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Ekološka kriza izziva temeljne predpostavke modernega političnega besedišča, vključno z dualizmom narava in družba. S pojmi ontološke politike in ontološkega obrata skušamo opisati posledice tega dualizma, njegovo krizo in možnosti politične konstitucije onkraj njega. Članek tematizira ponoven interes za ontološko politična vprašanja. Pri tem izhaja iz izkušnje agroekologije, nedavnega razvoja gibanj za podnebno pravičnost in za zaščito zemlje in iz pristopov družbenih gibanj proti neoliberalni globalizaciji. Avtor razvija ontološko predpostavko za svet mnogoterih svetov in zagovarja njeno veljavnost proti ugovorom domnevne indiferentnosti relacijskih ontologij.

David Wallace has argued that there is no special problem for free will in the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, beyond the well-known problem of reconciling free will with physical determinism. I argue to the contrary that, on the plausible and popular “deep self” approach to compatibilism, the many-worlds interpretation does face a special problem. It is not clear on the many-worlds picture how our actions can issue from our most central character traits, given that copies of us in other branches are certain to act differently than we do.

A defence is offered of a version of the branch-counting rule in the Everett interpretation (otherwise known as many worlds interpretation) of quantum mechanics that both depends on the state and is continuous in the norm topology on Hilbert space. The well-known branch-counting rule, for realistic models of measurements, in which branches are defined by decoherence theory, fails this test. The new rule hinges on the use of decoherence theory in defining branching structure, and specifically decoherent histories theory. On this basis ratios of branch numbers are defined, free of any convention. They agree with the Born rule and deliver a notion of objective probability similar to naive frequentism, save that the frequencies of outcomes are not confined to a single world at different times, but spread over worlds at a single time. Nor is it ad hoc: it is recognizably akin to the combinatorial approach to thermodynamic probability, as introduced by Boltzmann in 1879. It is identical to the procedure followed by Planck, Bose, Einstein and Dirac in defining the equilibrium distribution of the Bose–Einstein gas. It also connects in a simple way with the decision-theory approach to quantum probability.

In the framework of relational information, we explore analogs of physical theories and their properties. Specifically, we investigate the causal characteristics of relational information, examining how initial knowledge impacts future relational understanding of the universe/system. To achieve this, we establish a parameter space defining relational structures called dendrograms, exhibiting causal properties akin to those of Minkowski metric. Subsequently, we propose a statistical-dynamical model on this Minkowski-like parameter space, unifying Bohmian and Many Worlds interpretations of quantum theory in the framework of relational information. Additionally, we provide an analytical proof of the non-ergodicity of the relational information framework, revealing CHSH inequality violations as an emergent phenomenon. Our focus on relational information underscores its significance across scientific disciplines, where a single measurement or observation lacks meaning without context.

A general argument is presented against relativistic, unitary, single-outcome quantum mechanics. This is achieved by combining the Wigner’s Friend thought experiment with measurements on a Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger (GHZ) state, and describing the evolution of the quantum state in various inertial frames. Assuming unitary quantum mechanics and single outcomes, the result is that the Born rule must be violated in some inertial frame: in that frame, outcomes are obtained for which no corresponding term exists in the pre-measurement wavefunction.

I provide a simple derivation of the Born rule as giving a classical probability, that is, the ratio of the measure of favorable states of the system to the measure of its total possible states. In classical systems, the probability is due to the fact that the same macrostate can be realized in different ways as a microstate. Despite the radical differences between quantum and classical systems, I show that the same can be applied to quantum systems, and the result is the Born rule. This works only if the basis is continuous (an eigenbasis of observables with continuous spectra), but all known physically realistic measurements involve a continuous basis (the position basis). The continuous basis is not unique, and for subsystems it depends on the observable. But for the entire universe, there are continuous bases that give the Born rule for all measurements, because all measurements reduce to distinguishing macroscopic pointer states, and macroscopic observations commute. This allows for the possibility of a unique ontic basis for the entire universe. In the wavefunctional formulation, the basis can be chosen to consist of classical field configurations, and the coefficients Ψ [ ϕ ] can be made real by absorbing them into a global U(1) gauge. For the many-worlds interpretation, this result gives the Born rule from micro-branch counting.

A brief (subjective) description of the state of the art of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI) is presented. It is argued that the MWI is the only interpretation which removes action at a distance and randomness from quantum theory. Limitations of the MWI regarding questions of probability which can be legitimately asked are specified. The ontological picture of the MWI as a theory of the universal wave function decomposed into a superposition of world wave functions, the important parts of which are defined in three-dimensional space, is presented from the point of view of our particular branch. Some speculations about misconceptions, which apparently prevent the MWI from being in the consensus, are mentioned.

Since the onset of the pandemic, many of the routines and institutions that once structured our reality have been destabilized or destroyed. In the in-between space of what has been and what will be, we must learn to orient ourselves from the inside out and shape the contours of our reality with a novel intentionality. Such is the goal of the reality shifters, an experimental collective working at the junction between science and spirituality to manipulate the forces of reality and explore worlds beyond our own. Discussing methods, motivations, and the larger tradition of spiritual science, this article considers the emancipatory potential of shifting in its embrace of diverse forms of knowledge and experimentation—not its scientific legitimacy. Within a broader cultural shift toward fluidity and multiplicity, reality shifting can thus serve as a provocation to reexamine the nature of our world, our reality, and our place within it—even if we choose not to explore the multiverse ourselves.

I analyze the possibility of free-will in the many-worlds interpretation (MWI), arguing for their compatibility. I use as a starting point Nicolas Gisin’s “The Multiverse Pandemic” (preprint arXiv:2210.05377 , 2022, after Gisin, N., “L’épidémie du multivers”, in “Le Plus Grand des Hasards”, Belin, Paris, 2010), in which he makes an interesting case that MWI is contradicted by our hard to deny free-will. The counts he raised are: (1) MWI is deterministic, forcing choices on us, (2) in MWI all our possible choices happen, and (3) MWI limits creativity, because everything is entangled with everything else. I argue that each of these features of MWI is in fact compatible with more freedom than it may seem. In particular, MWI allows compatibilist free-will, but also free-will very much like the libertarian free-will defined by Chisholm. I argue that the position that alternative choices exist as possibilities does not make sense from a physical point of view, but MWI offers a physical ground for alternatives.

We present a critique of the many-world interpretation of quantum mechanics, based on different “pictures” that describe the time evolution of an isolated quantum system. Without an externally imposed frame to restrict these possible pictures, the theory cannot yield non-trivial interpretational statements. This is analogous to Goodman’s famous “grue-bleen” problem of language and induction. Using a general framework applicable to many kinds of dynamical theories, we try to identify the kind of additional structure (if any) required for the meaningful interpretation of a theory. We find that the “grue-bleen” problem is not restricted to quantum mechanics, but also affects other theories including classical Hamiltonian mechanics. For all such theories, absent external frame information, an isolated system has no interpretation.