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One of the most refined tools that have been devised for the analysis of marriage behavior of a population is the nuptiality tables. There are two main categories of such tables: gross and net. The latter (net tables) are primarily used for the study of reproduction in natural fertility populations, while the former (gross tables) are more suitable for comparing nuptiality among several populations, as differences in net tables may be due to differences either in mortality or in nuptiality or to an unknown mixture of both. In what follows, gross, abridged, period nuptiality tables have been constructed for the single population of Greece for four time points: 1991, 2001, 2011, and 2021. A significant decline in nuptiality was observed during the thirty-year period, with the age pattern of marriage being different by sex. While spinsters nowadays (2021) are more likely to marry at old ages (especially at ages above 40) than ever in the past, this is not the case for bachelors anymore. For a bachelor in Greece, the probabilities of marrying are lower in every age group than ever in the last 30 years.

We show that the neighborhoods in which children grow up shape their earnings, college attendance rates, and fertility and marriage patterns by studying more than 7 million families who move across commuting zones and counties in the United States. Exploiting variation in the age of children when families move, we find that neighborhoods have significant childhood exposure effects: the outcomes of children whose families move to a better neighborhood—as measured by the outcomes of children already living there—improve linearly in proportion to the amount of time they spend growing up in that area, at a rate of approximately 4% per year of exposure. We distinguish the causal effects of neighborhoods from confounding factors by comparing the outcomes of siblings within families, studying moves triggered by displacement shocks, and exploiting sharp variation in predicted place effects across birth cohorts, genders, and quantiles to implement overidentification tests. The findings show that neighborhoods affect intergenerational mobility primarily through childhood exposure, helping reconcile conflicting results in the prior literature.

Trends toward later and less marriage and childbearing have been even more pronounced in East Asia than in the West. At the same time, many other features of East Asian families have changed very little. We review recent research on trends in a wide range of family behaviors in China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. We also draw upon a range of theoretical frameworks to argue that trends in marriage and fertility reflect tension between rapid social and economic changes and limited change in family expectations and obligations. We discuss how this tension may be contributing to growing socioeconomic differences in patterns of family formation. This focus on East Asia extends research on the second demographic transition in the West by describing how rapid decline in marriage and fertility rates can occur in the absence of major changes in family attitudes or rising individualism.

Using population intercensus and national survey data, we examine marriage timing in urban China spanning the past six decades. Descriptive analysis from the intercensus shows that marriage patterns have changed in China. Marriage age is delayed for both men and women, and prevalence of nonmarriage became as high as one-quarter for men in recent birth cohorts with very low levels of education. Capitalizing on individual-level survey data, we further explore the effects of demographic and socioeconomic determinants of entry into marriage in urban China over time. Our study yields three significant findings. First, the influence of economic prospects on marriage entry has significantly increased during the economic reform era for men. Second, the positive effect of working in the state-owned sector has substantially weakened. Third, educational attainment now has a negative effect on marriage timing for women. Taken together, these results suggest that the traditional hypergamy norm has persisted in China as an additional factor in the influences of economic resources on marriage formation.

Popular discussions of changes in American families over the past 60 years have revolved around the “retreat from marriage.” Concern has focused on increasing levels of nonmarital childbearing, as well as falling marriage rates that stem from both increases in the age at first marriage and greater marital instability. Often lost in these discussions is the fact that the decline of marriage has coincided with a rise in cohabitation. Many “single” Americans now live with a domestic partner and a substantial fraction of “single” mothers are cohabiting, often with the child's father. The share of women who have ever cohabited has nearly doubled over the past 25 years, and the majority of nonmarital births now occur to cohabiting rather than to unpartnered mothers at all levels of education. The emergence of cohabitation as an alternative to marriage has been a key feature of the post–World War II transformation of the American family. These changes in the patterns and trajectories of family structure have a strong socioeconomic gradient. The important divide is between college graduates and others: individuals who have attended college but do not have a four-year degree have family patterns and trajectories that are very similar to those of high school graduates.

