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The detection of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) in lactating dairy cattle in the United States, with high viral titers in raw milk, has raised concerns about zoonotic transmission through unpasteurized milk and dairy products. While viral inactivation during pasteurization is documented, data on persistence in raw-milk cheeses remain limited. This study evaluated the survival of avian influenza viruses (AIVs), both low pathogenic (LPAIV, H1N1) and highly pathogenic (HPAIV, H5N1), during the production and ripening of Grana-type hard cheeses from raw cow’s milk. Experimental cheesemaking was carried out with milk artificially contaminated with A/duck/Italy/281904-2/06 (H1N1; 107.75 EID50/mL) or A/duck/Italy/326224-2/22 (H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b; 106.75 EID50/mL). Cheeses were manufactured under Parmigiano-Reggiano standards and ripened 30 days at 5–6 °C. Viral detection in finished cheeses was performed using inoculation in specific-pathogen-free embryonated chicken eggs (SPF-ECEs), hemagglutination (HA) assay, and monoclonal antibody-based ELISA. No infectious virus was detected in cheese samples after two blind passages in SPF-ECEs. Both HA and ELISA tests were negative, indicating complete viral inactivation. These results demonstrate that Grana-type cheese processing, including cooking, acidification, and ripening, effectively inactivates LPAIV and HPAIV. Findings support the microbiological safety of raw-milk hard cheeses regarding AIV, contributing to risk assessment and food safety policies.

There have been three waves of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks in commercial, backyard poultry, and wild birds in Ukraine. The first (2005–2006) and second (2008) waves were caused by H5N1 HPAI virus, with 45 outbreaks among commercial poultry (chickens) and backyard fowl (chickens, ducks, and geese) in four regions of Ukraine (AR Crimea, Kherson, Odesa, and Sumy Oblast). H5N1 HPAI viruses were isolated from dead wild birds: cormorants (Phalacrocorax carbo) and great crested grebes (Podiceps cristatus) in 2006 and 2008. The third HPAI wave consisted of nine outbreaks of H5N8 HPAI in wild and domestic birds, beginning in November 2016 in the central and south regions (Kherson, Odesa, Chernivtsi, Ternopil, and Mykolaiv Oblast). H5N8 HPAI virus was detected in dead mute swans (Cygnus olor), peacocks (Pavo cristatus) (in zoo), ruddy shelducks (Tadorna ferruginea), white-fronted geese (Anser albifrons), and from environmental samples in 2016 and 2017. Wide wild bird surveillance for avian influenza (AI) virus was conducted from 2006 to 2016 in Ukraine regions suspected of being intercontinental (north–south and east–west) flyways. A total of 21 511 samples were collected from 105 species of wild birds representing 27 families and 11 orders. Ninety-five avian influenza (AI) viruses were isolated (including one H5N2 LPAI virus in 2010) from wild birds with a total of 26 antigenic hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) combinations. Fifteen of 16 known avian HA subtypes were isolated. Two H5N8 HPAI viruses (2016–2017) and two H5N2 LPAI viruses (2016) were isolated from wild birds and environmental samples (fresh bird feces) during surveillance before the outbreak in poultry in 2016–2017. The Ukrainian H5N1, H5N8 HPAI, and H5N2 LPAI viruses belong to different H5 phylogenetic groups. Our results demonstrate the great diversity of AI viruses in wild birds in Ukraine, as well as the importance of this region for studying the ecology of avian influenza.

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses (HPAIVs) arise from low pathogenic precursors following spillover from wild waterfowl into poultry populations. The main virulence determinant of HPAIVs is the presence of a multi-basic cleavage site (MBCS) in the hemagglutinin (HA) glycoprotein. The MBCS allows for HA cleavage and, consequently, activation by ubiquitous proteases, which results in systemic dissemination in terrestrial poultry. Since 1959, 51 independent MBCS acquisition events have been documented, virtually all in HA from the H5 and H7 subtypes. In the present article, data from natural LPAIV to HPAIV conversions and experimental in vitro and in vivo studies were reviewed in order to compile recent advances in understanding HA cleavage efficiency, protease usage, and MBCS acquisition mechanisms. Finally, recent hypotheses that might explain the unique predisposition of the H5 and H7 HA sequences to obtain an MBCS in nature are discussed.

