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Piracy is a significant source of concern facing software developers, music labels, and movie production companies, to name a few. Digital goods producers and government entities argue that there are victims of piracy, whereas pirates may perceive their actions to be victimless. Regarding implications of our research, we extend the theory of planned behavior (TPB) by theorizing that attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control could influence perceptions of moral obligations as a consequence of the desire to rationalize unethical behavior. Unlike prior literature, we manipulate the rationalization of moral obligations due to the victimless view toward piracy and show how moral obligations become important determinants of piracy behavior. Accordingly, our demonstrated malleability of morals may be an important path through which individuals are able to continue past behaviors. We also conduct a second study to identify the effect of implementing an educational message from a fictitious software company to exogenously nudge the pirate and influence the impact of perceived moral obligations on intentions to pirate. Our results show that the introduction of an exogenous educational message is an effective piracy mitigation strategy.

The China–Australia Route, which serves as the southern economic corridor of the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’, bears great importance in safeguarding maritime transportation operations. This route plays a crucial role in ensuring the security and efficiency of such activities. To pre-assess the risks of this route, this paper presents a two-stage analytical framework that combines fault tree analysis and Bayesian network for evaluating the occurrence likelihood of risk of transporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) on the China–Australia Route. In the first stage, our study involved the identification of 22 risk influencing factors drawn from a comprehensive review of pertinent literature and an in-depth analysis of accident reports. These identified factors were then utilized as basic events to construct a fault tree. Later, we applied an expert comprehensive evaluation method and fuzzy set theory, and by introducing voting mechanism into expert opinions, the prior probability of basic events was calculated. In the second stage, a fault tree was transformed into a Bayesian network, which overcame the deficiency that the structure and conditional probability table of the Bayesian network find difficult to determine. Consequently, the employment of the Bayesian network architecture was applied to forecast the likelihood of LNG maritime transport along the China–Australia shipping pathway. The probability importance and critical importance of each basic event was calculated through an importance analysis. The development of a risk matrix was achieved by considering the two primary dimensions of frequency and impact, which were subsequently utilized to categorize all relevant risk factors into high, moderate, or low risk categories. This allowed for effective risk mitigation and prevention strategies to be implemented. Finally, assuming that the final risk occurs, we calculated the posterior probability of the basic event to diagnose the risk. The research findings indicate that the primary reasons for the risk of transporting LNG on the China–Australia Route are the impact of natural forces and epidemics, piracy and terrorist attacks, and the risk of LNG explosions. In the final section, we provide suggestions and risk control measures based on the research results to reduce the occurrence of risks.

The Maritime Silk Road (MSR) is an important channel for maritime trade between China and other countries in the world. Maritime piracy has brought huge security risks to ships’ navigation and has seriously threatened the lives and property of crew members. To reduce the likelihood of attacks from pirates, it is necessary to study the risk to a ship exposed to attacks from pirates on the MSR. Firstly, risk factors were established from three risk component categories (hazard, mitigation capacity, and vulnerability and exposure) and the risk index system of piracy and armed robbery events was founded. Secondly, the dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) method was introduced to establish a pirate attack risk assessment model ad to conduct a quantitative analysis of the process risk of a ship being attacked by pirates. Finally, combined with the scene data of the MSR, the process risk of a ship being attacked by pirates was modeled and applied as an example. The results showed that the overall risk of a ship being attacked by pirates is the lowest in July and the highest in March. In the whole route, when the ship was in the Gulf of Guinea, the Gulf of Aden–Arabian Sea, and the Strait of Malacca, the risk of pirate attack was the highest. This dynamic network model can effectively analyze the level of risk of pirate attacks on ships, providing a reference for the safety decision-making of ships on ocean routes.

U.S. Department of Defense 1206 Assistance to Yemen FY2006:$4.3 million FY2007: $ 26 million FY2008: none FY2009:$66.8 million Total: $ 97.1 million FY2009 DOD 1206 obligations include: ·$5.9 million for an aerial surveillance counter-terror initiative (helicopters with night-vision cameras), · $ 30.1 million for Coast Guard patrol and maritime security to combat piracy (two boats, radios), ·$25 million for border security (360 4x4 armored pickup trucks) · and $ 5.8 million for improving improvised explosive device (IED) ordnance mitigation. Between FY2006 and FY2007, Yemen received approximately$30.3 million from the U.S. Department of Defense's Section 1206 account. [...]this most recent tranche of defense aid (totaling $ 66.8 million) is more than double the level of the previous two fiscal years combined.

In the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), which unites 80 countries, international organisations, and the maritime industry in the fight against piracy, the U.A.E. co-chairs the Working Group on \"Maritime Counter-Piracy and Mitigation Operations\" with Japan and the Seychelles. [...]to tackle root causes of piracy and other maritime crimes requires confronting instability on land.

People who appear in this episode include: * Lars Gustafson, Senior Vice President, Global Marine Practice, Marsh; and * John Barnwell, Global Marine Insurance Product Leader, Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty.

The CAS is intended to provide enforcement through a consumer-friendly approach: * Consumers have a right to know when their Internet accounts are being used for content theft and the system provides information on steps consumers can take to identify and stop such activity. * The multiple alerts and grace periods provide consumers with time to change their behavior before the next alert is sent and before any mitigation is imposed. * No personal information about subscribers is exchanged between content owners and ISPs without subscriber consent, and then only in connection with certain challenges under an independent review. * ISPs are not required to impose any mitigation measure that could disable a subscriber's essential services, such as telephone service, email, or security or health service. IACC Payment Processor Portal Program: First Year Statistical Review, October, 2012, available at http://www.gacg.org/Content/Upload/MemberNewsDocs/October%202012%20Report%20to%20IPEC%20-%20FINAL.pdf. n4 Id. n5 See ANA press release about Pledge to Deter Advertising on Rogue Sites, May, 2012, with link to pledge, available at http://www.ana.net/content/show/id/23408. n6 Available at http://www.iab.net/QAGInitiative/overview/quality_assurance_guidelines and http://www.iab.net/about_the_iab/recent_press_releases/press_release_archive/press_release/pr-072513. n7 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/07/15/coming-together-combat-online-piracy-and-counterfeiting and http://www.2013ippractices.com/bestpracticesguidelinesforadnetworkstoaddresspiracyandcounterfeiting.html. n8 See http://www.icann.org/en/groups/board/documents/resolutions-new-gtld-25jun13-en.htm. n9 See www.cgcprinciples.com. n10 See http://insidesearch.blogspot.com/2012/08/an-update-to-our-search-algorithms.html. n11 See RIAA, \"Six Months Later - A Report Card on Google's Demotion of Pirate Sites', Feb. 21, 2013, available at http://76.74.24.142/3CF95E01-3836-E6CD-A470-1C2B89DE9723.pdf.

Risk Mitigation with Insurance Solutions As evidenced, maritime pirates are constantly adapting their savage tactics, undermining the efforts of stability operations. Since exposure to piracy-related risks is inherent to operating in conflict and post-conflict coastal regions, it is essential for stability operations to secure a financial safeguard with proper insurance. With a local insurance provider, an aid and development organization may be subject to these regulatory inconsistencies. [...]it is advisable to obtain insurance from an international provider located in a country with a strong insurance regulatory authority.