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174,149 result(s) for "obligations"
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A theory of legal obligation
The focus of this monograph lies in the construction of a theory of legal obligation, understanding it as a discrete notion with its own defining traits. In this work, Bertea specifically addresses the question: how should legal obligation be distinctively conceptualized? The conceptualization of legal obligation he defends in this work gradually emerges from a critical assessment of the theories of legal obligation that have been most influential in the contemporary legal-theoretical debate. Building on such critical analysis, Bertea's study purports to offer a novel and unconventional conceptualization of legal obligation, which is characterized as a law-engendered intersubjective reason for carrying out certain courses of conduct.
Securing Obligations: A Reply to Hindriks
In his contribution to this special issue, Hindriks considers the Security Principle, an account of pro tanto obligations based on our account of reasons (Gunnemyr and Touborg 2023a). According to the Security Principle, you have a pro tanto obligation not to perform an action that makes a harm more secure. Hindriks raises two objections to this account. First, that it is too flexible; second, that it gives wrong verdicts when agents are robustly unwilling to act in a certain way. Here, we respond to Hindriks' objections and argue that Hindriks' account, the Threshold Principle, gives counterintuitive verdicts in preemption and low-probability cases.
What We Owe to Family
Although people often recognize the moral value of impartial behavior (i.e., not favoring specific individuals), it is unclear when, if ever, people recognize the moral value of partiality. The current studies investigated whether information about special obligations to specific individuals, particularly kin, is integrated into moral judgments. In Studies 1 and 2, agents who helped a stranger were judged as more morally good and trustworthy than those who helped kin, but agents who helped a stranger, instead of kin were judged as less morally good and trustworthy than those who did the opposite. In Studies 3 and 4, agents who simply neglected a stranger were judged as less morally bad and untrustworthy than those who neglected kin. Study 4 also demonstrated that the violation (vs. fulfillment) of perceived obligations underlaid all judgment patterns. Study 5 demonstrated boundary conditions: When occupying roles requiring impartiality, agents who helped a stranger instead of kin were judged as more morally good and trustworthy than agents who did the opposite. These findings illuminate the importance of obligations in structuring moral judgment.
Conversions of debt among the Yawanawa: an analytical model of the cultural, social and political grounds of exchange
This text proposes the notion of conversions of debt and aims to show its analytical usefulness on revealing the entanglements of money, commodities and market transactions with a web of political, cultural and social obligations. In order to do so, it deploys material collected during fieldwork to analyze two pairs of conversions of debt in which goods and money circulate among the Yawanawa, a native population from southwestern Amazon. In such conversions, debts generated by political relations, as well as ritual and cure services, generate prestations in the form of money, goods and services. Analyzing conversions of debt among the Yawanawa, the text demonstrates that money and goods are domesticated, serving political, cultural and social obligations, and do not corrode principles of sociability or cultural reproduction of the Yawanawa, despite the constant effort to keep these transactions subordinated to community goals.
The Moral Impact Theory of Law
I develop an alternative to the two main views of law that have dominated legal thought. My view offers a novel account of how the actions of legal institutions make the law what it is, and a correspondingly novel account of how to interpret legal texts. According to my view, legal obligations are a certain subset of moral obligations. Legal institutions—legislatures, courts, administrative agencies—take actions that change our moral obligations. They do so by changing the morally relevant facts and circumstances, for example by changing people's expectations, providing new options, or bestowing the blessing of the people's representatives on particular schemes. My theory holds, very roughly, that the resulting moral obligations are legal obligations. I call this view the Moral Impact Theory because it holds that the law is the moral impact of the relevant actions of legal institutions. In this Essay, I elaborate and refine the theory and then illustrate and clarify its implications for legal interpretation. I also respond to important objections.
INCLUSIVE SPACE LAW: THE CONCEPT OF BENEFIT SHARING IN THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
This article examines the legal principles governing the sharing of benefits deriving from the exploration and use of outer space. It shows that, over time, three strands of State practice have developed different understandings of the content of the obligation contained in Article I, paragraph 1 of the Outer Space Treaty. While drawing parallels with other areas of international law, the article examines the role of equity in the structure of the obligation and evaluates the possibility of replacing considerations of equivalence with a proportionality test to facilitate the fulfilment of the benefit sharing obligation under the Outer Space Treaty.