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This contribution responds to the so-called judicial amendment to the Constitution of the Slovak Republic of 9 December 2020, which was published in the Collection of Law No. 422/2020, which resulted, inter alia, in major changes of the position, composition, and powers of the Judicial Council of the SR; the author points to the evolution of the Slovak Judicial Council since 2001 as well as summarizes the circumstances that led to its establishment, also changes in its constitutional status, composition, presidency, and competencies. The contribution includes concrete details how, according to recent constitutional reform, the system of checks and balances in the composition of the Judicial Council of the Slovak republic was implemented, to eliminate the judicial corporatism and negative consequences of political influence on that matter. The essential part of this document is the comparative analysis of the selected aspects of the composition of judicial councils in the selected European states. Special attention is paid to the issue of the majority of the judges among other members and the influence of the political forces in the process of selecting the members of the judicial councils. All of these used methods of scientific research led the author to formulate and identify the system of checks and balances in the composition of the judicial councils to ensure the independence and effectiveness of the judicial council and even for the whole judiciary in a national and/or European environment.

Judicial councils – separation of powers – fourth-branch institutions – judicial independence – four ideal types of judicial councils – a judge-controlled, politician-controlled, inter-branch and fourth-branch judicial council – danger of politicisation and corporativism of the judiciary

The Canadian Judicial Council is primarily responsible for regulating misconduct among federally appointed judges. Over the last decade, the Council has faced some highly publicized challenges to its authority when judges facing misconduct complaints commenced judicial review proceedings pursuant to the Federal Courts Act. In response to these challenges, the Council sought to immunize itself from judicial review, first by pleading its case in court and then by pressing for legislative changes in the form of Bill C-9. The new legislation, which exempts the Council from almost all external judicial oversight, was driven by the Council and assented to by a government willing to delegate its power to judicial elites. The legislation not only fails to provide adequate checks on the Council's power as an administrative decision maker, it represents a high-water mark in judicialized politics, pointing to a judicialization of governance in the area of judicial discipline.

Currently, at least three approaches to judicial governance coexist in the European continent: the judicial council model, the courts service model, and the Ministry of Justice model. Although doctrinal and case-specific literatures abound on this topic, examples of cross-country studies explaining choices on these models of judicial governance are rather scarce. More particularly, we lack so far knowledge on how different factors interact in leading to the implementation of the judicial council model. This is striking, given the importance of judicial councils for the operation of the rule of law. Furthermore, explanations on the choices of models of judicial governance are essential to understanding the intricate issue of the political rationalities underlying macrolevel design of judicial institutions. Using qualitative comparative analysis and focusing on European liberal democracies, this article contributes to the literature in the field. It is shown that judicial councils are created when postauthoritarian countries implement new constitutions either in romanistic law countries or in countries subject to Europeanizing pressures.

There have been a sizeable number of studies trying to identify the determinants of judicial performance on the country level. Such a design is appropriate to identify underperforming individual judges or underperforming courts or court districts. However, it is not appropriate to identify institutions conducive to judicial performance. A dataset produced by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice contains very detailed information on the judicial systems of the 47 member countries of the Council of Europe. Drawing on robust regressions and using an objective variable, we find that (1) resolution rates are not a function of per capita income. In other words: poor countries can also afford them. (2) Countries belonging to the French legal tradition enjoy relatively lower resolution rates. (3) Resolution rates are negatively—and very robustly—correlated with court budget. As such, a higher budget will not “buy” more court decisions. (4) Resolution rates are never positively correlated with the presence of judicial councils. (5) Mandatory training for judges is correlated with higher resolution rates. Drawing on the subjectively perceived efficiency of the judiciary as the dependent variable we find that (6) countries belonging to both the French and the socialist legal tradition are less efficient and that (7) judicial councils are also negatively correlated with our measure of judicial efficiency, in other words: countries that do not have them should not introduce them.

The nature and status of the relationship between judicial officers and the judicial service commissions in the Commonwealth appears to be under-studied. Is it an employer-employee relationship or not? With respect to Nigeria, the relationship between the National Judicial Council (NJC) and judicial officers in Nigeria is a matter of serious controversy. This issue has continually led to jurisdictional questions. This paper appraises the legal and institutional framework for the regulation of judges in Nigeria. It examines the extent of control exerted by the National Judicial Council and contends that there exists not only an administrative relationship, but a master/servant relationship between Nigerian Judicial Officers and the NJC.

There is general agreement that in Italy the establishment of a judicial council ensured an overall higher degree of independence. Nevertheless, this self-governance template was criticized for propping up an accountability imbalance and a certain degree of inefficiency. In order to understand this assessment, this article delves into the relevance of informal rules and practices in the operation of the Italian judicial council. More specifically, it focuses on the activities relating to appointments of court presidents and professional assessment. Based on this analysis, it makes some observations on the factors shaping informal practices and questions their impact on judicial values and the quality of Italian democracy. I argue that informal institutions have amplified the corporatist character of the Italian judiciary, but it would be wrong to portray them in negative terms only, because the operation of the Italian judicial council and judicial system also benefits from a healthy dose of informality, which allows for enduring legitimacy in a polarized society.

Spanish Constitutional Court – Judicial behaviour – Mixed judicial selection – Empirical testing – Decisions of the Spanish Constitutional Court, 1980-2018 – Judicial background – Government – Senate – Congress – Spanish Judicial Council – Invalidation of statutes –Dissent opinions – Shaping politicisation.

This paper analyzes the development of legislation and identifies specific gaps and shortcomings in the selection and appointment of judges in the Republic of Kazakhstan, proposing improvements crucial for an independent judiciary and the implementation of the rule of law. It highlights that while Kazakhstan has attempted to borrow judicial selection mechanisms from other countries, these have not always proven effective due to unique national challenges. Specific issues identified include systemic errors in legislative reforms, lack of transparency, and susceptibility to political and internal judicial pressure. For instance, the composition and functioning of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) have not effectively ensured impartial and competent judicial appointments, leading to low public trust. In 2020, Kazakhstan ranked 63rd out of 128 countries on the Rule of Law Index, and the judicial system is perceived as highly corrupt. Kazakhstan’s transition from a Soviet-influenced system to a more democratic model faces unique challenges, including deeply ingrained cultural practices such as nepotism. By addressing these legislative and systemic issues, the proposed reforms aim to enhance judicial independence, improve the quality of the judiciary, and ultimately restore public confidence in the legal system. The expected impact includes more transparent and accountable judicial appointments, leading to a more robust and fair judicial system that upholds the rule of law and human rights.

The purpose of this article is to describe almost one century of institutional track record of diverse aspects of the judicial power in the estates of Mexico. Starting with the original databases of the constitutions of the 31 Mexican estates and all their reforms since 1917 to 2014, we systematically describe aspects relevant to the higher courts, judicial councils and the constitutional courts of the estates, the judicial power budgeting and special jurisdictions. The most important finding is the interesting diversity of the judicial power´s institutional architecture in the estates for almost one hundred years; these include authoritarian regime periods as well as a democratic regime at national level.