Explore the vast range of titles available.

This article will analyze the interpretation limits and methodologies used by the Constitutional Court when reviewing constitutional reforms. In Judgment C-551 of 2003, it was established that although the 1991 Colombian Consti­tution does not contain any eternity clauses, the consubstantial elements of the Constitution and those elements of the constitutional block that identify it cannot be changed through constitutional reform. In this case, the power of reform would become constituent power, subverting its powers and giving rise to a procedural defect. In this context, we will examine whether these methodologies are useful in limiting the broad degree of discretion the Court has in determining when a reform supersedes the Constitution En el artículo se analizarán los limites interpretativos y las metodologías que ha dispuesto la Corte Constitucional cuando hace la revisión de las reformas constitucionales. En la Sentencia C-551 de 2003, se dispuso que a pesar de que la Constitución colombiana de 1991 no contiene cláusulas pétreas, no se pueden cambiar o derogar a través de la reforma constitucional los elementos consustanciales de la Constitución y aquellos elementos del bloque de consti­tucionalidad que la identifican. En este caso el poder de reforma se convertiría en poder constituyente, subvertiría sus competencias y daría lugar a un vicio de forma. En este orden de ideas, se verificará si dichas metodologías son útiles para limitar el amplio grado de discrecionalidad que tiene la Corte en determinar cuándo una reforma sustituye la Constitución.

The topic of constitutional amendments in Nicaragua has not been widely studied beyond its borders. Since its promulgation in 1987, the Nicaraguan Constitution has been amended approximately sixteen times, modifying over 95 articles. Some of these changes were minimal, while others led to revolutionary alterations that disrupted essential elements such as the form and system of government and fundamental rights. To understand the dynam­ics of the constitutional amendments carried out between 1987 and the first quarter of 2024, this essay examines the content of those amendments and analyzes the constitutional amendment procedure established by the Nica­raguan Constitution. This procedure, combined with the country’s political situation, the absence of explicit unamendable clauses, and a virtually non-existent judicial review of constitutional amendments, makes it relatively easy to carry out all kinds of changes, with equal potential for both use and abuse of the constitutional amendment power. El tema de las reformas constitucionales en Nicaragua no ha sido muy estu­diado más allá de sus propias fronteras. Desde su promulgación en 1987, la Constitución nicaragüense ha sido reformada alrededor de dieciséis veces. En dichas ocasiones, se modificaron más de 95 artículos. Algunos de estos cam­bios fueron mínimos, pero otros llevaron a cabo alteraciones revolucionarias que trastocaron elementos esenciales como la forma y sistema de gobierno y los derechos fundamentales. Para comprender la dinámica de las reformas constitucionales llevadas a cabo entre 1987 y el primer trimestre de 2024, se hace un recorrido por el contenido de aquellas y se analiza el procedimiento de reforma constitucional diseñado por la Constitución nicaragüense, que, aunado a la situación política de aquel país, a la ausencia de cláusulas pétreas expresas y a un ––prácticamente–– inexistente control judicial de las reformas constitucionales, vuelve relativamente fácil la realización de toda clase de cambios, usando y abusando por igual del poder de reforma constitucional.

The unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine has emerged as a highly successful, albeit still controversial, export in comparative constitutional law. The doctrine has often been defended as protecting a delegation from the people to the political institutions that they created. Other work has noted the doctrine’s potential utility in guarding against abusive constitutionalism. In this article, we consider how these justifications fare when expanded to encompass claims against the original constitution itself, rather than a later amendment to the text. That is, beyond the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine, can or should there be a doctrine of an unconstitutional constitution? Our question is spurred by a puzzling 2015 case from Honduras where the Supreme Court held an unamendable one-term limit on presidential terms, as well as protective provisions punishing attempts to alter that limit, to be unconstitutional. What is particularly striking about the case is that these provisions were not later amendments to the constitution, but rather parts of the original 1982 constitution itself. Thus, this article examines the possibility of ‘an unconstitutional constitution’, what we predict to be the next trend in global constitutionalism.

Presidential term limit provisions are often perceived as a feature of modern democratic systems. It has been argued that their existence is a key intervention mechanism to pre-empt some undemocratic outcomes associated with incumbency advantages. In 2008, the Constitution of Cameroon was amended to abolish the presidential term limit. More than ten years on, there are ostensible signs of a democratic decline. This article takes a retrospective look at the constitutional amendment to assess its constitutionality. It is argued that a conclusion on the constitutionality of the amendment may not be unequivocal. Nevertheless, there are substantial grounds for considering the constitutional change as a constitutional dismemberment. This is premised on the fact that, although the amendment followed the normal rules for constitutional amendments, the transformation amounted to a fundamental break with the constitutional commitment to democracy that underpinned the adoption of the 1996 Constitution.

