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\"[Fanis] demonstrates an impressive ability to travel nimbly between abstract theoretical concepts and a messy reality. In each one of the case study chapters, her analysis is rich, thoughtful, and imaginative.\"-Ido Oren, University of Florida Combining insights from cultural studies, gender studies, and social history, Maria Fanis shows the critical importance of national identity in decisions about war and peace. She challenges conventional approaches by demonstrating that domestic ethical codes influence perceptions of threat from abroad. With an in-depth study of U.S.-British relations in the first half of the nineteenth century, and with an application to the recent War in Iraq, she ties changes in U.S. and British national interest to shifts in these nations' domestic codes of morality. Fanis's findings have important implications for contemporary international relations theory. Apart from its relevance to current events, her work also makes a contribution to the literatures on foreign policy-specifically American and British foreign policies-and the causes of war.

British strategy-making has been subject to a sustained critique in recent years, from parliamentarians, retired members of the armed forces and scholars of strategic studies. This article examines the nature of this critique and the evolving character of strategic practice in Britain. It argues that the criticisms of British strategy-making are often misplaced, for two main reasons. First, many base their critique on a reductionist notion of unitary 'national interest' that fails to capture systemic patterns of complexity and contestation in the wider security environment and in Britain. Second, they underestimate or ignore the extent to which the UK strategic community is itself innovating in response to these themes, particularly since the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review. This is not to argue that considerable challenges do not remain for strategy-making in Britain. Most notably, these include: how to translate strategic innovation in departments and elsewhere into a coherent national strategic agenda; how to do this while maintaining institutional coordination and a shared sense of strategic purpose across government (and beyond); how to sustain and consolidate institutional expertise and experience in a rapidly changing civil service and at a time of continuing public austerity; and how to articulate and legitimate security policy decisions among a general public that is both disengaged from elite strategic discourse and sceptical of the efficacy of military force. Even so, the article concludes by arguing that it is possible to see the outline of an emergent and distinctive theory of action in contemporary British strategic practice, characterized by principles of adaptivity, anticipation, self-organisation and nascent cross-governmentalism.

This book explores how George W. Bush's Freedom Agenda for the Middle East and North Africa was conceived and implemented as an American national interest, from the Bush era right through to the initial stages of the Obama administration. It highlights how the crisis presented by September 11 2001 led to regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq, but more broadly how American policy towards the region had a softer imperial side, which drew on broader economic theories of democratisation and modernisation. The Freedom Agenda contained within it a prescribed method of combating terrorism, but also a method of engaging with and reforming the entire Middle East region more broadly, with many institutions seeking to use the opportunity to implement neo-liberal market logics in the region. Constructing America's Freedom Agenda for the Middle East highlights the particular understanding of \"freedom\" that underpins America's imperial project in the region; a project trapped between a policy of democratisation and domination. This book analyses the Freedom Agenda in significantly more depth than in available current literature and would be of interest to students and researchers of global politics and international foreign policy of recent years.

Since its independence in 1991, Russia has struggled with the growing pains of defining its role in international politics. After Vladimir Putin ascended to power in 2000, the country undertook grandiose foreign policy projects in an attempt to delineate its place among the world's superpowers. With this in mind, Robert Nalbandov examines the milestones of Russia's international relations since the turn of the twenty-first century. He focuses on the specific goals, engagement practices, and tools used by Putin's administration to promote Russia's vital national and strategic interests in specific geographic locations. His findings illuminate Putin's foreign policy objective of reinstituting Russian global strategic dominance. Nalbandov argues that identity-based politics have dominated Putin's tenure and that Russia's east/west split is reflected in Asian-European politics. Nalbandov's analysis shows that unchecked domestic power, an almost exclusive application of hard power, and determined ambition for unabridged global influence and a defined place as a world superpower are the keys to Putin's Russia.

The analytical tension between legal norms, moral values, and national interests seems no uncharted territory in political science, but has found very little interest in legal academia. For lawyers, moral values and national interests are largely “unknowns,” dealt with by other disciplines. Looking a bit deeper, the picture becomes more nuanced, however. As part of a roundtable on “Balancing Legal Norms, Moral Values, and National Interests,” this essay argues that norms, values, and interests are not different universes of legal normativity, morality, and specific interests, but are interrelated concepts. Values clearly influence norms and often underpin them, while seemingly concrete norms (rules) are themselves often fragile constructs trying to balance competing interests. Value systems are quite diverse within societies, and this is even truer for interests; each society is a dynamic system of social interaction where conflicting interests are constantly playing out. In a way, underlying conflicts of values and interests are constantly being renegotiated in the legal system, with the norms enshrined in the text of statutes and treaties serving to constitute transitory reference points.

