Explore the vast range of titles available.

The aim of this study was to examine extrinsic and intrinsic motivations as the antecedents of work engagement and to empirically test the motivation crowding theory using hospitality employees. The findings showed that intrinsic motivation played an important role in improving employees’ work engagement. The study also found that there was no indication that employees’ intrinsic motivation diminished when extrinsic motivation entered. It is also suggested that employers need to understand that creating a comfortable workplace environment and making jobs more interesting and meaningful will increase employees’ intrinsic motivation, which will help employees to engage more at work. Motivational antecedents of work engagement have been rarely studied and no studies have been conducted to research impacts of extrinsic and intrinsic motivators on employees’ work engagement in the hospitality industry, particularly in small restaurant businesses. In addition, empirical studies on motivation crowding theory are needed due to the inconclusive results.

A Q&A community typically employs various types of external incentives to motivate knowledge contribution from their community members. This study aims to examine the effects of different external incentives, which are conceptualized as different types of motivational factors, on community participants’ sustained knowledge contribution. Drawing on motivation crowding theory, the present study proposes that different motivators interact and jointly influence knowledge contribution behavior. The panel data were collected from a Chinese Q&A community by using the Python Scrapy crawler, and the Poisson regression model with fixed effects was used to validate the integrative model. The results revealed that generalized reciprocity and social learning undermined the effect of online attractiveness on sustained knowledge contribution, whereas peer feedback strengthens this effect. The findings contribute to the extant research on sustained contribution behavior and provide practical insights into sustaining virtual communities.

Motivation crowding theory (MCT) argues that performance-related pay (PRP) can crowd out intrinsic motivation, with detrimental consequences for employees' willingness to exert effort, but this mechanism is only expected when PRP is perceived to be controlling. However, the issue of whether the mechanism is motivational, as expected, has not been tested. This article finds support for such expectations using a vignette survey experimental setup of 1,150 responses (from 384 respondents). The results indicate that PRP positively affects organizational citizenship behavior (OCB), but that the effect is reduced significantly when PRP is perceived as a control factor, because the importance of intrinsic motivation for effort is weakened. Thus, PRP can cause a cognitive shift from intrinsic to extrinsic orientation, but only if PRP is perceived as controlling. When PRP is perceived as noncontrolling, the importance of intrinsic motivation can actually increase. The findings imply that PRP is not necessarily harmful, and that managers should pay close attention to how their employees perceive performance-based pay systems.

In order to motivate individuals to share their knowledge in online communities, the use of extrinsic rewards and goals is a typical approach. However, extrinsic motivation may have unintended consequences. Although past studies have examined the direct effect of extrinsic motivation on intrinsic motivation, no research to date has investigated how extrinsic motivation moderates the impact of intrinsic motivation on knowledge sharing, or how the effect of extrinsic motivation on intrinsic motivation is contingent upon whether a member is active or not. Drawing on attribution theory and theory of planned behavior, the study was conducted with data collected from a large social Q&A site consisting of multiple online communities with millions of registered users; the data were analyzed with moderated regression and structural equation modeling. Results show that the effect of enjoyment in helping others on attitude toward knowledge sharing is undermined by virtual organizational rewards, while the effect of knowledge self-efficacy on attitude toward knowledge sharing is undermined by reciprocity. The results also show that the effect of virtual organizational rewards on enjoyment in helping others is contingent upon whether members are active or not. Specifically, for active members, virtual organizational rewards undermine enjoyment in helping others; for inactive members, however, virtual organizational rewards increase enjoyment in helping others. These findings enrich the research on unintended consequences of extrinsic motivation specifically, and the theory of motivation in general. Additionally, these findings provide practical insights on how and when to use extrinsic rewards/goals to motivate individuals to share knowledge in social Q&A sites.

Research summary: Awards are a valuable strategic resource. Motivation theory and the emerging body of empirical literature suggest that awards can have a significant effect on employee motivation and corporate performance, though not always in the intended direction. Awards can also destroy value. The organizational award literature has so far largely neglected this important issue. We develop a synthesis of the dimensions critical for successful award bestowals, and analyze under which conditions awards generate firm-specific value that is sustained and difficult for competitors to imitate. The process of value creation and capture is contingent on the given firm's organizational characteristics and nature of production. The article concludes by laying out empirical implications. Managerial summary: Awards are widely used in the corporate sector. They fundamentally differ from monetary incentives, which risk crowding out employees' intrinsic motivation. Among the variety of awards, two general types can be distinguished: confirmatory awards based on explicit, pre-determined performance criteria, and discretionary awards, which rely on broad performance evaluations and may be used ex post to honor outstanding performance. Appropriately designed and adjusted to the specific firm's characteristics, awards enhance employees' motivation and corporate performance. They express recognition and support their recipients' perceived competence and social status. Awards help to retain valuable employees and to establish role models. However, awards may also backfire, for instance, when they provoke envy among coworkers. We propose when awards risk destroying value and when they are particularly useful.

Employees are motivated intrinsically as well as extrinsically. Intrinsic motivation is crucial when tacit knowledge in and between teams must be transferred. Organizational forms enable different kinds of motivation and have different capacities to generate and transfer tacit knowledge. Since knowledge generation and transfer are essential for a firm's sustainable competitive advantage, we ask specifically what kinds of motivation are needed to generate and transfer tacit knowledge, as opposed to explicit knowledge.

This article advances our understanding of the effects of monetary rewards on public employee performance and of the contingencies that may moderate these effects. In a randomized control-group experiment with nurses working at a local health authority in Italy, performance-related pay (PRP) had a larger effect on task performance when the rewards were kept secret than when they were disclosed. The negative interaction between PRP and visibility was stronger among participants who were exposed to direct contact with a beneficiary of their efforts, which heightened their perception of making a positive difference in other people's lives. These results are consistent with theoretical predictions that monetary incentives for activities with a prosocial impact may crowd out employee image motivation. There were no crowding-out effects when a symbolic reward was substituted for the monetary incentive.

Desire for social esteem is a source of prosocial behavior. We develop a model in which actors' utility of esteem depends on the audience. In a principal-agent setting, we show that the model can account for motivational crowding out. Control systems and pecuniary incentives erode morale by signaling to the agent that the principal is not worth impressing. The model also offers an explanation for why agents are motivated by unconditionally high pay and by mission-oriented principals.

Although self-determination theory (SDT) is one of the most widely cited theories of human motivation and function, critics have questioned the practical utility of its three needs (i.e., autonomy, competence, and relatedness) in performance contexts. We conduct a meta-analysis ( k  = 108, N  = 30,648) to explore the magnitude and boundary conditions of need satisfaction and performance. As expected, autonomy (ρ = .28), competence (ρ = .37), and relatedness (ρ = .25) predict performance. Incentivization per se has little impact on need-satisfaction: instead, the need satisfaction → performance relationship is moderated by incentive salience. Consistent with a crowding-out hypothesis, need satisfaction matters less to performance when incentives are directly salient (ρ = .22) and more when indirectly salient (ρ = .45). Our meta-analysis demonstrates that indirectly salient incentives and need-satisfaction are indeed compatible, providing a direct response to criticisms of SDT in performance contexts. Additional unexpected findings and future directions are discussed.

We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or image-related) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed, and this \"overjustification effect\" can induce a partial or even net crowding out ofprosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify the settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and, more generally, those that make individual actions complements or substitutes, which we show depends on whether stigma or honor is (endogenously) the dominant reputational concern. Finally, we analyze the socially optimal level of incentives and how monopolistic or competitive sponsors depart from it. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.