Explore the vast range of titles available.

This article examines the intertwined dynamics of ecological crisis, digitalisation, and techno-primitivism through a genealogical and syncretic lens. It argues that the global ecological crisis is rooted not in a generalised “human impact,” but in the historical processes of colonialism and capitalist extractivism that have systematically depleted the Global South while concen-trating power and privilege in the Global North. As digital infrastructures expand, new forms of extractivism – especially data colonialism and digital colonialism – have intensified these global inequalities and externalised environmental harms. The paper critically assesses tech-no-primitivism as a reaction to technological alienation, highlighting its risk of reproducing co-lonial logics of othering by framing “primitive” or non-Western lifeways as static alternatives. Instead of technocratic or primitivist solutions, the study advocates for a transformative re-sponse based on decolonisation and relationality. Drawing on Indigenous, African, and plural philosophical traditions, it proposes centring the knowledge, rights, and agency of those most affected by ecological and digital injustices. The article contends that only by dismantling ex-tractivist, dualistic, and colonial paradigms and fostering reciprocal, relational approaches can more just, sustainable, and inclusive futures be achieved in both ecological and digital do-mains.

Quantum gravity’s suggestion that spacetime may be emergent and so only exist contingently would force a radical reconception of extant analyses of laws of nature. Humeanism presupposes a spatiotemporal mosaic of particular matters of fact on which laws supervene; primitivism and dispositionalism conceive of the action of primitive laws or of dispositions as a process of ‘nomic production’ unfolding over time. We show how the Humean supervenience basis of non-modal facts and primitivist or dispositionalist accounts of nomic production can be reconceived, avoiding a reliance on fundamental spacetime. However, it is unclear that naturalistic forms of Humeanism can maintain their commitment to there being no necessary connections among distinct entities. Furthermore, non-temporal conceptions of production render this central concept more elusive than before. In fact, the challenges run so deep that the survival of the investigated analyses into the era of quantum gravity is questionable.

In this intriguing study, Jason Dormady examines the ways members of Mexico’s urban and rural poor used religious community to mediate between themselves and the state through the practice of religious primitivism, the belief that they were restoring Christianity—and the practice of Mexican citizenship—to a more pure and essential state. Focusing on three community formation projects—the Iglesia del Reino de Dios en su Plenitud, a Mormon-based polygamist organization; the Iglesia Luz del Mundo, an evangelical Protestant organization; and the Union Nacional Sinarquista, a semi-fascist Mexican Catholic group—Dormady argues that their attempts to establish religious authenticity mirror the efforts of officials to define the meaning of the Mexican Revolution in the era following its military phase. Despite the fact that these communities engaged in counterrevolutionary behavior, the state remained pragmatic and willing to be flexible depending on convergence of the group’s interests with those of the official revolution.

Die erste Monographie über einen der originellsten niederländischen Maler des 16. Jahrhunderts.Der in Antwerpen ansässige Cornelis van Dalem (1530/35–1573) war wie sein Vater Tuchhändler von Beruf, hatte aber auch das Malerhandwerk erlernt. Anders als den meisten seiner Zunftgenossen wurde ihm eine humanistische Ausbildung zuteil, er besaß eine reich ausgestattete Bibliothek und hinterließ ein zahlenmäßig bescheidenes, aber ungemein wichtiges Werk. In der Kunstgeschichte wurde van Dalem bislang vor allem als besonders erfinderischer Landschaftsmaler geschätzt. Die \"wilde Natur\" mit ihren bizarren Felsformationen, die seine Bilder zeigen, ist jedoch nicht Selbstzweck. Sie bildet den Rahmen für Darstellungen unterschiedlicher Formen \"primitiven Lebens\". Die meist mit Hilfe von Antwerpener Malerkollegen ausgeführten Figuren belegen van Dalems Interesse an verschiedenen Phasen der Urgeschichte der Menschheit, am asketischen Leben von Eremiten, aber auch an den Bräuchen der aus dem Osten eingewanderten \"Zigeuner\". Im Gegensatz zu seinen Zeitgenossen beurteilte er deren Lebensweise nicht negativ, sondern setzte sie in Kontrast zu den prekären Lebensumständen der einheimischen bäuerlichen Bevölkerung. Für van Dalems rebellischen Charakter spricht die Tatsache, dass er, als Ketzer verdächtigt, Antwerpen verlassen musste. Als Exilierter verbrachte er die letzten acht Lebensjahre auf einem Landsitz bei Breda.Wilde Natur – primitives Leben ist die erste Gesamtdarstellung dieses Werks. Mit zahlreichen farbigen Abbildungen illustriert, wird das Schaffen des Malers als kohärentes intellektuelles Projekt präsentiert. Vor der Folie der in antiken Texten entwickelten Vorstellungen vom Goldenen Zeitalter erscheint van Dalems Werk als eine Anthropologie avant la lettre, als eine Reflexion über die Bedingungen für ein glückliches Leben.

