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The uniform pricing puzzle for vertically differentiated media and entertainment products (movies, books, music, mobile apps, etc.) is that a firm with market power sells high- and low-quality products at the same price even though quality is perfectly observable and price adjustments are not costly. We resolve this puzzle by assuming that consumers have an uncertain taste for quality and accounting for consumer loss aversion in monetary and consumption utilities. The novelty of our approach is that the so-called reference transaction is endogenously set as part of a \"personal equilibrium\" and is based only on past purchases of same-quality products.

To date, the studies on managerial loss aversion have produced contradictory findings, making it impossible to: (i) identify the ultimate impact of managerial loss aversion on the value that organisations create for themselves and for their stakeholders, and (ii) mitigate the effect of managerial loss aversion to improve corporate value creation. With the aim of filling this gap, the authors of this paper first performed a Systematic Literature Review (SLR), resulting in 65 relevant papers. The 65 papers were then analysed through a Thematic Analysis (TA), which was aimed at isolating and revising the single effects of managerial loss aversion on the corporate value creation process. Once it became clear when and how managerial loss aversion leads to negative impacts on corporate value creation (such as suboptimal investments in corporate social responsibility, short-term-oriented budget expenditures, illegal corporate conduct in favourable contexts, and low demand for audit quality), a novel theoretical framework was built. This framework proposes some preliminary approaches to mitigate these detrimental effects. In particular, future empirical research may operationalise potential debiasing strategies, derived from critical analysis of the literature, to reduce managerial loss aversion in different business settings, thereby improving corporate value creation.

Loss aversion is a central element of prospect theory, the dominant theory of decision making under uncertainty for the past four decades, and refers to the overweighting of potential losses relative to equivalent gains, a critical determinant of risky decision making. Recent advances in affective and decision neuroscience have shed new light on the psychological and neurobiological mechanisms underlying loss aversion. Here, integrating disparate literatures from the level of neurotransmitters to subjective reports of emotion, we propose a novel neural and computational framework that links norepinephrine to loss aversion and identifies a distinct role for dopamine in risk taking for rewards. We also propose that loss aversion specifically relates to anticipated emotions and aspects of the immediate experience of realized gains and losses but not their long-term emotional consequences, highlighting an underappreciated temporal structure. Finally, we discuss challenges to loss aversion and the relevance of loss aversion to understanding psychiatric disorders. Refining models of loss aversion will have broad consequences for the science of decision making and for how we understand individual variation in economic preferences and psychological wellbeing across both healthy and psychiatric populations.

Kahneman and Tversky (1979) first demonstrated that when individuals decide whether or not to accept a gamble, potential losses receive more weight than possible gains in the decision. This phenomenon is referred to as loss aversion. We investigated how loss aversion in risky financial decisions is influenced by sudden changes to wealth, employing both behavioral and neurobiological measures. We implemented an fMRI experimental paradigm, based on that employed by Tom et al. (2007). There are two treatments, called RANDOM and CONTINGENT. In RANDOM, the baseline setting, the changes to wealth, referred to as wealth shocks in economics, are independent of the actual choices participants make. Under CONTINGENT, we induce the belief that the changes in income are a consequence of subjects' own decisions. The magnitudes and sequence of the shocks to wealth are identical between the CONTINGENT and RANDOM treatments. We investigated whether more loss aversion existed in one treatment than another. The behavioral results showed significantly greater loss aversion in CONTINGENT compared to RANDOM after a negative wealth shock. No differences were observed in the response to positive shocks. The fMRI results revealed a neural loss aversion network, comprising the bilateral striatum, amygdala and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex that was common to the CONTINGENT and RANDOM tasks. However, the ventral prefrontal cortex, primary somatosensory cortex and superior occipital cortex, showed greater activation in response to a negative change in wealth due to individual's own decisions than when the change was exogenous. These results indicate that striatum activation correlates with loss aversion independently of the source of the shock, and that the ventral prefrontal cortex (vPFC) codes the experimental manipulation of agency in one's actions influencing loss aversion.

It is proposed that a future time interval's perceived length will be affected by whether the interval ends with a gain or loss. Confirming this, several experiments indicate that consumers perceive intervals ending with losses as shorter than equivalent intervals ending with gains. The authors explore the mechanisms underlying these effects, and they identify several parallels between the current effects and loss aversion. The authors further show that these changes in time perception influence consumption decisions, and they consider the implications of the findings for theories of time perception and intertemporal choice.

