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This paper examines how a firm’s financial distress and the legal environment regarding the ease of bankruptcy reorganization can alter product market competition and supplier–buyer relationships. We identify three effects—predation, bail-out, and abetment—that can change firms’ behavior from their actions in the absence of financial distress. The predation effect increases competition before potential bankruptcy as the nondistressed competitor behaves as if it has some first-mover advantage that could benefit a supplier with price control. The bail-out effect reflects the supplier’s incentive to grant the distressed firm concessions to preserve competition, improving supply chain efficiency and providing support for the exclusivity rule in Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code when the supplier and the distressed firm are financially linked. The abetment effect is that the supplier may deliberately abet the competitor’s predation, leading to increased operational disadvantages for the distressed firm before bankruptcy. Together these effects stress that a firm’s bankruptcy potential can hurt its competitors and benefit its suppliers/customers. They also provide guidelines for firms’ operational decisions in such situations, a rationale for observed firm actions surrounding bankruptcies, and motivation for policies supporting reorganization and relaxing broad enforcement of nondiscriminatory pricing regulations. This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management .

As an integrated part of a supply contract, trade credit has intrinsic connections with supply chain coordination and inventory management. Using a model that explicitly captures the interaction of firms’ operations decisions, financial constraints, and multiple financing channels (bank loans and trade credit), this paper attempts to better understand the risk-sharing role of trade credit—that is, how trade credit enhances supply chain efficiency by allowing the retailer to partially share the demand risk with the supplier. Within this role, in equilibrium, trade credit is an indispensable external source for inventory financing, even when the supplier is at a disadvantageous position in managing default relative to a bank. Specifically, the equilibrium trade credit contract is net terms when the retailer’s financial status is relatively strong. Accordingly, trade credit is the only external source that the retailer uses to finance inventory. By contrast, if the retailer’s cash level is low, the supplier offers two-part terms, inducing the retailer to finance inventory with a portfolio of trade credit and bank loans. Further, a deeper early-payment discount is offered when the supplier is relatively less efficient in recovering defaulted trade credit, or the retailer has stronger market power. Trade credit allows the supplier to take advantage of the retailer’s financial weakness, yet it may also benefit both parties when the retailer’s cash is reasonably high. Finally, using a sample of firm-level data on retailers, we empirically observe the inventory financing pattern that is consistent with what our model predicts. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.

Trade credit insurance (TCI) is a risk management tool commonly used by suppliers to guarantee against payment default by credit buyers. TCI contracts can be either cancelable (the insurer has the discretion to cancel this guarantee during the insured period) or noncancelable (the terms cannot be renegotiated within the insured period). This paper identifies two roles of TCI: the (cash flow) smoothing role (smoothing the supplier’s cash flows) and the monitoring role (tracking the buyer’s continued creditworthiness after contracting, which enables the supplier to make efficient operational decisions regarding whether to ship goods to the credit buyer). We further explore which contracts better facilitate these two roles of TCI by modeling the strategic interaction between the insurer and the supplier. Noncancelable contracts rely on the deductible to implement both roles, which may result in a conflict: a high deductible inhibits the smoothing role, whereas a low deductible weakens the monitoring role. Under cancelable contracts, the insurer’s cancelation action ensures that the information acquired is reflected in the supplier’s shipping decision. Thus, the insurer has adequate incentives to perform its monitoring function without resorting to a high deductible. Despite this advantage, we find that the insurer may exercise the cancelation option too aggressively; this thereby restores a preference for noncancelable contracts, especially when the supplier’s outside option is unattractive and the insurer’s monitoring cost is low. Noncancelable contracts are also relatively more attractive when the acquired information is verifiable than when it is unverifiable. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.

We find that inventory productivity strongly predicts future stock returns among a sample of publicly listed U.S. retailers during the period from 1985 to 2010. A zero-cost portfolio investment strategy, which consists of buying from the two highest and selling from the two lowest quintiles formed on inventory turnover, earns more than 1% average monthly abnormal return benchmarked to the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model. Our results are robust to different measures of inventory productivity, distinct from the well-known firm characteristics known to generate abnormal returns, and not driven by a particular subsample period. A longitudinal analysis of portfolio returns over longer holding periods shows that although inventory productivity is predictive of stock returns, its information dissipates about one to two years after release. This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management .

