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In the system of multilevel democracy emerging from the Lisbon Treaty, the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) embodies the idea that it is possible to have democratic law-making in a polity characterized by a plurality of organized demoi. This article takes stock of this idea by examining what role democratic aspirations played in the invention of the OLP and how this procedure has affected EU policy-making processes, legislative outputs, and political participation in critical new areas of market regulation. Though the OLP is no silver bullet for EU democracy, it embeds the EU policy-making process in a rule-based logic. Its democratic effects are intimately bound up with the evolving institutions of the so-called legislative trilogues.

The purpose of this article is to analyze whether the Treaty of Lisbon provisions have – as expected – increased the EU legislative productivity. To this end, the author tests the hypothesis that the TL has increased the number of legislative proposals submitted by the European Commission under the ordinary legislative procedure. This expectation is verified using a negative binomial regression on a dataset containing 1116 draft acts proposed by the Commission in 2004‑2014. The analysis shows that, contrary to expectations, the Treaty of Lisbon has not led to a visible increase in EU legislative productivity. Despite the extension of treaty bases envisaging the OLP and QMV, the number of proposals submitted under this procedure after the entry into force of the TL remained more or less at the same level as before. In addition, the study reveals that adaptation, anticipation of future enlargement, closeness to the end of the EP term as well as annual schedule of legislative work are key predictors of the Commission’s productivity.

Over the last 20 years, the political dynamics in EU legislative policy-making have fundamentally changed as trilogues have become the major forum for legislative negotiations. From this perspective, this article represents a first systematic review of the literature on trilogues by using the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses. In doing so, it demonstrates the impact of trilogues on EU legislative politics, both intra- and inter-institutionally, as well as the normative concerns they have raised. It also shows that trilogues do not yet constitute uniform practices. Further, this article identifies the limits of our knowledge and therefore avenues for future research to improve our understanding of EU legislative politics.

This article assesses the political and power dynamics of the Ordinarily Legislative Procedure (OLP) in social Europe and the likely impact of the UK’s departure in the field for future integration. It provides a detailed analysis of the OLP in social Europe during two recent periods of integration in the field—the first Barroso Commission (2004–2009) and the Juncker Commission (2014–2019). It finds the dynamics of the OLP have shifted from intergovernmental deadlock during the Barroso Commission to the characteristics of a new intergovernmental core state power during the Juncker Commission, even though the policy area is not a core state power per se. Despite the use of qualified majority voting policy agreements can only be achieved when there is near unanimity support in the Council, the Commission remains a neutral broker, and the Parliament shifts its position to that of the Council. As a result, continued opposition to integration in social Europe by Northern and Eastern Members means the removal of UK political agency will have only a marginal impact on the slow and piecemeal approach to integration in the field.

The paper deals with private international law after the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon. In particular, it discusses the legal basis for adopting secondary legislation in this field and the EU competence to conclude international agreements. Next, the EU legislative activity is presented, with particular emphasis on family law, in which enhanced cooperation has already been initiated twice.

In the aftermath of the 2019 European elections, the article tries to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the European Parliament within the framework of the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision). After defining and formulating the main indicators, the paper analyses the micro- and macro-performance of the European Parliament within the decision-making process from a quantitative-qualitative and a qualitative-quantitative perspective; highlighting the relativizing factors and the responsiveness of the European decision-making process to the Europeans' needs.

The Lisbon Treaty has substantially extended the co-legislative rights of the European Parliament (EP). This raises the general question of how the EP organizes itself internally in order to be able to maximize its input into the legislative process. In the quest of information processing, it is likely that officials inside the EP gain in importance. The article thus aims to clarify the conditions under which these EP officials impact on the EU policy process and as such can influence policy outcomes. The analysis is based on case studies from five different policy domains. The observations reflect that under certain conditions EP officials play a steering role in the EU decision-making process. As such they can have a significant impact on the policymaking process, defying the dualistic Weberian approach according to which politicians take decisions and officials merely implement.

The purpose of the article is to identify the conditions that affect the success of the European Parliament’s amendments in the ordinary legislative procedure. In the first step, hypotheses were delineated predicting the impact of specific factors on the effectiveness of EP demands. Subsequently, they were verified using the logistic regression. The results revealed that the EP is more likely to be successful in this procedure if it applies the following negotiation techniques. First, it bundles several legislative proposals in one package. Second, it persuades the European Commission to support its amendments. Third, it negotiates the legislative proposals in trilogues. Fourth, it is cohesive during negotiations. Fifth, it prolongs negotiations with the Council until the end of parliamentary term. Sixth, it designates a rapporteur from a country acting at the same time as the Council Presidency. Seventh, it negotiates with the Council when the Presidency legislative workload is high.

The dynamic relations that develop between institutional actors within the formal European Union (EU) institutional structure and the ways in which they shape what the EU does are the subject of this chapter. It provides a succinct overview of how EU policy‐making is shaped through the interaction of different institutions and through political inputs from parties, citizens, and interest groups. The bulk of important policy‐making comes in the form of an ordinary legislative procedure, a consensual process of institutionalized negotiation that links together the Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament. The chapter explains interest groups vary in their resources and ability to mobilize citizens, which results in their having different approaches as to how to influence EU policy‐making. Member states share the setting of the EU policy agenda and decision‐making responsibilities with supranational institutions, notably the Commission and the Parliament.

The nature of the relationship betweenlex et consuetude parliamenti(“lex parliamenti,” for short) andlex terraeis central to any conception of privilege in Britain. Lex parliamenti is that body of law dealing with issues internal to Parliament—each House’s composition, its organization, its procedures, its privileges, and so forth. Lex terrae—the law of the land—is the general law, applicable to all, and enforceable by the ordinary courts. The important question here is one of institutional power, and there are, broadly speaking, three possibilities: (1) the courts can say nothing at all about lex parliamenti and must