There have been three waves of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks in commercial, backyard poultry, and wild birds in Ukraine. The first (2005–2006) and second (2008) waves were caused by H5N1 HPAI virus, with 45 outbreaks among commercial poultry (chickens) and backyard fowl (chickens, ducks, and geese) in four regions of Ukraine (AR Crimea, Kherson, Odesa, and Sumy Oblast). H5N1 HPAI viruses were isolated from dead wild birds: cormorants (Phalacrocorax carbo) and great crested grebes (Podiceps cristatus) in 2006 and 2008. The third HPAI wave consisted of nine outbreaks of H5N8 HPAI in wild and domestic birds, beginning in November 2016 in the central and south regions (Kherson, Odesa, Chernivtsi, Ternopil, and Mykolaiv Oblast). H5N8 HPAI virus was detected in dead mute swans (Cygnus olor), peacocks (Pavo cristatus) (in zoo), ruddy shelducks (Tadorna ferruginea), white-fronted geese (Anser albifrons), and from environmental samples in 2016 and 2017. Wide wild bird surveillance for avian influenza (AI) virus was conducted from 2006 to 2016 in Ukraine regions suspected of being intercontinental (north–south and east–west) flyways. A total of 21 511 samples were collected from 105 species of wild birds representing 27 families and 11 orders. Ninety-five avian influenza (AI) viruses were isolated (including one H5N2 LPAI virus in 2010) from wild birds with a total of 26 antigenic hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) combinations. Fifteen of 16 known avian HA subtypes were isolated. Two H5N8 HPAI viruses (2016–2017) and two H5N2 LPAI viruses (2016) were isolated from wild birds and environmental samples (fresh bird feces) during surveillance before the outbreak in poultry in 2016–2017. The Ukrainian H5N1, H5N8 HPAI, and H5N2 LPAI viruses belong to different H5 phylogenetic groups. Our results demonstrate the great diversity of AI viruses in wild birds in Ukraine, as well as the importance of this region for studying the ecology of avian influenza. Ha habido tres oleadas de brotes de influenza aviar altamente patógena en aves comerciales, de traspatio y en aves silvestres en Ucrania. La primera (2005-2006) y la segunda (2008) fueron causadas por el virus de influenza aviar de alta patogenicidad H5N1, con 45 brotes en aves comerciales (pollos) y aves de traspatio (pollos, patos y gansos) en cuatro regiones de Ucrania (AR Crimea, Kherson, Odesa y Sumy Oblast). Los virus de alta patogenicidad H5N1se aislaron de aves silvestres muertas: cormoranes (Phalacrocorax carbo) y de somormujos lavanco (Podiceps cristatus) en 2006 y 2008. La tercera ola del virus de influenza aviar de alta patogenicidad consistió en nueve brotes del virus de alta patogenicidad subtipo H5N8 en aves silvestres y domésticas, a partir de noviembre de 2016 en las regiones central y sur (Kherson, Odesa, Chernivtsi, Ternopil y Mykolaiv Oblast). Se detectó el virus al patogenicidad H5N8 en cisnes blancos muertos (Cygnus olor), pavos reales (Pavo cristatus) (en zoológicos), tarros canelos (Tadorna ferruginea), gansos caretos (Anser albifrons) y en muestras ambientales en 2016 y 2017. Una vigilancia más amplia de aves silvestres para detectar el virus de la influenza aviar se realizó entre 2006 y 2016 en las regiones de Ucrania sospechosas de ser rutas migratorias intercontinentales (norte-sur y este-oeste). Se recolectaron un total de 21,511 muestras de 105 especies de aves silvestres que representan a 27 familias y 11 órdenes. Se aislaron ochenta y dos virus de influenza aviar de baja patogenicidad (incluido un virus H5N2 de baja patogenicidad del 2010) de aves silvestres con un total de 23 combinaciones antigénicas de hemaglutininas (HA) y neuraminidasas (NA). Se aislaron quince de los 16 subtipos de HA aviar conocidos. Dos virus de alta patogenicidad H5N8 y dos virus H5N2 de baja patogenicidad se aislaron de aves silvestres vivas y de muestras ambientales (heces de aves frescas) durante la vigilancia antes del brote en avicultura. Los virus ucranianos de alta patogenicidad H5N1, H5N8 y de baja patogenicidad H5N2 pertenecen a diferentes grupos filogenéticos de H5. Estos resultados demuestran la gran diversidad de virus de la influenza aviar en aves silvestres en Ucrania, así como la importancia de esta región para estudiar la ecología de la influenza aviar.