We analyze the emergence of the first socioeconomic institution in history limiting fertility: west of a line from St. Petersburg to Trieste, the European Marriage Pattern (EMP) reduced childbirths by approximately one-third between the fourteenth and eighteenth century. To explain the rise of EMP we build a two-sector model of agricultural production—grain and livestock. Women have a comparative advantage in animal husbandry. After the Black Death in 1348-1350, land abundance triggered a shift toward the pastoral sector. This improved female employment prospects, leading to later marriages. Using detailed data from England, we provide strong evidence for our mechanism.

The United States shows striking racial and ethnic differences in marriage patterns. Compared to both white and Hispanic women, black women marry later in life, are less likely to marry at all, and have higher rates of marital instability. Kelly Raley, Megan Sweeney, and Danielle Wondra begin by reviewing common explanations for these differences, which first gained momentum in the 1960s (though patterns of marital instability diverged earlier than patterns of marriage formation). Structural factors—for example, declining employment prospects and rising incarceration rates for unskilled black men—clearly play a role, the authors write, but such factors don't fully explain the divergence in marriage patterns. In particular, they don't tell us why we see racial and ethnic differences in marriage across all levels of education, and not just among the unskilled. Raley, Sweeney and, Wondra argue that the racial gap in marriage that emerged in the 1960s, and has grown since, is due partly to broad changes in ideas about family arrangements that have made marriage optional. As the imperative to marry has fallen, alongside other changes in the economy that have increased women's economic contributions to the household, socioeconomic standing has become increasingly important for marriage. Race continues to be associated with economic disadvantage, and thus as economic factors have become more relevant to marriage and marital stability, the racial gap in marriage has grown.

Objective Empirically examine whether different economic theories of marriage formation predict the transition from cohabitation to marriage differently across social classes. Background Less‐educated individuals marry their cohabiting partners at lower rates than their college‐educated peers, but the reasons for this are unknown. Few studies have examined the intersection of social class and couple‐level economic resources to understand if the potentially gendered economic determinants of marriage vary according to a couple's social location. Method Couple‐month data come from the 2014 Survey of Income and Program Participation, including 1879 cohabiting couples, 478 of whom transition to marriage. Logistic regression is used to test whether the marriage bar, gender specialization, gendered institutions, or gender revolution framework best predicts the likelihood of marrying. Results Joint indicators of the marriage bar and the gendered economic organization of couples both predict marriage, but the specific gendered organization varies by the couple's level of education. Among couples where neither partner has a college degree, male‐breadwinning couples are most likely to marry; dual‐earning couples are most likely to marry among more‐educated couples. Conclusion Although college‐educated couples seem to have shifted to a more egalitarian model of marriage, as predicted by the gender revolution framework, the marriages of the less‐educated are still characterized by traditional arrangements, in line with the idea that marriage is a gendered institution. By showing that different theories predict marriage depending on the couple's social position, these findings provide groundwork to explore why the less educated are increasingly less likely to marry their cohabiting partners.

This article argues that marriage has undergone a process of deinstitutionalization--a weakening of the social norms that define partners' behavior--over the past few decades. Examples are presented involving the increasing number and complexity of cohabiting unions and the emergence of same-sex marriage. Two transitions in the meaning of marriage that occurred in the United States during the 20th century have created the social context for deinstitutionalization. The first transition, noted by Ernest Burgess, was from the institutional marriage to the companionate marriage. The second transition was to the individualized marriage in which the emphasis on personal choice and self-development expanded. Although the practical importance of marriage has declined, its symbolic significance has remained high and may even have increased. It has become a marker of prestige and personal achievement. Examples of its symbolic significance are presented. The implications for the current state of marriage and its future direction are discussed.

Marriage patterns differ dramatically in the United States by race and education. The author identifies a novel explanation for these marital divides, namely, the important role of personal wealth in marriage entry. Using event-history models and data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 cohort, the author shows that wealth is an important predictor of first marriage and that differences in asset ownership by race and education help to explain a significant portion of the race and education gaps in first marriage. The article also tests possible explanations for why wealth plays an important role in first marriage entry.