Vendor credit line (VCL) is a common instrument to fund retailers with capital constraints, wherein a supplier extends credit for a retailer’s purchases and limits credit size for the sake of default risk. Our study investigates the operational and financial decisions in a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a capital-constrained retailer, wherein the supplier sets credit limits for the retailer’s ordering, and then examines the financing choice between VCL and bank loan. We derive the equilibrium credit limits, order quantity and financing mode and conclude that, the credit limits linearly increase with the capital level, and both credit limits and capital level are decisive to the order quantity and financing mode. In the illustrating examples, we identify the decision regions contingent on critical fractiles under different demand distributions (e.g., normal, uniform and exponential) and find the financing choice hinging on the supplier’s profit margin if the capital level stays low, otherwise VCL dominates. Finally, sensitivity analysis on key parameters is employed, suggesting that VCL is more preferable as the wholesale price increases or as the retail price and production cost decreases.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to identify the interplay between a firm’s financial situation and its inventory ownership in a single-firm and a two-firm perspective. Design/methodology/approach The analysis uses different secondary data sources to quantify the effect of both financial constraints and cost of capital on inventory holdings of public US firms. The authors first adopt a single-firm perspective and analyze whether financial constraints and cost of capital do generally affect the amount of inventory held. Next, the authors adopt a two-firm perspective and analyze the inventory ownership in customer-supplier relationships. Findings Inventory levels are affected by financial constraints and cost of capital. Results indicate that higher costs of capital are weakly associated with lower inventories. However, contrary to the authors’ expectations, firms that are less financially constrained hold less inventories than firms that are more financially constrained. Finally, the authors find that customers hold the larger fraction of supply chain inventory in supplier-customer dyads. Practical implications The authors’ results indicate that financial considerations generally play a role in inventory management. However, inventory holdings seem to be influenced only slightly by financing costs and inventory holdings between supplier and customer seem to be less than optimal from a financial perspective. Considering those financial aspects can lead to relevant financial advantages. Originality/value In contrast to other recent research, the authors study how the financial situation of a firm affects its inventory levels (not vice versa) and also consider inventories from a two-firm perspective.

We present new evidence on disaggregated profit and loss (P/L) and value-at-risk (VaR) forecasts obtained from a large international commercial bank. Our data set includes the actual daily P/L generated by four separate business lines within the bank. All four business lines are involved in securities trading and each is observed daily for a period of at least two years. Given this unique data set, we provide an integrated, unifying framework for assessing the accuracy of VaR forecasts. We use a comprehensive Monte Carlo study to assess which of these many tests have the best finite-sample size and power properties. Our desk-level data set provides importance guidance for choosing realistic P/L-generating processes in the Monte Carlo comparison of the various tests. The conditional autoregressive value-at-risk test of Engle and Manganelli (2004) performs best overall, but duration-based tests also perform well in many cases. This paper was accepted by John Birge, focused issue editor.

This paper analyzes the impact of endogenous credit terms under capital market imperfections in a capacity investment setting. We model a monopolist firm that decides on its technology choice (flexible versus dedicated) and capacity level under demand uncertainty. Differing from the majority of the stochastic capacity investment literature, we assume that the firm is budget constrained and can relax its budget constraint by borrowing from a creditor. The creditor offers technology-specific loan contracts to the firm, after which the firm makes its technology choice and subsequent decisions. Capital market imperfections impose financing frictions on the firm. Our analysis contributes to the capacity investment literature by extending the theory of stochastic capacity investment and flexible versus dedicated technology choice to understand the impact of capital market imperfections, and by analyzing the impact of demand uncertainty (variability and correlation) on the operational decisions and the performance of the firm under different capital market conditions. We demonstrate that the endogenous nature of credit terms in imperfect capital markets may modify or reverse conclusions concerning capacity investment and technology choice obtained under the perfect market assumption and we explain why. The theory developed in this paper suggests some rules of thumb for the strategic management of the capacity and technology choice in imperfect capital markets. This paper was accepted by John Birge, focused issue editor.

This paper investigates how firms manage risk by examining the relationship between financial and operational hedging using a sample of bank holding companies. Risk management theory holds that capital market imperfections make cash flow volatility costly. I investigate whether financial firms consider this cost or focus exclusively on managing tradable exposures. After documenting that acquisitions provide operational hedging by reducing potentially costly volatility, I find that postacquisition financial hedging declines even after controlling for the specific underlying risks. In addition, the decrease in financial hedging is related to the acquisition's level of operational hedging. Larger increases in operational hedging are followed by larger declines in financial hedging. These results indicate that firms in this sample manage aggregate risk, not just tradable exposures, and that operational hedging can substitute for financial hedging. This paper was accepted by John Birge, focused issue editor.

We consider a firm that procures and distributes a commodity from spot and forward markets under randomly fluctuating prices; the commodity is distributed downstream to a set of nonhomogeneous retailers to satisfy random demand. We formulate a model that allows one to compute approximate, but near optimal, procurement and distribution policies for this system, and we explore the value of the commodity's market in providing managers with (a) additional flexibility in procurement and (b) information on price dynamics generated through the trading of futures contracts. Our results indicate that the presence of the commodity market and the information that it conveys may lead to significant reductions in inventory-related costs; however, to obtain these benefits, both the spot procurement flexibility and the term structure of prices generated by the commodity market must be incorporated in the formulation of the operating policy. Managerial insights on the procurement strategy as a function of variability in prices and demand are also discussed. This paper was accepted by John Birge, focused issue editor.