As part of a roundtable on “Balancing Legal Norms, Moral Values, and National Interests,” this essay presents a Christian view of how to think coherently about the relationships between those three elements. Christian monotheism entails the view that there is a given moral order or “natural law,” which comprises basic human goods (or universally objective values) and moral rules for defending and promoting them. This natural law precedes all human, positive law. It follows that, while the authority of positive international law is important for the maintenance of the good of social order, it is still penultimate, since it can be trumped by natural law. Moreover, international law's authority is weaker than that of national law, because controversy over its sources gives greater scope for the interpreter's moral and political prejudices to shape its construal. Since the interpretation of international law is subject to diverse construals, occasions arise when its authority is invoked to shield the perpetration of grave injustice. In such circumstances, an appeal to natural law could supply moral justification for humanitarian military intervention, even when it violates the letter of international law. Humanitarian intervention, however, is often criticized for being motivated by national interests. A Christian view that follows Thomas Aquinas, however, does not regard national interests as immoral per se, but recognizes that self-interest can be legitimate, and that a national government has a moral responsibility to promote the legitimate interests of its people.

At present, the BITs are playing a significant part in regulating foreign direct investment (FDI) in the host countries and like other members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Malaysia have also signed BITs to facilitate trade. Malaysia’s FDI laws and BITs mainly protect foreign investors, however, neither of them has any specific provision on the protection of sovereignty, national interest and security. This paper addresses the question, to what extent are sovereignty, national interest and security protected through BITs during entry of FDI into Malaysia? Using non-doctrinal socio-legal research method, the authors critically analyzed 15 BITs to explore whether they protect the sovereignty, national interest and security of Malaysia. The findings show that the existing Malaysian BITs contain provisions to promote and protect foreign investments but lack specific references to protect sovereignty, national interest and security, therefore, the government should consider these important factors when signing future BITs.

This article proposes a three-level analysis of the democracy tradition in American foreign policy that identifies its ideational, strategic and policy dimensions and situates Barack Obama's presidency to date within it at each level. At the heart of this approach is the understanding that the motivations and practice of the United States' democracy promotion are shaped by its ideas about national identity, political order, national interest and international relations. This is the ideational source of the democracy tradition, which, as US power has grown, has led increasingly to decision-makers setting strategic goals that include democratization abroad as a facilitator of other US goals. Only slowly has this led to the development of specific policies to that end, though, and democracy promotion as a discrete policy field mostly developed from the 1980s onwards. Democracy promotion went through a 'boom' after the end of the Cold War as the United States enjoyed unparalleled power on the international stage. It is clear that Barack Obama and his administration belong firmly in the democracy tradition at the ideational, strategic and policy level, and they have given no cause to expect any major change in his second term as far as democracy promotion is concerned. It is in any case a mistake to think that changes in the democracy tradition come from particular leaders; rather, it is the changing international environment confronting US foreign policy that is more likely, in the longer term, to lead to a shift away from democracy promotion.

This paper studies the costs and benefits of foreign lobbying. We show how and when foreign lobbying can help internalize cross-national externalities. We argue that this is an often overlooked benefit of foreign lobbying. We also study under what conditions a constitutional rule banning foreign lobbying is in the national interest of a country. A key factor in this calculus is whether the interests of foreign lobby groups and domestic unorganized groups coincide or not. We illustrate the logic with examples from trade policy and environmental regulation. Ce texte les coûts et avantages du lobbying étranger. On montre quand et comment que le lobbying étranger peut aider à internaliser des effets externes transnationaux. On suggère que c'est souvent un avantage qu'on est porté à négliger du lobbying étranger. On étudie sous quelles conditions une règle constitutionnelle bannissant le lobbying étranger peut être dans l'intérêt national d'un pays. Un facteur clé dans ce calcul est le fait que les intérêts des groupes étrangers coincident ou non avec ceux des groupes nationaux non-organisés. On illustre la logique sous-jacente à l'aide d'exemples portant sur la politique commerciale et la réglementation environnementale.

The British government is in the process of re-energizing its relations with the Gulf states. A new Gulf strategy involving a range of activities including more frequent elite bilateral visits and proposals sometimes touted as Britain's military 'return to east of Suez' are two key elements of the overarching strategy. Such polices are designed to fall in line with British national interest as identified by the government-authored 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), which emphasizes the importance of security, trade, and promoting and expanding British values and influence as perennial British raisons d'etat. In the short term, the Gulf initiatives reflect and compliment these core interests, partly based on Britain's historical role in the region, but mostly thanks to modern day trade interdependencies and mutually beneficial security-based cooperation. However, there is yet to emerge a coherent understanding of Britain's longer-term national interest in the region. Instead, government-led, party-political priorities, at the expense of thorough apolitical analysis of long-term interests, appear to be unduly influential on the origins of both the Gulf proposals and the NSS conclusions themselves. Without a clear strategic, neutral grounding, both the Gulf prioritization and the NSS itself are weakened and their longevity undermined.