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Most U.S. state supreme court justices face elections or reappointment by elected officials, and research suggests that judicial campaigns have come to resemble those for other offices. We develop predictions on how selection systems should affect judicial decisions and test these predictions on an extensive dataset of death penalty decisions by state courts of last resort. Specifically, the data include over 12,000 decisions on over 2000 capital punishment cases decided between 1980 and 2006 in systems with partisan, nonpartisan, or retention elections or with reappointment. As predicted, the findings suggest that judges face the greatest pressure to uphold capital sentences in systems with nonpartisan ballots. Also as predicted, judges respond similarly to public opinion in systems with partisan elections or reappointment. Finally, the results indicate that the plebiscitary influences on judicial behavior emerge only after interest groups began achieving success at targeting justices for their decisions.

The bill passed both houses of the General Assembly, along largely party-line votes, and the governor signed the legislation less than a week after its enactment. [...]candidates for election to the supreme court and courts of appeal in 2022 will have party affiliation on the ballot for the first time in Ohio history. [...]of whether party affiliation appears on the general election ballot, indicia of judicial candidates' party identification are readily available to voters. Since 2010, the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct has permitted judicial candidates to include party affiliation, nominations, and endorsements in campaign advertising.2 Newspaper articles featuring judicial races and editorial endorsements in those races routinely reference the candidates' political affiliation, with those affiliations highlighted for state supreme court contests. [...]after receiving the committee's report and recommendations, the court considered those in its first and, to date, only public conference of the justices. The amendments and justices' votes were recorded and reported publicly.4 This process produced new rules, effective in July 1995, that included limits on contributions to, and expenditures by, judicial campaigns, prohibitions on the solicitation or receipt of contributions from court employees and vendors, and enhanced disclosure of campaign contributions from court appointees, such as assigned counsel.5 The extensive amendments to then Canon 7 of the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules for the Government of the Judiciary featured three new provisions that remain unique in comparison to judicial campaign conduct regulations in other states.6 Mandatory Judicial Candidate Education Added to the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct was a requirement that each candidate for election or reelection to judicial office complete a two-hour course on campaign practices, finance, and ethics.7 The course must be taken one year prior to, or 60 days after, the judicial candidate is certified to first appear on the ballot, and completion of the course must be promptly certified to the Ohio Board of Professional Conduct.

We present evidence that Washington State judges respond to political pressure by sentencing serious crimes more severely. Sentences are around 10% longer at the end of a judge's political cycle than at the beginning; judges' discretionary departures above the sentencing guidelines range increase by 50% across the electoral cycle, accounting for much of the greater severity. Robustness specifications, nonlinear models, and falsification exercises allow us to distinguish among explanations for increased sentencing severity at the end of judges' political cycles. Our findings inform debates over judicial elections, and highlight the interaction between judicial discretion and the influence of judicial elections.

When we consider the importance of an independent judiciary, questions of impropriety are even more salient and the stakes are even higher.1 The issue is especially pressing when considering recent research that demonstrates an increase in independent expenditures in judicial races in the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling in Citizens United.2 Even if a judge were - in her own mind - completely impartial, \"proof of actual bias\"3 is not the standard for recusal; even the \"serious risk of actual bias - based on objective and reasonable perceptions\" is enough to require recusal.4 Consider the following: an open seat on a state supreme court, and a litigant who knows a case involving a large financial penalty levied against his business is headed to that very court. To combat the potential for corruption arising from contributions made to judicial candidates (the majority of which come from attorneys14), the American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Code of Judicial Ethics contains a canon providing that, \"A judge or candidate for judicial office shall not engage in political or campaign activity that is inconsistent with the independence, integrity, or impartiality of the judiciary. Table 1 shows that some, but clearly not all, states have promulgated restrictions on the ability of judicial candidates to personally solicit contributions for their campaigns.18 Earlier research by political scientist C. Scott Peters shows that the CJE Direct Solicitation Rule is significantly related to competitiveness in judicial elections.19 Peters shows that in states where the Direct Solicitation Rule is in place, incumbent judges are advantaged in re-election contests over challengers. [...]the rule appears to be creating barriers to entry for candidates, but the question remains whether or not the rule impacts the amount of money donors contribute to state judicial candidates. Candidates themselves raise money in larger sums than a proxy is able to raise.21 In other words, candidates are likely to garner contributions more often and in greater amounts when they themselves are involved in the fundraising efforts, as compared to when a proxy fundraises on a candidate's behalf. Because candidates are more successful in these ways, and because some states prohibit judicial candidates from directly soliciting funds, it stands to reason that the presence of the direct solicitation canon would reduce the dollar amount a donor contributes to a judicial campaign.

