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In recent years, several measurements of the quality of democracy have been developed (e.g. Democracy Barometer, Varieties of Democracy Project). These objective measurements focus on institutional and procedural characteristics of democracy. This article starts from the premise that in order to fully understand the quality of democracy such objective measurements have to be complemented by subjective measurements based on the perspective of citizens. The aim of the article is to conceptualize and measure the subjective quality of democracy. First, a conceptualization of the subjective quality of democracy is developed consisting of citizens’ support for three normative models of democracy (electoral, liberal, and direct democracy). Second, based on the World Values Survey 2005–2007, an instrument measuring these different dimensions of the subjective quality of democracy is suggested. Third, distributions for different models of democracy are presented for some European and non-European liberal democracies. They reveal significant differences regarding the subjective quality of democracies. Fourth, the subjective quality of democracy of these countries is compared with the objective quality of democracy based on three indices (electoral democracy, liberal democracy and direct popular vote) developed by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. Finally, further research questions are discussed.

The analytical research question of this contribution is twofold. (1) To develop (and to proto-type) a conceptual framework of analysis for a global comparison of quality of democracy. This framework also references to the concept of the “Quadruple Helix innovation systems” (Carayannis and Campbell). (2) The same conceptual framework is being used and tested for comparing and measuring empirical quality of democracy in the different OECD and European Union (EU27) member countries. In theoretical and conceptual terms, we refer to a Quadruple-Dimensional structure, also a Quadruple Helix structure (a “Model of Quadruple Helix Structures”) of the four basic (conceptual) dimensions of freedom, equality, control, and sustainable development for explaining and comparing democracy and quality of democracy. Put in summary, we may conclude for the USA that the comparative strength of quality of democracy in the USA focuses on the dimension of freedom. The comparative weakness of the quality of democracy in the USA lies in the dimension of equality, most importantly income equality. Quadruple Helix refers here to at least two crucial perspectives: (1) the unfolding of an innovative knowledge economy also requires (at least in a longer perspective) the unfolding of a knowledge democracy; (2) knowledge and innovation are being defined as key for sustainable development and for the further evolution of quality of democracy. How to innovate (and reinvent) knowledge democracy? There is a potential that democracy discourses and innovation discourses advance in a next-step and two-way mutual cross-reference. The architectures of Quadruple Helix (and Quintuple Helix) innovation systems demand and require the formation of a democracy, implicating that quality of democracy provides for a support and encouragement of innovation and innovation systems, so that quality of democracy and progress of innovation mutually “Cross-Helix” in a connecting and amplifying mode and manner. This relates research on quality of democracy to research on innovation (innovation systems) and the knowledge economy. “Cyber democracy” receives here a new and important meaning.

Scholars have long debated whether populism harms or improves the quality of democracy. This article contributes to this debate by focusing on the impact of populist parties in government. In particular, it inquires: (1) whether populists in government are more likely than non-populists to negatively affect the quality of democracies; (2) whether the role of populists in government matters; and (3) which type of populism is expected to negatively affect the quality of liberal-democratic regimes. The results find strong evidence that the role of populists in government affects several qualities of democracy. While robust, the findings related to (2) are less clear-cut than those pertaining to (1). Finally, regardless of their role in government, different types of populism have different impacts on the qualities of democracy. The results show that exclusionary populist parties in government tend to have more of a negative impact than other forms of populism.

Quadruple and Quintuple Helix innovation systems are based on democracy and ecology. Two propositions are here key: (1) without a democracy or knowledge democracy, the further advancement of knowledge and innovation are seriously constrained, so in that sense, knowledge and innovation evolution depend on democracy and knowledge democracy; (2) ecology and environmental protection represent a necessity and challenge for humanity, but they also act as drivers for further knowledge and innovation (this should lead to a win–win situation for ecology and innovation). Therefore, for an innovation system to be a Quadruple/Quintuple Helix innovation system, the political regime hosting these helixes needs to be democratic in essence, not just in form. The next stage in evolution of innovation systems may be that this also will require a “democracy of climate” (promoting a social, cultural, economic, and political “climate for democracy”), where democracies as innovation enablers are creating innovation that regard the ecology as a crucial driver for further innovation and for responsible innovation.

