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A novel metric that describes the vulnerability of the measurements in power systems to data integrity attacks is proposed. The new metric, coined vulnerability index (VuIx), leverages information theoretic measures to assess the attack effect in terms of the fundamental limits of the disruption and detection tradeoff. The result of computing the VuIx of the measurements in the system yields an ordering of their vulnerability based on the degree of exposure to data integrity attacks. This new framework is used to assess the measurement vulnerability of IEEE 9‐bus and 30‐bus test systems and it is observed that power injection measurements are significantly more vulnerable to data integrity attacks than power flow measurements. A detailed numerical evaluation of the VuIx values for IEEE test systems is provided. A novel metric that describes the vulnerability of the measurements in power systems to data integrity attacks is proposed. The new metric, coined vulnerability index (VuIx), leverages information theoretic measures to assess the attack effect on the fundamental limits of the disruption and detection tradeoff. This new metric observed that in IEEE test systems power injection measurements are overwhelmingly more vulnerable to data integrity attacks than power flow measurements.

This article presents a comprehensive taxonomy and survey of Cybersecurity Control Schemes (CCS) tailored for Smart Grids (SG), with a particular focus on vulnerabilities in the IEC 61850 standard and the countermeasures provided by IEC 62351. The taxonomy introduces four main dimensions to analyse 25 tailored CCS for SG, covering research from 2013 to 2023. It establishes classification criteria that encompass: (i) deployment strategies, categorised into five levels based on SG supervision hierarchy; (ii) security mechanisms, including prevention, detection and response mechanisms; (iii) mitigated threats, such as False Data Injection (FDI), Denial‐of‐Service (DoS), masquerade attacks, replay attacks, data tampering; and (iv) protected applications within the power system domain, such as supervisory, protection, and control applications, time synchronisation and synchrophasor data applications. The survey evaluates CCS characteristics aligned with IEC 61850 and IEC 62351 standards and provides a structured analysis of CCS deployment, commonly used data parameters, security mechanisms and response actions for mitigating cyberthreats in SG. Finally, by integrating lessons from industry standards, academic research and practical considerations, this study identifies open challenges and outlines future research opportunities to enhance CCS robustness. The findings offer actionable insights for researchers and practitioners seeking to strengthen the cybersecurity of SG systems. This work presents a taxonomy and a survey of cybersecurity control schemes specifically tailored for smart grids, considering vulnerabilities in IEC 61850 and the corresponding IEC 62351 security requirements. The taxonomy considers deployment strategies, analysis methods, mitigated threats and protected applications in power systems. The survey, which follows the taxonomy framework, analyses and classifies state‐of‐the‐art cybersecurity control schemes focusing in data parameters extracted from the automation systems, and the algorithms or methods employed for prevention, detection or response.

Traditional power systems have evolved into cyber‐physical power systems (CPPS) with the integration of information and communication technologies. CPPS can be considered as a typical hierarchical control system that can be divided into two parts: the power grid and the communication network. CPPS will face new vulnerabilities which can have network contingencies and cascading consequences. To address this challenge, a virtual‐physical power flow (VPPF) method is proposed for the vulnerability assessment of CPPS. The proposed method contains dual power flows, one is to simulate a virtual power flow from decision‐making units, and the other is to simulate a physical power flow. In addition, a novel hierarchical control model is proposed that includes four layers of CPPS: the physical layer, the secondary device layer, the regional control layer, and the national control layer. The model is based on IEEE test cases using data and structures provided by MATPOWER. Denial‐of‐service (DoS) and false data injection (FDI) are simulated as two major cyber‐attacks in CPPS. A novel vulnerability index is proposed that consists of system voltage, network latency, and node betweenness as three key indicators. This is a comprehensive and adaptive index because it encompasses both cyber and physical system characteristics and can be applied to several types of cyber‐attacks. The results of the vulnerability assessment are compared in national and regional control structures of CPPS to evaluate the vulnerability of cyber‐physical nodes. Traditional power systems have evolved into cyber‐physical power systems (CPPS) with the integration of information and communication technologies. CPPS can be considered as a typical hierarchical control system that can be divided into two parts: the power grid and the communication network. CPPS will face new vulnerabilities which can have network contingencies and cascading consequences. To address this challenge, a virtual‐physical power flow (VPPF) method is proposed for the vulnerability assessment of CPPS. The proposed method contains dual power flows, one is to simulate a virtual power flow from decision‐making units, and the other is to simulate a physical power flow. In addition, a novel hierarchical control model is proposed that includes four layers of CPPS: the physical layer, the secondary device layer, the regional control layer, and the national control layer. The model is based on IEEE test cases using data and structures provided by MATPOWER. Denial‐of‐service (DoS) and false data injection (FDI) are simulated as two major cyber‐attacks in CPPS. A novel vulnerability index is proposed that consists of system voltage, network latency, and node betweenness as three key indicators. This is a comprehensive and adaptive index because it encompasses both cyber and physical system characteristics and can be applied to several types of cyber‐attacks. The results of the vulnerability assessment are compared in national and regional control structures of CPPS to evaluate the vulnerability of cyber‐physical nodes.

