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UK public law is often viewed as a sophisticated power struggle between rival institutions, an approach encouraged by the assumption that the law is ultimately dependent on such contingencies as the existence of an official consensus about its sources. From that perspective, legal judgments should be read as strategic moves within the political power-game. We can make better sense of public law if, instead, we interpret it as the articulation and enforcement of standards of legitimate governance, inspired by universal ideals of individual freedom and human dignity. The rule of Law denies the legal validity of arbitrary, unjustified assertions of power inimical to those ideals. Positive law is, at root, an instantiation of natural law, as the interplay of legal rule and underlying principle, characteristic of common law reasoning, confirms. There are important implications for our understanding of the constitutional foundations of judicial review, the limits of parliamentary sovereignty, the nature of the principle of legality, and the scope and content of fundamental rights.

This article explores the remaking of administrative law review in South Africa since the introduction of constitutional democracy in 1994. It characterizes the construction of the constitutional and legislative framework, as well as the courts’ interpretation of that framework, as the first phase of the remaking. The second phase encompasses the courts’ recognition of a constitutional principle of legality based on the rule of law, and their swift development of the content of this principle. This judicial creativity has resulted in an elaborate avenue to review, parallel to the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, and has caused problems of rivalry and avoidance. The article identifies and discusses some of the more significant implications of each of these phases of reconstruction. It also proposes corrective measures likely to advance the coherence and effectiveness of judicial review and discourage the adoption of a doctrine of non-justiciability.

This article examines the principle of legality, a principle of statutory interpretation that requires clear statutory words to oust basic common-law norms. The principle is of growing importance in the Supreme Court's public law jurisprudence, yet it has garnered little scholarly attention. This article offers a comprehensive account of the principle, unpacking its core elements and identifying key controversies. The article reveals that lying beyond this apparently straightforward principle is a complex and elaborate jurisprudence, which raises fundamental issues of principle, policy and judicial legitimacy.

To comply with Shiʿi theological-jurisprudential justifications and dogmatic traditions, the Iranian postrevolutionary legal system formally enshrined the principle of legality of crime and punishment within the Iranian Constitution and important legal provisions. Despite this formal entrenchment and codification of its criminal law, which together act as a legal constraint on the traditionally excessive power of Muslim judges, the Iranian theocratic system has exempted religious sins from this principle by blurring the distinction between crime and sin and criminalizing certain sinful acts with unclear language. These two legal mechanisms not only violate the principle of legality and amplify legal uncertainty, but their reference to Sharia law also binds the fate of the accused more tightly to the discretion of the judge than to the letter of the law. Consequently, the religiopolitical predilections of judges have become a determining factor in findings of criminal responsibility and imposition of punishment on citizens.

Traditionally and historically, any state of emergency has always had a widespread impact on fundamental rights. Specifically, the health emergency caused by Covid-19 engendered the greatest world constitutional emergency in the human history. According to this line of reasoning, the restriction of the right of freedom, in its subspecies of freedom of movement, may be regarded as a serious violation of human rights. Not only does the issue constitute an academic topic, but also it becomes ‘food for thought’ for both jurists and Courts. Consequently, this research paper aims to discuss and analyse, also from the standpoint of a UK comparative analysis (the Anglo-Welsh legal system and Scotland), the legislation and outcome in the Courts of the restrictions put in place during the pandemic. At least, it will emphasize that the harshest version of lockdown was experienced in Italy. This is a paradox, since the latter is a country that, formally, should rely on the toughest constitutional safeguards, including the existence of a Constitutional Court.

International criminal law (ICL) is an achievement, but at the same time a challenge to the traditional conception of the principle of legality (lex praevia, scripta, and stricta – Sect. 1). International criminal tribunals have often based conviction for international crimes on unwritten norms the existence and scope of which they have failed to substantiate. In so doing, they have evaded the objection that they were applying ex post facto criminal laws. This approach, the relaxation of the concept of law by including norms whose existence is doubtful, has apparently served to maintain a concept of strict legality, but it is unsatisfying (Sect. 2). In my opinion, the strict principle of legality that has linked its absolute validity to the positivity of law is not the correct premise. It makes sense to state that positivity and validity do not necessarily go hand in hand (Sect. 3). Applied to ICL, this means that it is neither necessary nor convincing to “conceal” supra-positive law as positive law, as some decisions of the international criminal tribunals do. For this reason, I consider that Radbruch’s formula, consisting in admitting that there are supra-positive limits which positive law must respect in order to be valid, is well-founded (Sect. 4). The path taken by this significant philosopher of law is methodologically convincing, and it squarely faces the problem of the value of positive law. Nevertheless, if we admit Radbruch’s formula and thereby the limited value of positive law (if we claim that the validity of the law depends on it respecting supra-positive minimums of justice), we must also face the problem of the definition of supra-positive values, the epistemological difficulties of having access to them (Sect. 5), and the question of the scope and enforceability of supra-positive law (Sect. 6). In summary, this article aims to explain why Radbruch’s formula offers a convincing conceptual basis for international criminal legality and, in doing so, aims to contribute to the discussion about the foundations of ICL.