Is the quality of democracy undermined or enhanced by party-system fragmentation? Addressing this question would help us better assess normative claims about electoral reforms. Yet, doing so is difficult because of endogeneity issues: party systems are endogenous to many other dynamics in a polity. We overcome this problem by putting forward an instrument for the number of parties in a system, based on the level of fragmentation added by parties that narrowly make it to parliament. We then test the effect of party-system fragmentation on the quality of democracy, drawing upon an extensive battery of outcomes. Against previous literature, we find that a higher number of parties leads to more fractionalized governments, but has no impact on other democratic outcomes. Subsample analyses suggest that fragmentation may have some effect in contexts of very high polarization, but we find no effect in other theoretically meaningful subsamples. Our results indicate that party-system fragmentation may have fewer normative implications than previously assumed.

Mounting evidence indicates that power-sharing supports transitions to democracy. However, the resulting quality of democracy remains understudied. Given the increasing global spread of power-sharing, this is a crucial oversight, as prominent critiques accuse it of a number of critical deficiencies. The present article advances this literature in two ways. First, it offers a comprehensive discussion of how power-sharing affects the quality of democracy, going beyond specific individual aspects of democracy. It argues that power-sharing advances some of these aspects while having drawbacks for others. Second, it offers the first systematic, large-N analysis of the frequently discussed consequences of power-sharing for the quality of democracy. It relies on a dataset measuring the quality of democracy in 70 countries worldwide, combining it with new fine-grained data for institutional power-sharing. The results indicate that power-sharing is a complex institutional model which privileges a particular set of democratic actors and processes, while deemphasizing others.

This introductory article discusses current challenges in quality of democracy research, explains the objectives of this Special Issue, and provides a brief overview of controversies in existing indices that are considered by the contributors to this Special Issue.

The three books reviewed here represent a new generation of rigorous scholarship on participatory institutions (PIs). They demonstrate that - under certain conditions - it is possible to build large-scale PIs that strengthen democratic governance and improve citizens' lives. Nonetheless, significant challenges remain. Due in part to the absence of either high-quality national-level comparative data or fine-grained subnational data, and in part to research design choices of existing studies, the literature remains limited in its capacity to make general claims about the causes and effects of large-scale PIs. Ultimately, the key question collectively addressed, but not fully answered, by the works reviewed is whether governments can build PIs that deliver on their promise to improve the quality of democracy and enhance public service provision on a large scale in diverse contexts beyond Brazil.

There are already a number of good accounts of the impact of the recent 2008–2014 economic crisis on European democracies. However, no systematic assessments of how it has affected specific aspects of democracy have so far been carried out. We explore its impact on European democracies in several areas by adopting the ‘quality of democracy’ framework. Our analysis shows that the measures we employ capture the variation in quality during this ‘troubled’ period. The empirical analysis suggests that a shrinking of private and public resources due to an economic downturn prompts three reactions: (a) a general deterioration of the rule of law; (b) citizens become more sensitive about what governments deliver; and (c) detachment from the institutional channels of representation along with a choice to protest.

During the past few decades, Latin American governments’ recurrent attacks against journalists have contributed to the erosion of press freedom in the region and, relatedly, of the quality of democracy. Yet what pushes governments to harass journalists? We argue that governments are more likely to harass journalists when popular support for them drops. Due to the ability of journalists to influence public opinion, governments could perceive the harassment of journalists as a means to punish and silence those individuals who are seen as contributing to their decline in public support or as obstacles to regaining popularity. We test our argument on a sample of Latin American countries observed from 1990 to 2019. We find that declines in governments’ popular support lead to more harassment of journalists. Our research contributes to the debate on the determinants of press freedom and sheds further light on the current decline of democratic quality in Latin America.