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Wild aquatic birds are natural reservoirs of low‐pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (LPAIVs). Laughing gulls inoculated with four gull‐origin LPAIVs (H7N3, H6N4, H3N8, and H2N3) had a predominate respiratory infection. By contrast, mallards inoculated with two mallard‐origin LPAIVs (H5N6 and H4N8) became infected and had similar virus titers in oropharyngeal (OP) and cloacal (CL) swabs. The trend toward predominate OP shedding in gulls suggest a greater role of direct bird transmission in maintenance, whereas mallards shedding suggests importance of fecal‐oral transmission through water contamination. Additional infectivity and pathogenesis studies are needed to confirm this replication difference for LPAI viruses in gulls.

The H9 and H6 subtypes of low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (LPAIVs) cause substantial economic losses in poultry worldwide, including Vietnam. Herein, we characterized Vietnamese H9 and H6 LPAIVs to facilitate the control of avian influenza. The space–time representative viruses of each subtype were selected based on active surveillance from 2014 to 2018 in Vietnam. Phylogenetic analysis using hemagglutinin genes revealed that 54 H9 and 48 H6 Vietnamese LPAIVs were classified into the sublineages Y280/BJ94 and Group II, respectively. Gene constellation analysis indicated that 6 and 19 genotypes of the H9 and H6 subtypes, respectively, belonged to the representative viruses. The Vietnamese viruses are genetically related to the previous isolates and those in neighboring countries, indicating their circulation in poultry after being introduced into Vietnam. The antigenicity of these subtypes was different from that of viruses isolated from wild birds. Antigenicity was more conserved in the H9 viruses than in the H6 viruses. Furthermore, a representative H9 LPAIV exhibited systemic replication in chickens, which was enhanced by coinfection with avian pathogenic Escherichia coli O2. Although H9 and H6 were classified as LPAIVs, their characterization indicated that their silent spread might significantly affect the poultry industry.

Objectives Ducks can shed and spread influenza A viruses (IAVs) while showing no disease signs. Our objective was to clarify the role of ‘foie gras’ ducks in the circulation of IAVs in Bulgaria. Methods Monthly avian influenza surveillance was conducted on 63 ‘foie gras’ duck farms, 52 of which were surveyed throughout the study between November 2008 and April 2012. Virologic and serologic samples were collected and tested. During this time, wild bird samples were collected at major wild bird‐resting areas near the Black Sea coast and Danube River. Results The study showed high isolation frequency of low‐pathogenicity avian influenza viruses. In the raising population (<75 days old), subtypes H3, H4, and H6 were detected monthly and H5 LPAIV, sporadically. Different subtypes (H1, H10, H11) were isolated from the fattening premises (75‐ to 100‐day‐old ducks), suggesting different routes of introduction. Only 6 of the 52 farms that were surveyed both virologically and serologically were influenza‐free throughout the study, possibly due to higher biosecurity measures implemented. No evidence of direct transmission of IAV from wild birds was found. Wild bird surveillance showed low isolation frequency of IAV. IAV prevalence of 0·55% for migratory ducks and 0·53% for migratory geese was estimated in November–December 2011 and January–February 2012, respectively, at two ornithologically important locations near the Black Sea coast. Conclusions The ‘foie gras’ duck farms in Bulgaria are an optimal niche where Eurasian‐like IAVs are maintained and reassorted unapparent to farmers and veterinarians.

Between 2006 and 2008, only one outbreak of highly pathogenic notifiable avian influenza (AI) was reported from the Americas, the Caribbean, and Australia. The outbreak, caused by H7N3, occurred in September 2007 in a multiage broiler breeder facility (∼49,000 birds) near Regina Beach in southern Saskatchewan, Canada. The disease was confined to a single farm; the farm was depopulated. All other reports of infections in poultry or wild birds involved low pathogenicity AI viruses. A notable event that occurred during the 3-yr period was the spread of low pathogenicity notifiable AI (LPNAI) H5N2 (Mexican lineage) into the Caribbean countries of the Dominican Republic and Haiti in 2007 and 2008, respectively, representing the first detection of AI reported in these countries. Mexico reported that the LPNAI H5N2 virus continued to circulate in the central regions of the country, and a total of 49 isolations were made from 12 states between 2006 and 2008. Also, during this period there was a significant increase in AI surveillance in many countries throughout the Americas, the Caribbean, and Australia, resulting in the detection of AI subtypes H1 through H12 and N1 through N9 in domestic bird species (chickens, turkeys, guinea fowl, upland game birds, and ducks/geese). The United States was the only one of these countries that reported detections of LPNAI (H5 or H7) infections in commercial poultry: one in chickens (H7N3, 2007), two in turkeys (H5N1 and H5N2, 2007), and one in pheasants (H5N8, 2008). Detections of AI viruses in wild birds between 2006 and 2008 were reported from North America (Canada and the United States), South America (Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil), and Australia.