Low pathogenic avian influenza virus (LPAIV) usually causes mild disease or asymptomatic infection in poultry. LPAIV has, however, become a great threat to poultry industry due to mixed infections with other pathogens. Coinfections do frequently occur in the field but are not easily detected, and their impact on pathobiology is not clearly defined due to their complicated nature, but it is well known that there is an impact. One way to increase our knowledge of coinfections in poultry is to challenge birds in experimental and controlled conditions. While many articles report in vivo experiments with LPAIV in avian models, only a few have studied coinfections. Moreover, researchers tend to choose different bird types, ages, inoculation routes, and doses for their experiments, making it difficult to compare between studies. This review describes the state of the art for experimental infections with LPAIV alone or associated with coinfecting pathogens in avian models. It also discusses how best to mimic field infections in laboratory settings. In the field of avian diseases, experimental design is obviously directly linked with the research question addressed, but there is a gap between field and experimental data, and further studies are warranted to better understand how to bring laboratory settings closer to field situations.

A vast diversity of 16 influenza hemagglutinin (HA) subtypes are found in birds. Interestingly, viruses from only two subtypes, H5 and H7, have so far evolved into highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) following insertions or substitutions at the HA cleavage site by the viral polymerase. The mechanisms underlying this striking subtype specificity are still unknown. Here, we compiled a comprehensive dataset of 20,488 avian influenza virus HA sequences to investigate differences in nucleotide and amino acid usage at the HA cleavage site between subtypes and how these might impact the genesis of HPAIVs by polymerase stuttering and realignment. We found that sequences of the H5 and H7 subtypes stand out by their high purine content at the HA cleavage site. In addition, fewer substitutions were necessary in H5 and H7 HAs than in HAs from other subtypes to acquire an insertion-prone HA cleavage site sequence, as defined based on in vitro and in vivo data from the literature. Codon usage was more favorable for HPAIV genesis in sequences of viruses isolated from species or geographical regions in which HPAIV genesis is more frequently observed in nature. The results of the present analyses suggest that the subtype restriction of HPAIV genesis to H5 and H7 influenza viruses might be due to the particular codon usage at the HA cleavage site in these subtypes.

Understanding the transmission dynamics and persistence of avian influenza viruses (AIVs) in the wild is an important scientific and public health challenge because this system represents both a reservoir for recombination and a source of novel, potentially human-pathogenic strains. The current paradigm locates all important transmission events on the nearly direct fecal/oral bird-to-bird pathway. In this article, on the basis of overlooked evidence, we propose that an environmental virus reservoir gives rise to indirect transmission. This transmission mode could play an important epidemiological role. Using a stochastic model, we demonstrate how neglecting environmentally generated transmission chains could underestimate the explosiveness and duration of AIV epidemics. We show the important pathogen invasion implications of this phenomenon: the nonnegligible probability of outbreak even when direct transmission is absent, the long-term infectivity of locations of prior outbreaks, and the role of environmental heterogeneity in risk.

