levels of investor protection. Firms manage their earnings less when independent FIIs are among their shareholders, especially for firms in which monitoring is more valuable – firms in weak investor protection countries and when firms have greater growth opportunities. These effects are robust to a quasi-exogenous shock to FIIs’ shareholdings, unobserved firm heterogeneity, and alternative earning management measures. FIIs are associated with an increase in foreign director presence on corporate boards and audit committees.

We study the impact of foreign institutional investors on price efficiency with firm-level international data. Using additions to the MSCI index and the U.S. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act as exogenous shocks to foreign ownership, we show that greater foreign ownership increases stock price informativeness, especially in developed economies. This increase arises from new information that foreign investors bring in and displacement of less-informed domestic retail investors. Finally, we show that foreign ownership, particularly from active investors, increases market liquidity, reduces firms’ cost of equity, and increases firms’real investment growth.

We investigate the influence of foreign institutional investors on firms’ auditor choices in an international setting. Foreign institutional investors are likely to demand high-quality audits to mitigate the information asymmetry they face and facilitate their external monitoring when they invest overseas. On the other hand, foreign institutional investors not only face difficulties in monitoring overseas firms in general but also have the limited ability to influence their auditor choices in particular. Using a large sample of 111,078 firm-year observations from 40 non-US countries for the period of 2001–2011, we find that firms with higher foreign institutional ownership are more likely to hire Big 4 auditors. To address the endogeneity concern, we show that our findings are robust to the use of identification strategies exploiting the exogenous variation in foreign institutional ownership following MSCI index additions, two-stage least squares regressions, and change-on-change regressions. More importantly, we further explore cross-sectional/cross-country variations in the relation between foreign institutional investors and auditor choice and find that this relation is stronger (a) when foreign institutional investors are from countries with stronger governance institutions and (b) when the investee firms are located in countries with higher information asymmetries. Overall, our findings suggest that cross-border institutional investment plays an important role in influencing firms’ auditor choices and improving the information environment of firms across different countries around the world.