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This article raises some questions about the intuitionist response to skepticism developed by Michael Bergmann in Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition , with a focus on Bergmann’s contention that epistemic intuitions serve as justifying evidence in support of anti-skepticism. It raises three main concerns: that an intuitionist conception of evidence is overly narrow, that it has undesirable implications for cases of disagreement, and that the evidential role that epistemic intuitions play in Bergmann’s version of anti-skepticism undercuts his claim that an intuitionist particularist response to skepticism is superior to disjunctivist responses.

Logical reasoning is often presumed to require effortful cognition. However, there is evidence that reasoners may have some form of “logical intuition” that generates rapid, intuitive logical responses to arguments. Previous studies have shown that intuitive logical judgments for some forms of inference can be generated by matching strategies or by activation of semantic information, leaving the existence of any form of purely logical intuition an open question. In this paper, we examined the possibility that once these effects are controlled for, at least some people are able to make rapid, intuitive logical inferences that reflect only logical structure. In two studies, participants were given 5 s to make a series of inferences, which included semi-abstract syllogisms of the form “All A are B, X is B, X is A,” where the B term was abstract (meaningless), and for which both matching and semantic activation were controlled. Results show that about 15% of participants were able to consistently respond logically to these inferences. These indicate that there is a clear, although limited, form of abstract logical intuition.

Human reasoning is often conceived as an interplay between a more intuitive and deliberate thought process. In the last 50 years, influential fast-and-slow dual-process models that capitalize on this distinction have been used to account for numerous phenomena – from logical reasoning biases, over prosocial behavior, to moral decision making. The present paper clarifies that despite the popularity, critical assumptions are poorly conceived. My critique focuses on two interconnected foundational issues: the exclusivity and switch feature. The exclusivity feature refers to the tendency to conceive intuition and deliberation as generating unique responses such that one type of response is assumed to be beyond the capability of the fast-intuitive processing mode. I review the empirical evidence in key fields and show that there is no solid ground for such exclusivity. The switch feature concerns the mechanism by which a reasoner can decide to shift between more intuitive and deliberate processing. I present an overview of leading switch accounts and show that they are conceptually problematic – precisely because they presuppose exclusivity. I build on these insights to sketch the groundwork for a more viable dual-process architecture and illustrate how it can set a new research agenda to advance the field in the coming years.

Does cooperating require the inhibition of selfish urges? Or does \"rational\" self-interest constrain cooperative impulses? I investigated the role of intuition and deliberation in cooperation by meta-analyzing 67 studies in which cognitive-processing manipulations were applied to economic cooperation games (total N = 17,647; no indication of publication bias using Egger's test, Begg's test, or p-curve). My meta-analysis was guided by the social heuristics hypothesis, which proposes that intuition favors behavior that typically maximizes payoffs, whereas deliberation favors behavior that maximizes one's payoff in the current situation. Therefore, this theory predicts that deliberation will undermine pure cooperation (i.e., cooperation in settings where there are few future consequences for one's actions, such that cooperating is not in one's self-interest) but not strategic cooperation (i.e., cooperation in settings where cooperating can maximize one's payoff). As predicted, the meta-analysis revealed 17.3% more pure cooperation when intuition was promoted over deliberation, but no significant difference in strategic cooperation between more intuitive and more deliberative conditions.

Marketers frequently style food to look pretty (e.g., in advertising). This article investigates how pretty aesthetics (defined by classical aesthetic principles, such as order, symmetry, and balance) influence healthiness judgments. The author proposes that prettier food is perceived as healthier, specifically because classical aesthetic features make it appear more natural. In a pilot, six main studies and four supplemental studies (total N = 4,301) across unhealthy and healthy, processed and unprocessed, and photographed and real foods alike, people judged prettier versions of the same food as healthier (e.g., more nutrients, less fat), despite equal perceived price. Even given financial stakes, people were misled by prettiness. In line with the proposed naturalness process, perceived naturalness mediated the effect; belief in a \"natural = healthy\" connection moderated it; expressive aesthetics, which do not evoke naturalness, did not produce the effect (despite being pretty); and reminders of artificial modification, which suppress perceived naturalness, mitigated it. Given that pretty food styling can harm consumers by misleading healthiness judgments for unhealthy foods, managers and policy makers should consider modification disclaimers as a tool to mitigate the \"pretty = healthy\" bias.

We present a longitudinal, empirical study of the entrepreneurial opportunity development process, focused specifically on intuition in multiple forms. By following the opportunity development process for several participants over a two-year period, we were able to extract empirical instances of various types of intuition applied to the development of entrepreneurial opportunities. We found that the entrepreneurs in the study used at least four distinct types of intuition: problem-solving, creative, social, and temporal. Of these, we propose temporal intuition as a type not yet discussed in extant literature, while the others have not previously been studied in the entrepreneurial context. There are strong connections between these various aspects of intuition, and we discuss how the four types interact in a dynamic, unfolding process we tentatively define as opportunity intuition.

Many psychology studies are statistically underpowered. In part, this may be because many researchers rely on intuition, rules of thumb, and prior practice (along with practical considerations) to determine the number of subjects to test. In Study 1, we surveyed 291 published research psychologists and found large discrepancies between their reports of their preferred amount of power and the actual power of their studies (calculated from their reported typical cell size, typical effect size, and acceptable alpha). Furthermore, in Study 2, 89% of the 214 respondents overestimated the power of specific research designs with a small expected effect size, and 95% underestimated the sample size needed to obtain .80 power for detecting a small effect. Neither researchers' experience nor their knowledge predicted the bias in their self-reported power intuitions. Because many respondents reported that they based their sample sizes on rules of thumb or common practice in the field, we recommend that researchers conduct and report formal power analyses for their studies.

[Display omitted] •Light package colors are often used to highlight a product’s healthiness.•Conflicting color–taste associations may undermine package effectiveness, however.•Two boundary conditions are expected to moderate the opposing inferences.•Six studies systematically manipulate different aspects of real food products.•This research supports the notion that package color is a double-edged sword. In food packaging, light and pale colors are often used to highlight product healthiness. What has been largely overlooked is that this seemingly positive health cue may also convey another crucial piece of information. It is this paper’s premise that light-colored packages evoke two opposing effects: They stimulate favorable health impressions (health effect) and they activate detrimental taste inferences (taste effect) which jointly guide the purchase decision. To contribute to a better understanding of when this package cue is an asset or a liability, this research elucidates the boundary conditions under which the opposing effects operate. The unfavorable color-induced taste effect should be particularly dominant when (i) consumers have a strong need to make heuristic taste inferences (i.e., when tasting is not possible) and (ii) when health is not the overarching goal (e.g., for less health-conscious consumers). A series of experiments manipulating actual food packages confirms that the package health cue can indeed trigger negative taste associations in the consumer’s mind that backfire. Marketers therefore are advised to consider the identified contingencies carefully.

I raise two concerns about Bergmann’s philosophical methodology: the first is a parity problem for his intuition-based “autodidactic” approach; the second is a tension between that approach and the commonsense tradition in which he situates it. I then use his approach to reflect on the limits of rational argument and set it alongside an alternative that likewise emphasizes the personal nature of philosophical inquiry while remaining more neutral about the rational standing of competing intuitions.