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À l’aune de la rationalisation de l’action publique et de l’exigence de transparence de la décision politique, l’analyse d’impact de la réglementation (A.I.R.) revêt une importance plus cruciale que jamais. Or la réglementation s’appuie sur des instruments de politique publique de plus en plus divers, intriqués et complexes : au-delà d’instruments standards tels que l’obligation, l’interdiction, la sensibilisation ou encore la taxe, émergent en effet de nombreux instruments qui mettent en interaction un nombre croissant d’acteurs selon des modalités d’influence variables et sur des échelles diverses. Il est indispensable d’expliciter les contours des instruments de politique publique, et de lever la confusion sémantique, conceptuelle et cognitive qui les entoure, et dont nous ferons état. À cet effet, nous proposons d’abord de définir les instruments comme autant de chaînes de causalité mettant en interaction des acteurs, des actions, des opérateurs logiques et des vecteurs d’impact. Autour d’un langage algorithmique ad hoc, nous développons ensuite trois leviers de (rétro‑)conception afin de rendre compte de la nature protéiforme et fractale des instruments, en prenant l’exemple de l’instrument « taxe ». Enfin, nous exposons succinctement les applications pratiques de cette approche algorithmique, en matière d’évaluation de la mise en œuvre d’un instrument et en matière d’innovation.

State and local governments in the USA are evaluating a wide range of policies to reduce carbon emissions, including carbon taxes, which have existed internationally for nearly 20 years. In this article, existing carbon tax policies, both internationally and in the USA, are reviewed, and carbon policy design and effectiveness are analysed. Design considerations include which sectors to tax, where to set the tax rate, how to use tax revenues, what the impact will be on consumers, and how to ensure that emissions reduction goals are achieved. Emissions reductions that are due to carbon taxes can be difficult to measure, although some jurisdictions quantify reductions in overall emissions, others examine impacts that are due to programmes funded by carbon tax revenues.

In contrast to the federal government, some US states have taken an aggressive approach to curbing climate change. They use a variety of policy instruments to reduce greenhouse gases. These instruments can be categorized into two broad categories: economic incentives and command-and-control regulation. While the use of economic incentives has, on average, increased, some states employ them more than others. This article compares the propensity of different US states to employ economic incentives in the area of climate change. For this purpose, it analyses and tests four models: (i) a needs/responsiveness model, (ii) an interest group influence model, (iii) an innovation-and-diffusion model, and (iv) a combined model. Interestingly, this article finds that economic incentives are pushed out of the political agenda when states are confronted with a more severe problem in terms of carbon emissions and dependence on conventional energy. This article also finds support for the traditional, antagonistic view of 'industry versus environmentalists': electric utility companies tend to oppose economic incentives, while environmentalists and renewable energy producers tend to support them.

This study analyses energy system development and the associated greenhouse gas emissions in Thailand under a reference case and three different carbon tax scenarios during 2013-2050 using a bottom-up cost-minimizing energy system model based on the Asia-Pacific Integrated Assessment Model (AIM/Enduse) framework. It considers the role of the renewable energy technologies as well as some emerging GHG-mitigating technologies, e.g. carbon capture and storage (CCS) in power generation, and GHG reduction in the country, and found that the power sector will play a major role in CO 2 emission reduction. Under the carbon tax scenarios, most of the CO 2 emission reduction (over 70%) will come from the power sector. The results also indicate the very significant potential for CO 2 emission reduction through a significant change in the transport system of the country by shifting from low-occupancy personal modes of transport to electrified MRTS and railways.

The case is examined for accelerated deployment of concentrated solar power (CSP) technology in the South African electricity sector. Policy mechanisms and enabling activities that need to be defined and developed to encourage investment in CSP are reviewed. The use of a tender process, complemented by support from other policy instruments such as feed-in tariffs, is proposed as an efficient way of meeting an effective CSP target. The advantages of international support and commitment to large-scale CSP deployment include the sharing of knowledge and the incremental improvements inherent in the process of 'learning-by-doing'. Policy relevance: South Africa requires a viable alternative to coal power generation if it is to endorse decarbonization of the power sector. CSP could offer an appropriate technology but, after some years of discussions, no pilot project has yet been realized. Amongst other enabling activities, this illustrates two requirements for such a shift to a new lowcarbon technology: finance to meet the incremental costs of the initial pilot projects, and a strategy to create domestic production or attract international manufacturers to South Africa. These requirements are necessary to reduce costs and replace lost jobs from reduced coal power generation. International cooperation might unlock these opportunities by providing financial support for the incremental costs, thus enhancing the credibility of longer-term deployment strategies so as to attract investment in the supply chain; for creating technical assistance and capacity-building measures towards a suitable regulatory framework; and for manufacturing, installation and operation of plants.

