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This open access book traces the journey of nuclear law: its origins, how it has developed, where it is now, and where it is headed. As a discipline, this highly specialized body of law makes it possible for us to benefit from the life-saving applications of nuclear science and technology, including diagnosing cancer as well as avoiding and mitigating the effects of climate change. This book seeks to give readers a glimpse into the future of nuclear law, science and technology. It intends to provoke thought and discussion about how we can maximize the benefits and minimize the risks inherent in nuclear science and technology. This compilation of essays presents a global view in discipline as well as in geography. The book is aimed at representatives of governments - including regulators, policymakers and lawmakers - as well representatives of international organizations and the legal and insurance sectors. It will be of interest to all those keen to better understand the role of law in enabling the safe, secure, and peaceful use of nuclear technology around the world. The contributions in this book are written by leading experts, including the IAEA's Director General, and discuss the four branches of nuclear law - safety, security, safeguards and nuclear liability - and the interaction of nuclear law with other fields of national and international law.

The outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has caused more than 80 813 confirmed cases in all provinces of China, and 21 110 cases reported in 93 countries of six continents as of 7 March 2020 since middle December 2019. Due to biological nature of the novel coronavirus, named severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) with faster spreading and unknown transmission pattern, it makes us in a difficulty position to contain the disease transmission globally. To date, we have found it is one of the greatest challenges to human beings in fighting against COVID-19 in the history, because SARS-CoV-2 is different from SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV in terms of biological features and transmissibility, and also found the containment strategies including the non-pharmaceutical public health measures implemented in China are effective and successful. In order to prevent a potential pandemic-level outbreak of COVID-19, we, as a community of shared future for mankind, recommend for all international leaders to support preparedness in low and middle income countries especially, take strong global interventions by using old approaches or new tools, mobilize global resources to equip hospital facilities and supplies to protect noisome infections and to provide personal protective tools such as facemask to general population, and quickly initiate research projects on drug and vaccine development. We also recommend for the international community to develop better coordination, cooperation, and strong solidarity in the joint efforts of fighting against COVID-19 spreading recommended by the joint mission report of the WHO-China experts, against violating the International Health Regulation (WHO, 2005), and against stigmatization, in order to eventually win the battle against our common enemy — COVID-19.

Article 43 of this legally binding instrument restricts the measures countries can implement when addressing public health risks to those measures that are supported by science, commensurate with the risks involved, and anchored in human rights.1 The intention of the IHR is that countries should not take needless measures that harm people or that disincentivise countries from reporting new risks to international public health authorities.2 In imposing travel restrictions against China during the current outbreak of 2019 novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19), many countries are violating the IHR. WHO has issued COVID-19 technical guidance on several such measures, including risk communication, surveillance, patient management, and screening at ports of entry and exit.9 Third, and most importantly, Article 3.1 strictly requires all additional health measures to be implemented “with full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons”,1 which in turn must reflect the international law principles of necessity, legitimacy, and proportionality that govern limitations to and derogations from rights and freedoms.10 Under no circumstances should public health or foreign policy decisions be based on the racism and xenophobia that are now being directed at Chinese people and those of Asian descent.11 Many of the travel restrictions implemented by dozens of countries during the COVID-19 outbreak are therefore violations of the IHR.12 Yet, perhaps even more troubling, is that at least two-thirds of these countries have not reported their additional health measures to WHO,12 which is a further violation of IHR Articles 43.3 and 43.5. [...]the IHR only governs countries, not corporations and other non-governmental actors. [...]some countries are finding themselves with de-facto travel restrictions when airlines stop flying to places affected by COVID-19.

In the last decade, economists have produced a considerable body of research suggesting that the historical origin of a country's laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with economic outcomes. We summarize this evidence and attempt a unified interpretation. We also address several objections to the empirical claim that legal origins matter. Finally, we assess the implications of this research for economic reform.

