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This text brings into analytical focus the workings of whiteness within the politics regarding Ukrainian refugees in two neighboring countries, Austria and Czechia. Th is comparison aims to contextualize various racial hierarchies in which Ukrainian refugees are embedded, and to connect public discourses translated by mass media and critically accepted by scholars and experts with the personal experience of refugees and those recruited to help them in reception centers. We follow the layering and conversion of racial hierarchies through examining three interrelated realms of public policy: (1) the confl ation of illiberal and liberal populisms concerning the Russian invasion and the subsequent refugee movements in the discursive practices of leading politicians and those responsible for refugee politics; (2) the intersectionality of gender, class, and race as a locus of control over Ukrainian women, who comprise the majority of those fleeing the country; and (3) elaborating an extreme case of forging whiteness, within the overt and covert racist practices concerning Ukrainian Romani refugees. To conclude, we discuss possible directions for future research that apply critical whiteness studies for understanding how racial hierarchies design public politics concerning refugees, and what can be done to minimize the injustices determined by whiteness.

This paper explores how teachers respond to the requirement to promote 'fundamental British values' (FBV) to their pupils. It offers a preliminary analysis of data drawn from interviews with teachers and (mostly lesson) observations in schools. It argue that, first, the policy cannot be understood without a consideration of the multi-layered context in which it is being enacted in schools. Second, it locates the policy to promote FBV as a liberal nationalist one and considers some of the problematic issues that arise from this philosophy. Third, it turns to schools and teachers to consider their reactions and responses. It is concluded that teachers and schools in this research often did attempt to neutralize potentially exclusionary readings of the policy and were effective in absorbing the requirement to promote British values. However, doubt is cast on the policy's ability to meet its aims and the paper also raise concerns about the limited amount of time given to pupils' engagement with the values.

Is it true that national identity increases trust, as liberal nationalists assume? Recent research has studied this side of the ‘national identity argument’ by focusing on conceptions of the content of national identity (often civic or ethnic) and their links to social, rather than political, trust. This paper argues that if we take social identity theory seriously, however, we need to complement this picture by asking how varying the strength – rather than the content – of a person’s sense of their national identity affects both their social and political trust. We break down the different dimensions of national identity, hypothesizing and empirically verifying that there are divergent links from national attachment, national pride, and national chauvinism to social and political trust. We do so with data from the US (General Social Survey) and the Netherlands (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences ), thus expanding current knowledge of national identity and trust to a highly relevant yet neglected European case.

Rather than vilifying or rejecting it, an increasing number of scholars from two seemingly anti-nationalist cohorts, namely liberal political theory and multiculturalism, have come to argue that nationalism is not intrinsically illiberal or undesirable, but some forms of it (e.g. liberal, multicultural, pluralistic) can be a positive force to meet the demands for nation-building, national identity and national culture, on the one hand, and demands for recognition, respect and accommodation of diversity, on the other. This paper critically examines recent scholarly literature on liberal nationalism and multicultural nationalism. It argues that both projects have developed necessary responses to (1) growing diversity and (2) ethnonational and populist-majoritarian forms of nationalism and hence, are welcome. However, two substantial shortcomings need to be addressed. The first is the nation-building–education nexus and the limits of multicultural education (e.g. the teaching of history), and the second is the nationalism–transnationalism nexus or the normative desirability of dual nationalities. The paper concludes that a morally acceptable form of nationalism (e.g. pluralistic, inclusive or moderate) operating within multi-national and multicultural liberal democracies is theoretically possible, yet its viability is related to the extent to which it addresses the two issues raised, amongst others.

