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Research shows that masculinity and sexuality are pivotal to the leadership and success of the populist radical right (PRR). In particular, normative conceptions of masculinity, as seen in gendered nationalism, have been argued to be important to the appeal of PRR parties. However, the supply side of this dynamic remains understudied. To fill this gap, this article uses critical discourse analysis to analyze the role of masculinity and sexuality in the self-positioning and envisioned hegemonies of the most successful Dutch PRR leaders: Pim Fortuyn, Geert Wilders, and Thierry Baudet. The Dutch case is particularly insightful as it presents a diverse array of PRR parties in one country context. We found crucial similarities and differences between the discourses of these leaders. Our findings suggest that masculinity and sexuality, while constitutive at the party level, are largely negotiable or nondefining for the larger party family. These findings problematize often-made identifications of PRR politics with a one-of-a-kind conservative ideology of gender and sexuality.

This study examines the interplay between presence of stigmatized immigrants, threat, and inter group contact that underlies radical right voting (voting propensity and actual district-level vote results). On the one hand, low-status immigrants are often stigmatized and depicted as threats. Thus, presence of stigmatized immigrants should heighten threat perceptions, thereby increasing radical right voting. On the other hand, as positive contact with stigmatized immigrants is known to reduce anti-immigrant prejudice, it should also attenuate radical right voting. As predicted, multilevel path analyses with the Swiss Election Studies 2011 data (N = 1,736 respondents in 136 districts) revealed that the proportion of stigmatized immigrants (from former Yugoslavia and Albania) in districts heightened perceived threat. Threat perceptions, in turn, increased propensity to vote for the Swiss People's Party, the major radical right party. In contrast, experiencing positive, everyday contact with former Yugoslav and Albanian immigrants reduced voting propensity through attenuated threat perceptions. Contact and threat perceptions were also related to the actual vote through voting propensity.

This article analyses the formal and lived organisation of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany). We show that the party is exceptional among what is usually understood as the populist radical right (PRR) party family, at least from an organisational perspective: The AfD sharply contradicts the “standard model” of PRR party organisation, which emphasises “charismatic” leadership and the centralisation of power as key features. Instead, studying the AfD’s efforts to adopt some elements of a mass-party organisation and its relatively decentralised decision-making underlines the importance of “movement-party” strategy, collective leadership, and internal democracy—concepts that are usually associated with Green and left-wing parties. Our analysis shows how the party’s organisation is essential for understanding its development more broadly as it reflects and reinforces sharp intra-party conflict. From this perspective, the case of the AfD sheds new light on the relationship between PRR party organisation and electoral success, indicating the importance of strong ties to parts of society over effective internal management as long as demand for anti-immigration parties is high. We conclude that even though AfD quickly built up a relatively inclusive organisational structure, the role of both its leadership and its rank-and-file is still a matter of controversy.

This article questions the utility of assessing radical right party placement on economic issues, which has been extensively analyzed in academic literature. Starting from the premise that political parties have varying strategic stakes in different political issues, the article considers political competition in multiple issue dimensions. It suggests that political competition is not simply a matter of taking positions on political issues, but rather centers on manipulating the dimensional structure of politics. The core argument is that certain political parties, such as those of the radical right, seek to compete on neglected, secondary issues while simultaneously blurring their positions on established issues in order to attract broader support. Deliberate position blurring – considered costly by the literature – may thus be an effective strategy in multidimensional competition. The article combines quantitative analyses of electoral manifestos, expert placement of political parties, and voter preferences, by studying seventeen radical right parties in nine Western European party systems.

This study examines whether negative contact with immigrants promotes voting for radical right-wing parties, to what extent this relationship can be explained by feelings of outgroup threat, and whether this relationship depends on perceived personal and collective self-efficacy. Hypotheses were tested among 630 native Dutch respondents, mainly living in multicultural neighborhoods. The results show that negative contact with immigrants is associated with feelings of personal (egocentric) and group (sociotropic) threat, and both these feelings, in turn, are associated with radical right-wing voting. However, negative intergroup contact is less strongly related to egocentric threat when individuals feel able to personally address negative situations with other people (personal self-efficacy). Furthermore, the findings suggest that negative intergroup contact is less strongly related to sociotropic threat when individuals believe that people in their neighborhood are able to collectively address some negative situations (collective self-efficacy).