Different approaches have been suggested for extending the reach of carbon trading into the whole economy by including the emissions resulting from individual consumption of energy. The most radical suggestions involve granting emissions rights to individuals-known as 'personal carbon trading' (PCT). A taxonomy is provided of various proposed design options along with consideration of the previously neglected issue of who surrenders the emissions rights and how this is enforced. PCT relies on an enforcement system in which the penalty level determines the price at which constrained actors will breach the cap. Breaching the cap may require a 'safety valve' option to cap carbon prices at politically acceptable levels. This could weaken the argument that PCT guarantees certainty of the environmental outcome. Enforcement is examined for three sets of actors: primary fuel suppliers (upstream), suppliers of final energy (midstream), and the final users themselves (downstream). The choice leads to very different consequences for the design and political economy of the resulting carbon markets. Although upstream enforcement is relatively straightforward, it would not lead to the strong involvement of individuals in carbon markets. Midstream enforcement could encourage more citizen engagement, but cannot guarantee it. Downstream enforcement through end-users would be administratively complex and is politically unlikely.

Although several personal carbon trading (PCT) scheme designs have been mapped, the practical challenges in the context of existing EU climate policies have not been addressed in detail. The implementation and administration of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) are compared with the current PCT proposals to reveal the intricacies of the implementation and administration of a new emissions trading scheme as well as issues of compatibility between schemes. Several issues need to be resolved. For example, problems of double regulation and double counting could be created by the parallel existence of the EU ETS. In addition, a clear definition of 'personal' is needed in order to prevent carbon leakage to 'non-personal' areas. Furthermore, monitoring (international) mobility emissions is a challenge without a practical and politically acceptable solution. Monitoring of emissions and trading of allowances in real time through the use of a carbon swipe card is likely to increase the costs and reduce the political acceptability of a PCT scheme. Finally, the assumption that equal per capita allocation would be fairer than other allocation methods is far from being accepted, therefore weakening some of the benefits of a PCT scheme.

L’information joue un rôle dans la construction et l’évolution des politiques. Le Programme de paiements pour services environnementaux (PPSE) au Costa Rica a été l’objet d’une production d’informations importante et de natures variées. L’article propose une catégorisation de l’information identifiant six flux d’informations distincts. Parmi ces flux, ceux de nature nationale et/ou gérés au niveau du programme contribuent à des changements mineurs du programme, alors que ceux comportant une dimension internationale, contribuent à des changements plus stratégiques. L’article souligne cependant que les dimensions nationale et internationale sont généralement imbriquées à travers les jeux d’acteurs qui contribuent, par la mobilisation d’informations, à déclencher les changements observés au niveau du PPSE.

Malgré l’intérêt croissant qu’ils suscitent, les instruments de « paiements pour services écosystémiques » (PSE), sont encore loin d’être les stratégies politiques dominantes dans la conservation de la biodiversité et la protection du milieu, au Québec comme ailleurs. Afin de comprendre si les systèmes de PSE en place au Québec permettent d’augmenter le potentiel d’action des politiques publiques dans le domaine agricole, nous présentons d’abord un survol des différents dispositifs politiques de SE au Québec et situons le rôle qu’occupent, dans ces dispositifs, les programmes de PSE. Nous répondons ensuite à la question plus spécifique de savoir comment les programmes de PSE mis en place dans le domaine agricole au Québec peuvent contribuer à améliorer les dispositifs politiques existants.

Even as the evidence of global warming mounts, the international response to this serious threat is coming unraveled. The United States has formally withdrawn from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol; other key nations are facing difficulty in meeting their Kyoto commitments; and developing countries face no limit on their emissions of the gases that cause global warming. In this clear and cogent book-reissued in paperback with an afterword that comments on recent events--David Victor explains why the Kyoto Protocol was never likely to become an effective legal instrument. He explores how its collapse offers opportunities to establish a more realistic alternative. Global warming continues to dominate environmental news as legislatures worldwide grapple with the process of ratification of the December 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The collapse of the November 2000 conference at the Hague showed clearly how difficult it will be to bring the Kyoto treaty into force. Yet most politicians, policymakers, and analysts hailed it as a vital first step in slowing greenhouse warming. David Victor was not among them. Kyoto's fatal flaw, Victor argues, is that it can work only if emissions trading works. The Protocol requires industrialized nations to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases to specific targets. Crucially, the Protocol also provides for so-called \"emissions trading,\" whereby nations could offset the need for rapid cuts in their own emissions by buying emissions credits from other countries. But starting this trading system would require creating emission permits worth two trillion dollars--the largest single invention of assets by voluntary international treaty in world history. Even if it were politically possible to distribute such astronomical sums, the Protocol does not provide for adequate monitoring and enforcement of these new property rights. Nor does it offer an achievable plan for allocating new permits, which would be essential if the system were expanded to include developing countries. The collapse of the Kyoto Protocol--which Victor views as inevitable--will provide the political space to rethink strategy. Better alternatives would focus on policies that control emissions, such as emission taxes. Though economically sensible, however, a pure tax approach is impossible to monitor in practice. Thus, the author proposes a hybrid in which governments set targets for both emission quantities and tax levels. This offers the important advantages of both emission trading and taxes without the debilitating drawbacks of each. Individuals at all levels of environmental science, economics, public policy, and politics-from students to professionals--and anyone else hoping to participate in the debate over how to slow global warming will want to read this book.