In this Series paper, we review the contributions of One Health approaches (ie, at the human–animal–environment interface) to improve global health security across a range of health hazards and we summarise contemporary evidence of incremental benefits of a One Health approach. We assessed how One Health approaches were reported to the Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN, the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH, formerly OIE), and WHO, within the monitoring and assessment frameworks, including WHO International Health Regulations (2005) and WOAH Performance of Veterinary Services. We reviewed One Health theoretical foundations, methods, and case studies. Examples from joint health services and infrastructure, surveillance–response systems, surveillance of antimicrobial resistance, food safety and security, environmental hazards, water and sanitation, and zoonoses control clearly show incremental benefits of One Health approaches. One Health approaches appear to be most effective and sustainable in the prevention, preparedness, and early detection and investigation of evolving risks and hazards; the evidence base for their application is strongest in the control of endemic and neglected tropical diseases. For benefits to be maximised and extended, improved One Health operationalisation is needed by strengthening multisectoral coordination mechanisms at national, regional, and global levels.

Understanding the spread of SARS-CoV-2, how and when evidence emerged, and the timing of local, national, regional, and global responses is essential to establish how an outbreak became a pandemic and to prepare for future health threats. With that aim, the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response has developed a chronology of events, actions, and recommendations, from December, 2019, when the first cases of COVID-19 were identified in China, to the end of March, 2020, by which time the outbreak had spread extensively worldwide and had been characterised as a pandemic. Datapoints are based on two literature reviews, WHO documents and correspondence, submissions to the Panel, and an expert verification process. The retrospective analysis of the chronology shows a dedicated initial response by WHO and some national governments, but also aspects of the response that could have been quicker, including outbreak notifications under the International Health Regulations (IHR), presumption and confirmation of human-to-human transmission of SARS-CoV-2, declaration of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, and, most importantly, the public health response of many national governments. The chronology also shows that some countries, largely those with previous experience with similar outbreaks, reacted quickly, even ahead of WHO alerts, and were more successful in initially containing the virus. Mapping actions against IHR obligations, the chronology shows where efficiency and accountability could be improved at local, national, and international levels to more quickly alert and contain health threats in the future. In particular, these improvements include necessary reforms to international law and governance for pandemic preparedness and response, including the IHR and a potential framework convention on pandemic preparedness and response.

Objectives Disruptive public health risks and events, including infectious disease outbreaks, are inevitable, but their effects can be mitigated by investing in prevention and preparedness. We assessed the epidemic preparedness and response capacities of health systems in 186 countries from 2018 to 2022. Methods We utilized data from the International Health Regulations (IHR) State Party Self-Assessment Annual Reporting (SPAR) submissions to assess health systems’ IHR capacities to (1) prevent, (2) detect, (3) respond, (4) enable resources and coordinate, and (5) ensure operational readiness from 2018 to 2022. We categorized the IHR capacities into five levels, with level 1 denoting the lowest level of national capacity and level 5 the highest. We calculated each index’s capacity level as the arithmetic mean of its related indicators and analyzed changes over time using the Mann–Kendall nonparametric trend test. Results SPAR reporting marginally improved from 92.9% (182 of 196 countries) in 2018 to 94.9% (186 of 196 countries) in 2022, with considerable improvement in all five capacity domains over this period: prevention (58.4 in 2018 to 66.5 in 2022), detection (74.7 to 78.3), response (56.5 to 67.8), enabling resources and coordination (63.0 to 68.3), and ensuring operational readiness (62.8 to 69.9). From the 2022 submissions, 116 (62%) countries reported functional (Level 4 or 5) prevention capacity, 162 (87%) had functional detection capacity, 118 (63%) had functional response capacity, 121 (65%) had functional enabling resources and coordination capacity, and 133 (72%) had functional operational readiness against public health events. Across all the indexes, the WHO African Region reported the fewest countries with functional capacity in these domains. Conclusions There was an overall increase in functional capacity across all five domains at both global and regional levels; and a high percentage of countries achieved functional capacity across all domains in 2022. However, a significant number of countries, particularly in the Global South, have yet to achieve functional competence in these capacities, leaving the world vulnerable to the persistent risk of epidemics and infectious biohazards. Strengthening IHR competencies through local, national, and global engagements must be urgently prioritized to achieve global health security against infectious diseases.