We study how media environments interact with political institutions that structure the accountability of public officials. Specifically, we quantify media influence on the behavior of US state court judges. We analyze around 1.5 million criminal sentencing decisions from 1986 to 2006 and new data on the newspaper coverage of 9,828 trial court judges. Since newspaper coverage is endogenous, we use the match between newspaper markets and judicial districts to identify effects. We find that newspaper coverage significantly increases sentence length by nonpartisan elected judges for violent crimes. For partisan elected and appointed judges, there are no significant effects.

We use an agency model to analyze the impact of judicial review on the incentives of elected leaders to “posture” by enacting bold but ill-advised policies. We find that judicial review may exacerbate posturing by rescuing leaders from the consequences of unwise policies, but may also discourage posturing by alerting voters to unjustified government action. We further find that judges will defer to the decision of elected leaders unless posturing is sufficiently likely. We then show how judicial review affects voter welfare, both through its effect on policy choice and through its effect on the efficacy of the electoral process in selecting leaders. We also analyze how the desirability of judicial review is affected by characteristics of the leaders and the judges.

This article proposes that elections with substantial amounts of campaign activity change the substance of a state supreme court’s legitimacy from one derived from the court’s legalistic nature to one derived through representation. Using a national survey, it shows that because of this change the perceived legitimacy of courts with robust elections does not induce acceptance of their decisions. Only nonrepresentative courts with the legalistic form of legitimacy can convert their institutional legitimacy into decisional acceptance. This means that even highly legitimate courts with robust elections are ineffective at inducing acceptance. This hinders the ability of those courts to build public support for their decisions, which is essential for the effective functioning of the judiciary. Additional analyses show this effect is not caused by the politicization associated with campaigning but rather through the representation provided by elections.

[...]to genuinely preserve judicial independence, states should adopt a single, lengthy term for all high-court judges. [...]states should utilize judicial nominating commissions, independent bodies tasked with evaluating judicial candidates on nonpolitical criteria and producing a shortlist of names from which the governor can choose. Because the governor does not control the creation of a commission's shortlist, judicial nominating commissions can provide a layer of insulation from the normal operation of politics, while still empowering a politically accountable actor to make the final determination. [...]studies of judicial nomination commissions, which are already used in some form in many states, suggest that they have often been successful in setting aside political considerations and constraining governors' discretion.14 Yet our research on states' experiences also highlights that nominating commission design and processes can impact both their effectiveness and the public's confidence in the outcomes they produce. [...]a lengthy single fixed term may actually result in more turnover on a court - creating more opportunities for diversity - than a retention system with unlimited shorter terms, given the advantages that usually attach to incumbents.

The idea that wealthy people use their money to influence things, including politics, law, and media will surprise very few people. However, as Michael S. Kang and Joanna Shepherd argue in this readable and rich study of the state judiciary, the effect of money on judicial outcomes should disturb and anger everyone. In the current system that elects state judges, the rich and powerful can spend money to elect and re-elect judges who decide cases the way they want. Free to Judge is about how and why money increasingly affects the dispensation of justice in our legal system, and what can be done to stop it. One of the barriers to action in the past has been an inability to prove that campaign donations influence state judicial decision-making. In this book, Kang and Shepherd answer that challenge for the first time, with a rigorous empirical study of campaign finance and judicial decision-making data. Pairing this with interviews of past and present judges, they create a compelling and persuasive account of people like Marsha Ternus, the first Iowa state supreme court justice to be voted out of office after her decision in a same-sex marriage case. The threat of such an outcome, and the desire to win reelection, results in judges demonstrably leaning towards the interests and preferences of their campaign donors across all cases. Free to Judge is thus able to identify the pieces of our current system that invite bias, such as judicial reelection, and what reforms should focus on. This thoughtful and compellingly written book will be required reading for anybody who cares about creating a more just legal system.

Do state supreme courts act impartially or are they swayed by public opinion? Do judicial elections influence judge behavior? To date these questions have received little direct attention due to the absence of comparable public opinion data in states and obstacles to collecting data necessary for comprehensive analysis of state supreme court outcomes. Advances in measurement, data archiving, and methodology now allow for consideration of the link between public opinion and judicial outcomes in the American states. The analysis presented considers public opinion's influence on the composition of courts (indirect effects) and its influence on judge votes in capital punishment cases (direct effects). In elective state supreme courts, public support for capital punishment influences the ideological composition of those courts and judge willingness to uphold death sentences. Notably, public support for capital punishment has no measurable effect on nonelective state supreme courts. On the highly salient issue of the death penalty, mass opinion and the institution of electing judges systematically influence court composition and judge behavior.