This paper aims to answer the following research problem: what are the models of reasonable (proper) implementation of public expenditure arising from specific constitutional rules, and what are the standards for such spending? The authors present a thesis that the constitutional principle of legality, as well as the principle of public finance as a good which is protected constitutionally, sets general models, which consequently determine the standards of reasonable (proper) spending of public funds in the broad sense, i.e. in the context of legality and economy (purpose, economy, effectiveness and efficiency). Notably, these models and standards meet the postulate of complete financial control, i.e. at every stage of the budget procedure (budget design, planning and execution). The article uses so- called non-reactive research methods, based on the analysis of the content and availability of source information, i.e. theoretical and legal publications as well as legal regulations (especially constitutional ones) crucial from the point of view of the selected subject.

Abstract While legislation and administrative frameworks shape how landowners own or use their land, land law continues to be understood primarily as a private law subject. Public interventions are conventionally treated as outside land law’s remit and are rarely addressed in property theorization. Responding to this absence, this article outlines the scope of public land law—understood as the governance of land by the state in the public interest—introducing the concept of property as authorized, where land ownership and use are limited by authorization. The analysis draws on examples from planning, leasehold reform, and public access legislation, alongside human rights protections under Article 1 of Protocol 1 (A1P1) of the ECHR and the newly recognized fundamental common law right to property, to show how public and private land law both constitute property. By examining these interactions in the period between the Supreme Court’s hearing of the Darwall case and its judgment, the article encourages greater engagement with public land law to understand how land law operates today.

In X (judgment of 3 March 2020, case C-717/18, X (Mandat d'arrêt européen - Double incrimination), the Court of Justice has clarified the implications of a reform determining the increase of the penalty scales on the lifting the double criminality check pursuant to Art. 2, para. 2, of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, where an European Arrest Warrant is pending. While analysing the interpretative approach underpinning the reasoning of both the Court of Justice and the AG, the present Insight focuses on two key issues: the relationship between the EAW system and the nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege principle, and the renewed importance of the EAW form for purposes of contextual interpretation of the Framework Decision. The concluding remarks provide some reflections on the principle of effectiveness in EAW matters.

The European Union is a reality closer and closer for Albania as well. The status Albania obtained as a candidate country, not only means a step forward towards the European Union, but it also sets forth a number of challenges to be solved such as, freedom, property, democracy, human rights, the fight against organized crime and corruption etc. Under these circumstances, the analysis of the issues that have to do with the European Union is of a great importance, as in the near future, Albania is designated to join the great European family. The scope of this work is to analyze tow important aspects that have to do with one of the most important institutions of the European Union, such as the European Court of Justice. The first aspect of this work, which is also its first subject, refers to the juridical nature of the European Court of Justice. Analyzing this topic, we shall see that this Court, as per its nature, contains elements of different courts, thus, presenting similarities with the Constitutional Courts of Member States, civil courts, criminal courts, administrative and labour courts and with other international courts as well. However, despite the similarities it presents with other courts, the European Court of Justice is a court of a special kind, “sui generis”, exactly as the European Union is, thus, an organization of a special kind. The second aspect of this paper, which is also its second issue, analyses the fundamental principles where the European Court of Justice bases its activity. The most important principles are that of equality and non discrimination, the principle of protecting and guaranteeing the human rights, the principle of access before the court or the right to address the court, the principle of legality as well as the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. In this work, especially in the second part, there shall be presented several decisions of the European Court of Justice as well, that have to do with its interpretation on the dispositions of the establishing Treaties as well as the analysis of the above mentioned principles. At the end of this work, there will be given its conclusions as well as the bibliography where it is based on.