Power Internet of Things (PIoT) relies on various smart sensors and edge devices to support the operational status of the power grid. To address the challenge of conducting a comprehensive information security risk assessment for communication among heterogeneous devices in PIoT, a reliable security risk assessment method is proposed. This method, based on the analytic hierarchy process (AHP), considers four key dimensions: the cloud platform, communication transmission, edge side and terminal side. It integrates information indexes, the asset loss and risk probability to construct a risk assessment scheme oriented towards PIoT information security. The judgement matrix of AHP which fails the consistency test, is modified by using an improved multi‐objective particle swarm optimisation (IMPSO) algorithm, while minimising semantic offset distance. Verified through a case study, this method effectively reduces the consistency index to an average of 0.01 and achieves a correlation of 90.86% with traditional AHP assessment results. To address the challenge of conducting a comprehensive information security risk assessment for communication among heterogeneous devices in PIoT, a reliable security risk assessment method is proposed. This method, based on the analytic hierarchy process (AHP), considers four dimensions: cloud platform, communication transmission, edge side and terminal side. It incorporates information indexes, the asset loss and risk probability to construct a risk assessment scheme oriented towards PIoT information security. The judgement matrix of AHP which fails the consistency test, is modified by using an improved multi‐objective particle swarm optimisation algorithm, while minimising semantic offset distance.

Attackers are able to enumerate all devices and computers within a compromised substation network. Digital relays deployed in the substation are the devices with IP addresses that can be discovered in the process of trial‐and‐error search. This paper is concerned with studies of cyberattacks manipulating digital relays to disruptively disconnect the associated breakers. The plausible enumeration of such disruptive attack for each relay in a substation is verified with the dynamic simulation studies with the special protection system for frequency, voltage, and rotor angle stability. A pertinent approach with smaller scale contingency analysis results is proposed to reduce the enormous computation burden. The devised enumeration reduction method is evaluated using IEEE test cases. The proposed method provides an extensive enumeration strategy that can be used by utility engineers to identify the pivotal relays in the system and can be further strengthened with security protection.

Taking transmission sections as the monitoring objects of power system security and stability level can largely improve the efficiency of analysis and control in power system operation. However, existing approaches for identifying transmission sections mainly depend on years of experience, which is not suitable for complicated and variable power systems with large scales. Thus, a novel method for automatic identification of transmission sections using complex network theory is proposed. The proposed method presents the fundamental conditions of transmission sections and identifies them from three levels: transmission lines, key transmission links and partition sections. First, based on the small-world characteristics of power grid, the index of transmission betweenness is presented to identify key transmission links from transmission lines. Then clustering algorithm of complex network is used to divide the power grid and to obtain partition sections from the key transmission links. Finally, the combinations of partition sections are selected and ranked as the transmission sections. Numerical results with CEPRI-36 system and a provincial system are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness and adaptability of the proposed method.

Plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) impose considerable loads to existing power grids, and consequently, they can challenge power quality and reliability of power systems if their charging is not coordinated. To use existing distribution systems for PEV charging without upgrading them, coordinated charging is inevitable. In this study, an optimal PEV dynamic charging method is proposed observing power grid thermal ratings and voltage quality. The problem is formulated as a standard non-linear programming with minimising energy losses over the charging span as objective function subject to PEVs and power system security constraints. Node voltages and power losses are explicitly and precisely formulated in the proposed method. Coordinated charging span of PEVs starts from evening, when PEV owners arrive home, to the next day morning, when the owners need their car charged and ready to use. The IEEE 31-bus distribution system in highly stressed conditions is used to evaluate the performance of the proposed method in the worst voltage status. According to obtained results, discussed in detail, voltage quality constraints are more restricting than equipment thermal rating in PEV optimal charging because of mostly radial structure of distribution systems. The results confirm the efficiency of the proposed method.

Extensive deployment of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) is increasing the power system cyber security attack surface. National and jurisdictional interconnection standards require DER to include a range of autonomous and commanded grid‐support functions, which can drastically influence power quality, voltage, and bulk system frequency. Here, the authors investigate the impact to the cyber‐physical power system in scenarios where communications and operations of DER are controlled by an adversary. The findings show that each grid‐support function exposes the power system to distinct types and magnitudes of risk. The physical impact from cyber actions was analysed in cases of DER providing distribution system voltage regulation and transmission system support. Finally, recommendations are presented for minimising the risk using engineered parameter limits and segmenting the control network to minimise common‐mode vulnerabilities.

The role of cybersecurity in cyber‐physical power systems (CPPS) is reviewed, focusing on the applications of dynamic state estimation (DSE) techniques. These DSE techniques are particularly relevant with the integration of phasor measurement units (PMUs) and advanced communication infrastructure. A comprehensive review on DSE techniques and applications to efficiently protect CPPS against cyberattacks is classified into three cyber resilience phases including prevention, detection, and mitigation. The DSE techniques in the prevention phase are surveyed to improve the observability of the CPPS by the robust design of the Kalman filter and optimal protection of PMUs. The DSE techniques in the detection phase are surveyed to improve the adaptability of CPPS in various attack detection scenerios and optimise the detection accuracy. The DSE techniques in the mitigation phase are surveyed to enhance the flexibility of CPPS resource utilisation with compensation‐based, isolation‐based, and scheduling‐based strategies. Finally, the benefits and limitations of each DSE technique are summarised with potential suggestions on research directions for enhancing the cyber resilience of CPPS. The role of cybersecurity in cyber‐physical power systems (CPPS) is reviewed, focusing on the application of dynamic state estimation (DSE) techniques. A comprehensive review on DSE techniques and applications to efficiently protect CPPS against cyberattacks is classified into three cyber resilience phases including prevention, detection, and mitigation. DSE‐based case studies are categorised to showcase their benefits and limitations, and potential research directions for enhancing the resilience and cybersecurity of CPPS are suggested.

Energy management system (EMS) is one of the most essential categories of the advanced applications in current cyber‐physical power systems. However, because of the tight coupling relationship between a power network and EMS's communication network, a physical break‐line fault may be accompanied by a communication line outage, which may result in regional unobservability and uncontrollability. To maximally avoid and eliminate such operation risks, referring to current EMS's ‘active + standby’ communication configuration scheme in China, the authors propose a dynamic routing optimisation mechanism for its standby communication routings, assigning the most reliable communication lines to the most important information. Such optimisation considers two factors: information's significance and the reliability of communication lines. By introducing cyber‐physical sensitivity index and path‐branch incidence matrix, both factors can be expressed numerically. In the case study, the authors optimise the standby communication routings for a power flow corrective control application under different scenarios. The results verify the effectiveness and superiority of their approach.