Highly pathogenic (HP) avian influenza viruses (AIVs) are naturally restricted to H5 and H7 subtypes with a polybasic cleavage site (CS) in hemagglutinin (HA) and any AIV with an intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) ≥ 1.2. Although only a few non-H5/H7 viruses fulfill the criteria of HPAIV; it remains unclear why these viruses did not spread in domestic birds. In 2012, a unique H4N2 virus with a polybasic CS 322PEKRRTR/G329 was isolated from quails in California which, however, was avirulent in chickens. This is the only known non-H5/H7 virus with four basic amino acids in the HACS. Here, we investigated the virulence of this virus in chickens after expansion of the polybasic CS by substitution of T327R (322PEKRRRR/G329) or T327K (322PEKRRKR/G329) with or without reassortment with HPAIV H5N1 and H7N7. The impact of single mutations or reassortment on virus fitness in vitro and in vivo was studied. Efficient cell culture replication of T327R/K carrying H4N2 viruses increased by treatment with trypsin, particularly in MDCK cells, and reassortment with HPAIV H5N1. Replication, virus excretion and bird-to-bird transmission of H4N2 was remarkably compromised by the CS mutations, but restored after reassortment with HPAIV H5N1, although not with HPAIV H7N7. Viruses carrying the H4-HA with or without R327 or K327 mutations and the other seven gene segments from HPAIV H5N1 exhibited high virulence and efficient transmission in chickens. Together, increasing the number of basic amino acids in the H4N2 HACS was detrimental for viral fitness particularly in vivo but compensated by reassortment with HPAIV H5N1. This may explain the absence of non-H5/H7 HPAIV in poultry.

Influenza A virus (AIV) circulation was investigated in the Lombardy region, during 2022–2024, in wild ducks (through hunting and sampling of faecal samples within natural parks) and wild birds found dead. Samples were analysed through real-time RT-PCRs for Influenza A virus, H5 and H7. Whole genome sequencing was performed on AIV-positive samples. Screening of 3497 hunted Anatidae revealed a total of 184 positive samples. Complete sequencing of 136 samples highlighted the presence of 21 different subtypes ranging from H1N1 to H12N5. The H5N1 HPAIV (high pathogenic AIV) subtype, clade 2.3.4.4b, was the most common during the 2022–2023 winter season (31.8%), while H5 LPAI (low pathogenic AIV) strains were the most prevalent (28.6%) in the 2023–2024 season. The molecular survey on wild birds found dead (n = 481) showed two positive buzzards (14%, 2/14), one grey heron (5.5%, 1/18) and one kestrel (7.6%, 1/13). Regarding the order of Charadriiformes, the dead gulls sampled in 2022 (17 birds) were all negative, whereas 85 out of 167 (51%) individuals were positive in 2023. All positives were caused by an H5N1 HPAIV clade 2.3.4.4b virus belonging to genotype BB. All the faecal samples (1699) received from passive surveillance in nature parks were analysed for AIV with negative results.

Low pathogenic H9N2 avian influenza (LPAI H9N2) is considered one of the most important diseases found in poultry (broiler, laying hens, breeding chickens, and turkeys). This infection causes considerable economic losses. The objective of this work was to monitor and assess the presence of avian influenza virus (AIV) H9N2 in eight different regions of Morocco using real-time RT-PCR, and to assess the phylogenetic and molecular evolution of the H9N2 viruses between 2016 and 2019. Field samples were collected from 108 farms suspected of being infected with LPAI H9N2 virus. Samples were analyzed using H9N2-specific real-time RT-PCR. Highly positive samples were subjected to virus isolation and seven isolates were fully sequenced. Low pathogenic H9N2 avian influenza virus was introduced in Morocco in 2016. We show that in 2018–2019, the virus was still present irrespective of vaccination status. Phylogenetic and molecular analyses showed mutations related to virulence, although our viruses were related to 2016 Moroccan viruses and grouped in the G1 lineage. Specific amino acid substitutions were identified in Moroccan H9N2 viruses that are believed to lead to increased resistance to antiviral drugs.