Many of the political debates in Europe call for the strengthening of a national identity that is, somewhat paradoxically, described in universal liberal terms. Yet previous research has not been able to tell to which extent these conceptions of national identity are indeed liberal. This is because we lack an analytical tool that allows liberal conceptions of national identity to be separated from, for example, conservative ones. There is also a pervasive yet questionable assumption that the more liberal a national identity is, the less it can per definition be truly national. This paper seeks to remedy this gap, by bridging the literature on these empirical trends of civic integration with the normative debates surrounding liberal nationalism. The result is a tripartite typology for the conceptions of national identity in conservative nationalism, liberal nationalism and constitutional patriotism, respectively. Each is specified along the following dimensions: (1) whether the sense of national belonging is defined by vertical or horizontal ties; (2) whether the national history is to be revered, taken as a starting point or critically scrutinised; (3) whether the legitimate place for the shared activity by which the national identity is upheld excludes the private or even the public non-political sphere; (4) whether we are asked to cultivate feelings of piety or loyalty to the homeland; and (5) whether or not the shared public culture of the nation is considered changeable and enforceable. Policy implications for individual rights, immigration and cultural minorities are also discussed.

This article examines national identification from a comparative and multilevel perspective. Building on the identity, nationalism, and prejudice literatures, I analyze relationships between societies' economic, political, and cultural characteristics (e.g., development, globalization, democratic governance, militarism, and religious and linguistic diversity), individual characteristics (e.g., socioeconomic status and minority status), and preferences for the content of national identities. I also examine relationships between national identity content and public policy preferences toward immigration, citizenship, assimilation, and foreign policy, generally. I use confirmatory factor analysis and multilevel modeling to analyze country-level data and survey data from 31 countries (from the International Social Survey Program's 2003 National Identity II Module). Results suggest that individual and country characteristics help account for the variable and contested nature of national identification. Moreover, the content of national identity categories has implications for public policy and intergroup relations.

Studies of national identity distinguish between ethnic and civic nations and have sought to identify these alternative conceptions of national identity in public opinion. The standard measurement technique is to assess the normative content of American national identity by asking survey respondents to rate the importance of particular traits for making someone a \"true\" American. We argue that such measures are problematic, chiefly because of the impact of nonrandom measurement error. We explore the influence of using ranking measures instead of ratings, using a survey experiment conducted on a nationally representative sample of Americans in 2008. The ranking method is superior for distinguishing between ethnic and civic conceptions of nationhood and, therefore, for predicting preferences on issues such as immigration policy. We develop a new statistical method that effectively \"converts\" ratings into scores that approximate rankings, resulting in the creation of more valid measures of both ethnic and civic national identities.

This article explores the national identity argument in unsettled times by using the COVID-19 pandemic as a test case. It uses a longitudinal survey among Jewish Israelis to examine whether the pandemic influenced levels of national identity and solidarity and whether it altered their relationship. The findings indicate a clear reduction in levels of solidarity, national attachment, and national chauvinism over time. They also show that the positive connection between national attachment and solidarity grew stronger, while the connection between national chauvinism and solidarity became weaker and insignificant. These findings provide complex evidence for the national identity argument.

Nationalism in China emerged through historical experiences of greatness and humiliation. Until the 19th century, the Chinese were proud of its civilization and considered themselves as the centre of the world. Humiliation in the wars with Britain and Japan created new feelings of nationalism in China. The nature of the nationalism changed according to variation in its relation with western countries. This paper analyzes four stages in the development of nationalism in China, i.e. socialist-oriented state control nationalism, liberal nationalism, Patriotic Nationalism and cyber-nationalism. It analyzes major features of each stage, and the causes lead to change from one stage to another. It examines top-down and bottom-up aspects in the development of nationalist feeling and concludes that even though the communist party has major role in creating a civic nationalism through its restriction on media and education system, the Chinese people show highly nationalist feeling even in abroad where they can access international media.

This article surveys nation-building efforts in post-Soviet Russia. There have been five main nation-building projects reflecting the dominant ways of imagining the 'true' Russian nation but each has been fraught with contradictions and therefore have been unable to easily guide state policies. At the same time, a solution to the Russian nation-building dilemma may be emerging. This solution does not resolve the contradictions associated with each of the nation-building agendas but instead legalises the ambiguous definition of the nation's boundaries in the 1999 law on compatriots and the 2010 amendments to it. The fuzzy definition of compatriots in the law allows Russia to pursue a variety of objectives and to target a variety of groups without solving the contradictions of existing nation-building discourses.