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Europeans, on average, are distrustful toward representative institutions. In recent decades, to restore confidence in political institutions, several countries have implemented alternative decision-making processes. The literature has analyzed preferences for these alternatives, such as direct democracy or technocracy, and their drivers. However, these analyses often treated these preferences in isolation, without considering that citizens might have more complex preferences involving multiple actors in the decision-making process. We test whether this complexity exists in a novel survey experiment where citizens are exposed to two different vignettes about divisive policies in Italy. Our results indicate that, more than anything else, Italian citizens prefer having their fellow citizens decide alone in referendums. However, they also favor consulting experts before Parliament's decision. Furthermore, we demonstrate that while instrumentality is still crucial in evaluating the fairness of the processes, certain decision-making processes make losers of the policy outcome as satisfied as specific groups winners. These findings hold significant implications for citizens' policy evaluations, highlighting that the decision-making process might influence their overall satisfaction with policies.

The June 2016 Brexit referendum sent international shock waves, possibly causing adjustments in public opinion not only in the UK, but also abroad. We suggest that these adjustments went beyond substantive attitudes on European integration and included procedural preferences towards direct democracy. Drawing on the insight that support for direct democracy can be instrumentally motivated, we argue that the outcome of the Brexit referendum led (politically informed) individuals to update their support for referendums based on their views towards European integration. Using panel data from Germany, we find that those in favour of European integration, especially those with high political involvement, turned more sceptical of the introduction of referendums in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum. Our study contributes to the understanding of preferences for direct democracy and documents a remarkable case of how – seemingly basic – procedural preferences can, in today's internationalized information environment, be shaped by high-profile events abroad.

What determines citizens’ preferences over alternative decision-making procedures – the personal gain associated with a procedure, or the intrinsic value assigned to it? To answer this question, we present results of a laboratory experiment in which participants select a procedure to decide on the provision of a public good. In the first stage, they choose between majority voting and delegation to a welfare-maximizing algorithm. In the second stage, subjects either vote on the public good provision, or the decision is taken by the algorithm. We define three experimental conditions in which participants receive information about whether a majority in the group faces a positive or negative pay-off from the public good provision, about whether there is a positive group benefit from its provision, or neither kind of information. Findings confirm the importance of instrumental motives in procedural choices. At the same time, however, a significant share of participants chose a procedure that does not maximize their individual benefit. While majority voting seems to be preferred for intrinsic values of fairness and equality, support for delegation to the welfare-maximizing algorithm increases if the group benefit from a public good is known – even in participants who are net payers for its provision.

Populist parties have been shown to attract many voters disillusioned with representative democracies. And some of these parties do indeed propose models of government that challenge contemporary democratic systems. However, we do not know exactly what the democratic preferences of populist party supporters are. We propose to fill this gap by investigating the types of actors that citizens who are more sympathetic to populist parties would like to see play a greater role in their national political system. First, we find that populists believe that citizens should be more involved, highlighting the people-centred nature of populism. Second, they advocate a greater role for business leaders, military generals, and religious leaders, a preference found among both right-wing and left-wing populists. Third, left-wing populists show a unique preference for scientific experts in government, suggesting a technocratic inclination. Conversely, right-wing populists are particularly critical of elected politicians, underlining their deep anti-elitist attitudes. Our findings suggest that, among citizens who are more sympathetic to populist parties, there is support for models of government that challenge representative democracy. The question is whether populist parties would be influenced by these citizens to push for institutional reforms.

Understanding public preferences for governing processes is an understudied area of research. In this paper, I evaluate a set of critical assumptions relating to process preferences that the literature has thus far not addressed. I specifically address the claims made by John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse in their seminal book, Stealth Democracy, which suggests that people prefer political decisions to be made via expert-based governing arrangements to promote a level of efficiency and effectiveness within the government that elected officials cannot provide. Using original questions from the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, I find concurring evidence that citizens are not strongly attached to standard participatory processes found in democracy. However, upon using more precise measurements and placing expert processes into contemporary context, preferences weaken and appear to be shallow in nature. In an era where process preferences are receiving more attention as trust in government wanes, it is important to understand the depth of these preferences and their potential to change politics. These results suggest it is imperative for future scholars to approach the study of process preferences with care.

Previous research suggests that Europeans want more experts in government, but which experts do they want and why? Using survey data collected in 15 European countries, this study compared citizens’ preferences for high-ranking civil servants, university professors, and business executives over traditional political actors (MPs and former ministers) as ministers in government. Overall, university professors were rated more positively than MPs or former ministers in almost all countries, whereas civil servants and business executives were only rated more positively than politicians in Poland, Italy, Spain, Greece, Ireland, and Belgium. While political distrust is a key predictor of preferring political outsiders, we also found that civil servants are not as appealing to politically distrusting individuals, depending on the country. Furthermore, while the demand for more expertise in government mainly influences preferences for university professors, the demand for more government by the people is connected to preferences for business executives and (to a lesser extent) civil servants. The latter finding challenges the common distinction between citizen and expert-oriented visions of democracy and the alleged ‘elitist’ underpinnings of empowering non-elected outsiders.

Citizen-elite congruence has long been considered an important yardstick for the quality of democracy. The literature on citizen satisfaction with democracy, however, has reduced congruence almost exclusively to one of its components, policy congruence. Just as citizens are considered to have positions on policy issues, there is growing scholarly interest in the preferences they have about the process of representation. Yet studies inquiring into the impact of the divergent preferences that citizens and elites have regarding the representational process thus far have been few and their results inconclusive. Combining new, unique data from the 2014 Belgian Election and Candidate Studies, we seek to address this lacuna. Our findings indicate that we cannot understand citizen satisfaction without also taking process into account—even as the policy gap has the greater effect. They should be of interest to scholars of democracy, those concerned about citizen disengagement from politics, and political practitioners.

This article analyzes factors which explain support for the representative model and its two main alternatives: direct democracy and technocracy. It discusses the role played by two understudied explanatory factors: perceptions relating to the personal qualities of the different actors involved in decision-making (i.e. representatives, citizens and experts) and electoral support for mainstream parties (PSOE and PP) and new parties (Ciudadanos and Podemos). We rely on two Spanish surveys from 2011 and 2015. The results show that both perceived qualities and party preferences are linked to support for the three decision-making models. The emergence of new parties in 2015 has reshaped the connection between party choice and process preferences and has made this relationship stronger.

Most humour processing systems to date make at best discrete, coarsegrained distinctions between the comical and the conventional, yet such notions are better conceptualized as a broad spectrum. In this paper, we present a probabilistic approach, a variant of Gaussian process preference learning (GPPL), that learns to rank and rate the humorousness of short texts by exploiting human preference judgments and automatically sourced linguistic annotations. We apply our system, which is similar to one that had previously shown good performance on English-language one-liners annotated with pairwise humorousness annotations, to the Spanish-language data set of the HAHA@IberLEF2019 evaluation campaign. We report system performance for the campaign's two subtasks, humour detection and funniness score prediction, and discuss some issues arising from the conversion between the numeric scores used in the HAHA@IberLEF2019 data and the pairwise judgment annotations required for our method.

In a laboratory experiment, two dictators give serially to a common recipient. In all treatment conditions, the second dictator knows the outcome in the first game. We vary the nature of the dictator in the first game across different treatments. We ask if the resulting variation in the attribution of intent to the prior causal dictator affects giving in the second game. We find that causal attribution has no effect on average giving, but may impact marginal giving. In particular, giving in the second game is negatively correlated with that in the first only when the first dictator has self-interest. We further find that giving is not affected by knowledge of recipient endowment and falls over the sequence of games.