Context: The International Health Regulations (IHR) have been the governing framework for global health security for the past decade and are a nearly universally recognized World Health Organization (WHO) treaty, with 196 States Parties. In the wake of the Ebola epidemic, major global commissions have cast doubt on the future effectiveness of the IHR and the leadership of the WHO. Methods: We conducted a review of the historical origins of the IHR and their performance over the past 10 years and analyzed all of the ongoing reform panel efforts to provide a series of politically feasible recommendations for fundamental reform. Findings: We propose a series of recommendations with realistic pathways for change. These recommendations focus on the development and strengthening of IHR core capacities; independently assessed metrics; new financing mechanisms; harmonization with the Global Health Security Agenda, Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) Pathways, the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework, and One Health strategies; public health and clinical workforce development; Emergency Committee transparency and governance; tiered public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) processes; enhanced compliance mechanisms; and an enhanced role for civil society. Conclusions: Empowering the WHO and realizing the IHR's potential will shore up global health security—a vital investment in human and animal health—while reducing the vast economic consequences of the next global health emergency.

When the International Health Regulations (IHR) came into force in 2007, WHO announced that “the global community has a new legal framework to better manage its collective defences to detect disease events and to respond to public health risks and emergencies”.1 The IHR aim to enable the prevention, detection, and containment of health risks and threats, the strengthening of national capacities for that purpose, and the coordination of a global alert and response system. [...]many countries only applied the IHR in part, were not sufficiently aware of these regulations, or deliberately ignored them,3,4 and that WHO did not make full use of the powers given to it through the wording and spirit of the IHR. [...]the IHR are not deficient, but their implementation by member states and by WHO was inadequate. There was a marked lack of national responses both to WHO's first alerts—eg, published risk assessments and guidance on public health response and statements by the WHO Director-General—and to the Public Health Emergency of International Concern declaration.

Background Under the International Health Regulations (2005) [IHR (2005)] Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, after action reviews (AAR) and simulation exercises (SimEx) are two critical components which measure the functionality of a country’s health emergency preparedness and response under a “real-life” event or simulated situation. The objective of this study was to describe the AAR and SimEx supported by the World Health Organization (WHO) globally in 2016–2019. Methods In 2016–2019, WHO supported 63 AAR and 117 SimEx, of which 42 (66.7%) AAR reports and 56 (47.9%) SimEx reports were available. We extracted key information from these reports and created two central databases for AAR and SimEx, respectively. We conducted descriptive analysis and linked the findings according to the 13 IHR (2005) core capacities. Results Among the 42 AAR and 56 SimEx available reports, AAR and SimEx were most commonly conducted in the WHO African Region (AAR: n  = 32, 76.2%; SimEx: n = 32, 52.5%). The most common public health events reviewed or tested in AAR and SimEx, respectively, were epidemics and pandemics (AAR: n  = 38, 90.5%; SimEx: n  = 46, 82.1%). For AAR, 10 (76.9%) of the 13 IHR core capacities were reviewed at least once, with no AAR conducted for food safety, chemical events, and radiation emergencies, among the reports available. For SimEx, all 13 (100.0%) IHR capacities were tested at least once. For AAR, the most commonly reviewed IHR core capacities were health services provision ( n  = 41, 97.6%), risk communication ( n  = 39, 92.9%), national health emergency framework ( n  = 39, 92.9%), surveillance ( n  = 37, 88.1%) and laboratory ( n  = 35, 83.3%). For SimEx, the most commonly tested IHR core capacity were national health emergency framework ( n  = 56, 91.1%), followed by risk communication ( n  = 48, 85.7%), IHR coordination and national IHR focal point functions ( n  = 45, 80.4%), surveillance ( n  = 31, 55.4%), and health service provision ( n  = 29, 51.8%). For AAR, the median timeframe between the end of the event and AAR was 125 days (range = 25–399 days). Conclusions WHO has recently published guidance for the planning, execution, and follow-up of AAR and SimEx. Through the guidance and the simplified reporting format provided, we hope to see more countries conduct AAR and SimEx and standardization in their methodology, practice, reporting and follow-up.