The Second Republic of Zimbabwe has witnessed continued political and socio-economic crises. Despite the worsening crisis under the new dispensation, there have been calls for extending the current administration’s term limit beyond 2028. The impending crisis has attracted several responses and criticisms across various sectors. The church collective in Zimbabwe has raised concerns over the crisis and issued several statements commenting on the developments in the national landscape. However, the church has been criticised for failing to speak with one voice, especially on political matters. The purpose of this article is to analyse the ecumenical statement that was released by the Zimbabwe Heads of Christian Denominations (ZHOCD) on 21 January 2025, titled ‘Statement on Presidential Constitutional Term Limit’. The letter is the church leader’s response to the ongoing pronouncements for extending the presidential term limits to allow the incumbent President Emmerson Mnangagwa to rule beyond his constitutionally mandated two terms, into 2030. The paper seeks to establish the role of the prophetic voice of the church in defending the constitution and the implications of such actions on the nature of the church–state relations in the Second Republic of Zimbabwe. The paper draws data from the issued ecumenical statement, the official government response to it, and general responses to it available online.

This article examines whether there are any limitations on constitutional amendment powers that are external to the constitutional system and above it—‘supra-constitutional’ limits. It considers the theory and practice of the relationship between natural law, international law or other supranational law, and domestic constitutional law in a comparative prism. After considering the alleged supremacy of supranational law over constitutional amendments, the author explores the problem of the relationship between the different legal orders in the external/internal juridical spheres, and the important potential and actual role of national courts in ‘domesticating’ supranational law and enforcing its supremacy. It is claimed that despite the growing influence of supranational law, state practice demonstrates that constitutional law is still generally superior to international law, and even when the normative hierarchical superiority of supranational law is recognized within the domestic legal order, this supremacy derives not from supranational law as a separate legal order, but rather from the constitution itself. Therefore, it is claimed that existing practice regarding arguments of ‘supra-constitutional’ limitations are better described by explicit or implicit limitations within the constitution itself, through which supranational standards can be infused to serve as valid limitations on constitutional amendment powers.

[...]the US Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia is unique among 93 US Attorney's Offices as it serves as both the federal and local prosecutor, and, just like all other US Attorneys, is appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate to serve four-year terms. 28 U.S.C. § 541(b). Since the passage of the 22nd Amendment, credible arguments against presidential term limits have been rare. [...]prosecutorial decision-making and its effects are important subjects in the theoretical and empirical work of criminologists and scholars of law and society. [...]with no possibility of additional terms, DAs might be motivated to maximize their impact during their limited tenure, potentially increasing measurable outcomes and advancing transparency by publishing public-facing dashboards or even case-level data.

A growing number of states have modified constitutionally determined presidential term limits or adopted a flexible interpretation of relevant constitutional provisions to allow incumbent leaders additional terms in the highest office. This article investigates African Union (AU) responses to attempts to overturn or weaken term limits on executive power, one of the most tenacious constitutional trends in Africa. Inspired by the AU's well-established discourse on “unconstitutional changes of government” under the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the article frames the manipulation of presidential term limits as “undemocratic changes of the constitution”. From this perspective it argues for a more active role for the AU in monitoring and enforcing constitutionalism and respect for democratic standards by member states when they amend their constitution. It concludes with a tentative set of principles to guide processes of constitutional change in Africa.

The 2018 constitutional amendments in China have attracted strong criticism both at home and abroad. This paper first uses contextual, historical, and empirical analysis to examine whether the three major amendments are as bad as widely perceived, and whether or not they will have a significant impact on actual constitutional practice in China. The paper then analyses how the constitutional amendments may challenge the two existing theories on Chinese constitutionalism. The paper argues that although none of the constitutional amendments will have any practical importance, they do send out a very negative signal, and that the trend of a constitutionalised fused system demands at least revision of the existing theories and possibly a new theory, for the purpose of not only justifying Chinese constitutional practice but also leading China towards at least a thin rule of law.

It might seem counter-intuitive to suggest that the chasm between Europe and her citizens is partially caused by the weakening of constituent power at the national level. Nonetheless, this article contends that the strength of ever closer union depends partly on the resilience of national constituent power. An insight recovered from French constitutional theory – that respect for constituent power is closely related to respect for limits on the power of amendment – is used as a measure of this resilience. Upon examination of judicial decisions in Germany and Spain in which enumerated substantive limits on the power of amendment have not been satisfactorily enforced, and others in Ireland and France in which the existence of essential limits on the power of amendment has been flatly denied, this article concludes that by debilitating national constituent power, ironically treaty ratifications conduce to ever closer remoteness between the peoples of Europe.