Bimatrix games are reconsidered under assumption that players are loss averse and payoffs are fuzzy, where reference points are given exogenously. The impact of loss aversion on bimatrix game is investigated by applying credibility theory. Three solution concepts of credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibria (i.e., expected loss aversion Nash equilibrium, optimistic loss aversion Nash equilibrium and pessimistic loss aversion Nash equilibrium) and their existence theorems are proposed. The sufficient and necessary conditions are presented to find three equilibria. It is found that three credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibria are equivalent if confidence level is equal to 0.5. Furthermore, an analysis on credibilistic loss aversion equilibria with respect to loss aversion is performed in a 2 × 2 bimatrix game with triangular fuzzy payoffs. It is found that with a higher probability a more loss-averse player receives a preferred payoff in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in some situations, but receives the second highest payoff in other situations. Finally, a case study is shown to illustrate the validity of the bimatrix game with triangular fuzzy payoffs developed in this paper.

Inspired by Shalev’s model of loss aversion, we propose a bimatrix game with loss aversion, where the elements in payoff matrices are characterized as symmetric triangular fuzzy numbers, and investigate the effect of loss aversion on equilibrium strategies. Firstly, we define a solution concept of ( α , β )-loss aversion Nash equilibrium and prove that it exists in any bimatrix game with loss aversion and symmetric triangular fuzzy payoffs. Furthermore, a sufficient and necessary condition is proposed to find the ( α , β )-loss aversion Nash equilibrium. Finally, for a 2 × 2 bimatrix game with symmetric triangular fuzzy payoffs, the relation between the ( α , β )-loss aversion Nash equilibrium and loss aversion coefficients is discussed when players are loss averse and it is analyzed when a player can benefit from his opponent’s misperceiving belief about his loss aversion level.

As firms continue to abandon pensions in favor of employee-managed retirement plans, tremendous demands are being placed on the decision-making proficiency of future retirees. As reflected in the equity premium puzzle, individual investors tend to hold overly conservative portfolios that provide meager payoffs over time. Consequently, there is growing concern that the vast majority of retirement accounts might be insufficiently funded when employees reach retirement. Given that most retirement plans can now be managed online, a potential solution lies in designing a Web-based decision support system (DSS) that helps future retirees make more-profitable portfolio management decisions. This paper reports the results of a study in which 159 retirement plan participants were asked to use an experimental website to manage a portfolio of retirement investments over a simulated 30-year period. Using a psychological approach toward designing the DSS, myopic loss aversion is put forth as a theoretical explanation for the psychological mechanisms that encourage investors to hold overly conservative portfolios. Armed with this knowledge, three design features—information horizon, system restrictiveness, and decisional guidance—are implemented as part of an overarching design strategy targeted at increasing investors' willingness to take calculated risks. The results indicate that investor conservatism diminishes when the DSS presents prospective probabilities and payoffs over long time horizons. In contrast, short-term information horizons constitute a major stumbling block for investors. However, when confronted with short-term information horizons, risk aversion can be successfully counteracted by configuring a DSS to either restrict the frequency of decisions or to suggest a relatively aggressive portfolio allocation. These findings carry important implications for theory and practice.

Theory predicts that entrepreneurs have distinct attitudes toward risk and uncertainty, but empirical evidence is mixed. To better understand the unique behavioral characteristics of entrepreneurs and the causes of these mixed results, we perform a large “lab-in-the-field” experiment comparing entrepreneurs to managers (a suitable comparison group) and employees ( n = 2,288). The results indicate that entrepreneurs perceive themselves as less risk averse than managers and employees, in line with common wisdom. However, when using experimental incentivized measures, the differences are subtler. Entrepreneurs are only found to be unique in their lower degree of loss aversion, and not in their risk or ambiguity aversion. This combination of results might be explained by our finding that perceived risk attitude is not only correlated to risk aversion but also to loss aversion. Overall, we therefore suggest using a broader definition of risk that captures this unique feature of entrepreneurs: their willingness to risk losses. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics .

We call a decision maker risk averse for losses if that decision maker is risk averse with respect to lotteries having alternatives below a given reference alternative in their support. A two-person bargaining solution is called invariant under risk aversion for losses if the assigned outcome does not change after correcting for risk aversion for losses with this outcome as pair of reference levels, provided that the disagreement point only changes proportionally. We present an axiomatic characterization of the Nash bargaining solution based on this condition, and we also provide a decision-theoretic characterization of the concept of risk aversion for losses.