Existing explanations for the rise of populist radical‐right parties often focus on two primary factors: economic insecurity, driven by globalization, financial crises, and technological disruptions; and cultural backlash, which stems from intergenerational and immigration‐related value conflicts. While these perspectives offer valuable insights, there is little doubt that the growth of populist radical‐right parties is also closely linked to political distrust and declining confidence in democratic institutions. Supporters of populist radical‐right parties tend to exhibit lower political trust as compared to voters in mainstream parties. However, these explanations often overlook the complex relationship between anti‐establishment populist radical‐right parties and the very democratic accountability mechanisms designed to uphold transparency and institutional integrity. This study explores the paradoxical role of public transparency and press freedom in facilitating the rise of populist radical‐right and anti‐establishment movements, with a particular focus on Sweden—a country with exceptionally strong public transparency mechanisms. Traditionally regarded as pillars of democratic governance, these mechanisms have been strategically repurposed by the Sweden Democrats, an anti‐establishment, radical‐right party, to expose political scandals and erode trust in traditional elites. Leveraging alternative media platforms and even troll factories, the party has effectively weaponized transparency to amplify anti‐elite populist narratives. This research critically examines whether transparency and media freedom serve to strengthen democracy or instead enable the politicization of scandals, reinforcing populist distrust of institutions. By analyzing the intersection of transparency mechanisms, free press dynamics, and anti‐establishment populist strategies, this study provides a new perspective on how accountability tools can be manipulated for partisan gain. In doing so, it sheds light on the broader implications of transparency policies in an era of rising populism and increasing democratic polarization.

In this article, we investigate the ideology of the populist radical right (PRR) and the extent to which its political message has changed over time. In doing so, we also judge the usefulness of the PRR-tag. Like seminal scholarship on these parties, we contend that both economic and social positions are relevant for contemporary radical right parties. Further, we argue that contemporary parties’ stances are indicative of a nationalist ideology. Using the Manifesto Project Dataset, we investigate radical right policy preferences between 1970 and 2015. Results indicate that right-wing economic stances are more prevalent prior to the twenty-first century and that radical right parties increasingly make economically leftist claims. Results also demonstrate that radical right parties are not always the farthest to right in national political spaces. Further, we show that contemporary parties make nationalist claims. Indeed, nationalism not only increasingly characterizes these parties but also increasingly distinguishes them from other major party families, whose average positions over time are globalist. We argue that contemporary radical right parties are better conceptualized and described as neo-nationalist, a label consistent with both their social and economic positions.

The analysis builds on previous research exploring the impact of far-right support on citizenship policy. Using Bayesian analyses, this research evaluates the impact of far-right success on citizenship policy restrictiveness and citizenship policy outcomes per year across 29 European countries between 2003–2014. Results reveal that far-right success is a statistically and substantively significant factor in determining citizenship policy restrictiveness as well as rates of naturalization. However, differential levels of impact suggest that far-right influence is not uniform throughout the policy process.

This article explores the role that gender differences played in vote choice for radical right parties in European countries from 2002-2014. In particular, the research agenda explores whether men and women differ in regards to the attitudinal variables that drive vote choice for a radical right party. Further, the empirical analysis tests whether predictors of radical right vote choice have differing substantive effects for women and men. Using fixed effects statistical models; the major findings are that men and women do differ statistically on one attitude that correlates highly with radical right vote choice (i.e. far right ideology), but not other important attitudes (anti-immigrant sentiment). Substantively, however, given the same attitudes as men, women have a significantly lower probability of translating extreme attitudes into vote choice for radical right parties.

This symposium probes contemporary classifications of the “far-right”, “populist radical right” and “radical right” variety. It also considers whether there is a need to look beyond socio-economic factors to explain the upward trajectory such parties experienced in recent years. The symposium thus connects to ongoing debates regarding the nature of this party family (or families) and to previous accounts of their successes across Western Europe.