We present the results of Canada’s Interagency Surveillance Program for Avian Influenza in Wild Birds in the year following the first detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N1 on the continent. The surveillance program tested over 17,000 wild birds, both sick and apparently healthy, which revealed spatiotemporal and taxonomic patterns in HPAIV prevalence and mortality across Canada. The significant shift in the presence and distribution of HPAIV in Canada’s wild birds underscores the need for sustained investment in wild bird surveillance and collaboration across One Health partners.

After a sharp decrease of influenza A(H7N9) virus in China in 2018, highly pathogenic H7N9 viruses re-emerged in 2019. These H7N9 variants exhibited a new predominant subclade and had been cocirculating at a low level in eastern and northeastern China. Several immune escape mutations and antigenic drift were observed in H7N9 variants.

The current panzootic of high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 has been catastrophic for wildlife, and following substantial geographic spread, clade 2.3.4.4b is found in every region aside from Oceania. Herein, we report the results of our third year of targeted surveillance of incoming migratory seabirds and shorebirds into Australia. From October to December 2024, we captured and sampled 946 migratory shorebirds (Charadriiformes) and seabirds (Procelariiformes) in Australia to rule out the arrival of HPAI H5N1. We did not find evidence of HPAI H5N1 in any of the birds tested, and there were no reports of HPAI H5N1 in wildlife tested through other surveillance schemes in 2024. Unlike previous years, we detected a diversity of low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) viruses in shorebirds. Through phylogenetic analysis, we revealed that the H3N7 and H4N7 viruses recovered from Red-necked Stints were complex mosaic viruses, comprising segments of Eurasian, Australian shorebird and Australian waterfowl segments. One H1N7 virus detected comprised a wholly Eurasian introduction, confirming this incursion route for avian influenza viruses into Australian ecosystems. These results provide further evidence for the key role of long-distance migratory shorebirds in introducing novel LPAI viruses into Oceania. While our focus on northern migration routes remained appropriate for HPAI H5N1 surveillance in 2024, the continued spread of HPAI H5N1 to sub-Antarctic Islands demands consideration of a potential southern incursion route for Oceania in future.

Australia is a sink for low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses, with isolated circulation occurring on the continent. We report the incursion of a Eurasian low pathogenicity avian influenza H5 virus into Australia. This report benefits surveillance and diagnostic work because of the risk and current absence of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1).

Genomic sequencing of reemerging highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus detected in Argentina in February 2025 revealed novel triple-reassortant viruses containing gene segments from Eurasian H5N1 and low pathogenicity viruses from South and North American lineages. Our findings highlight continued evolution and diversification of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 in the Americas.

Avian influenza virus (AIV) subtypes H5 and H7 are capable of mutating from low to high pathogenicity strains, causing high mortality in poultry with significant economic losses globally. During 2015, two outbreaks of H7N7 low pathogenicity AIV (LPAIV) in Germany, and one each in the United Kingdom (UK) and The Netherlands occurred, as well as single outbreaks of H7N7 high pathogenicity AIV (HPAIV) in Germany and the UK. Both HPAIV outbreaks were linked to precursor H7N7 LPAIV outbreaks on the same or adjacent premises. Herein, we describe the clinical, epidemiological, and virological investigations for the H7N7 UK HPAIV outbreak on a farm with layer chickens in mixed free-range and caged units. H7N7 HPAIV was identified and isolated from clinical samples, as well as H7N7 LPAIV, which could not be isolated. Using serological and molecular evidence, we postulate how the viruses spread throughout the premises, indicating potential points of incursion and possible locations for the mutation event. Serological and mortality data suggested that the LPAIV infection preceded the HPAIV infection and afforded some clinical protection against the HPAIV. These results document the identification of a LPAIV to HPAIV mutation in nature, providing insights into factors that drive its manifestation during outbreaks.