I develop a challenge to reductive views of knowing that$ \\phi $that appeal to what I call a gradable property. Such appeal allows for properties that are intrinsically very similar to the property of knowing that$ \\phi $, but differ significantly in their normative significance. This violates the independently plausible claim Pautz (2017) labels the ‘small difference principle.’

In contemporary philosophy, it is tempting to apply the metaphysics of properties to the specific case of truth, in the hope of making progress on the investigation of the latter. In this paper, I argue that a different approach, mostly independent from the metaphysics of properties and based on the naturalness, in Lewis’ sense, of semantic nations, is often a better alternative, both in general and in some specific cases. In particular, adopting the new perspective, I present a new problem of combining logical validity and strong truth pluralism, and offer a way to sharply distinguish deflationism and primitivism about truth. The main original upshot of the paper is offering a perspective on philosophy of truth that sheds new light on the general problem of truth and on some particular issues.

Šiame straipsnyje kalbama apie „primityvistinius“ Europos modernaus meno objektus, daugiausia dėmesio skiriant Rytų Europos menininkams, įskaitant kai kuriuos, vėliau savo karjerą plėtojusius Vakaruose. Šie menininkai vertinami kaip netipiški, bet aktualūs modernizmo kultūros paveldo atvejai, tačiau jų indėlis mažiau tiriamas dėl ne Vakarų Europos kilmės. Ankstyvajai jų meninei kūrybai įtakos turėjo vietinis liaudies ir naivusis stilius bei kaimo, tėvynės motyvai, tačiau vėliau, jiems persikėlus į Vakarus (dažniausiai Prancūziją), jie pakeitė savo „primityvizmo stilių“, perimdami madingus egzotiškus, daugiausia afrikietiškus, Vakarų modernistinių mokyklų motyvus, juos jungė su modernistiniu menu ir taip sulaukė pripažinimo. Kitaip nei įprasta meno kritikoje, šiame straipsnyje naudojamas paveldo studijų metodas: pirmiausia konceptualizuojama ir svarstoma, kaip vienas paveldo primityvizmo tipas įtraukiamas į kitą šiame sudėtingame meniniame darinyje, o vėliau aptariamas šis disonuojantis kūrybos palikimas. Teigiama, kad kultūros paveldo diskusijose turime išplėsti disonansinio paveldo sąvoką, kad galima būtų aptarti dvejopą vietinio / egzotinio paveldo sampratą, kartu kritiškai iš naujo įvertinant primityvizmo panaudojimo būdus autentiškuose ir asimiliaciniuose ideologiniuose ketinimuose. This article deals with the ‘primitivist’ sources of European modern art, with a focus on Eastern European artists, including some who later developed their careers in the West. These artists are regarded as atypical but relevant cases of modernist legacies, yet their contribution is less studied because of their non- Western European backgrounds. Their early artistic careers were influenced by the local folk and naive style and motifs of their rural homelands, but they later transmuted their ‘primitivist style’, adopting the fashionable exotic, mostly African, motifs of the Western modernist schools when they moved to the West (typically, France), connected themselves with the modernist movement and received recognition. Unlike the perspective usually adopted by art criticism, this article suggests a heritage studies approach: it firstly conceptualises and considers how one type of heritage primitivism is subsumed to another in this complex artistic formation, and then problematises this dissonant legacy of their work. It is argued that in the field of cultural heritage debate, we need to extend the concept of dissonant heritage to discuss the dual concept of local/exotic heritage, while critically reassessing the uses of primitivism in its authenticist vs. assimilationist ideological intentions

Propositions are (generally taken to be) the semantic values of declarative sentences in context. There is a long history of thinking that an important reason for taking propositions to be structured stems from the fact that the semantic values of such sentences are (typically) compositionally determined. In this paper, I argue that compositionality does not entail, nor provide good evidence for, the claim that propositions are structured. I go on to argue that there is no additional feature of declarative sentences—for example, that they are true or false—that, in conjunction with compositionality, entails or provides good evidence for the claim that the semantic values of those sentences are complex.

One of the classic debates in cognitive science is between nativism and empiricism about the development of psychological capacities. In principle, the debate is empirical. However, in practice nativist hypotheses have also been challenged for relying on an illdefined, or even unscientific, notion of innateness as that which is “not learned”. Here this minimal conception of innateness is defended on four fronts. First, it is argued that the minimal conception is crucial to understanding the nativism-empiricism debate, when properly construed; Second, various objections to the minimal conception—that it risks overgeneralization, lacks an account of learning, frustrates genuine explanations of psychological development, and fails to unify different notions of innateness across the sciences—are rebutted. Third, it is argued that the minimal conception avoids the shortcomings of primitivism, the prominent view that innate capacities are those that are not acquired via a psychological process in development. And fourth, the minimal conception undermines some attempts to identify innateness with a natural kind. So in short, we have little reason to reject, and good reason to accept, the minimal conception of innateness in cognitive science.