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The role of exemplarity in the public realm is explored from a threefold angle. After introducing briefly the notion of exemplarity as distinct from \"being an example of,\" as possessed of a normative force resting on its potential for disclosure, and as connected with a sense of the human flourishing, two junctures are singled out at which exemplarity plays a significant role in contemporary political theory. First, John Rawls's notion of the reasonable, understood as a quality of the political actor and as a standard for public reason, and especially as it occurs in the phrase \"most reasonable for us,\" predicated of justice as fairness as a political conception of justice, is shown to presuppose the normativity of exemplarity if \"public reason\" is to remain distinct from \"practical reason.\" Second, in his recently published The Civil Rights Revolution (2014 - the third volume of We the People), Bruce Ackerman shows that 20th-century \"constitutional moments,\" starting from the New Deal, no longer follow the scripted Article Five-based path of constitutional amendment. They are ignited and unfold on the basis of \"landmark statutes\" (such as the New Deal legislation, the Civil Rights Act, the Fair Housing Act) and judicial \"exemplary superprecedents\" (such as Brown or Loving). This reconstruction of the new dynamics of constitutional change in US recent history prompts the question about the nature of \"landmarkness\" of both congressional statutes and Supreme Court pronouncements. The paper highlights the relation of landmarkness to exemplarity. Third, exemplarity in the public realm is then contrasted with other forms of exemplarity. Its specific nature is highlighted and four versions of public exemplarity are distinguished: exemplarity of the deed; of the personality; of a legal notion; of a constitutional order.

An influential strand in philosophy of science claims that scientific paradigms can be understood as relativized a priori frameworks. Here, Kant’s constitutive a priori principles are no longer held to establish conditions of possibility for knowledge which are unchanging and universally true, but are restricted only to a given scientific domain. Yet it is unclear how exactly a relativized a priori can be construed as both stable and dynamical, establishing foundations for current scientific claims while simultaneously making intelligible the transition to a subsequent framework. In this article, I show that important resources for this problem have been overlooked in Kant’s theory of reflective judgement in the third Critique. I argue that Kant accorded the task of formulating new scientific laws to reflective judgement, which is charged with forming new ‘universals’ that guide the experience of nature. I show that this is the very task attributed to the relativized a priori: the constitution of a given conceptual framework, not of the conditions for object-reference as such. I conclude that Kant’s considered conception of science encompasses the operations of both reflective and determining judgement. Relativizations of the a priori should follow Kant’s lead.

Though a wide array of definitions and conceptualisations of critical thinking have been offered in the past, further elaboration on some concepts is required, particularly with respect to various factors that may impede an individual’s application of critical thinking, such as in the case of reflective judgment. These barriers include varying levels of epistemological engagement or understanding, issues pertaining to heuristic-based thinking and intuitive judgment, as well as emotional and biased thinking. The aim of this review is to discuss such barriers and evaluate their impact on critical thinking in light of perspectives from research in an effort to reinforce the ‘completeness’ of extant critical thinking frameworks and to enhance the potential benefits of implementation in real-world settings. Recommendations and implications for overcoming such barriers are also discussed and evaluated.

The Forgiveness Project is an organisation whose peace activism is devoted to the collection and curation of testimonies that bear witness to the transformative power of nonviolent, restorative responses to (violent) conflict, crime, and injustice. To the ‘Testify’ feature for International Politics Reviews, this conversational piece contributes a discussion of The Forgiveness Project, and its understanding of, reliance upon, and use of stories in the pursuit of peace. A conversation between Christopher Peys and Marina Cantacuzino, MBE, this dialogue aims to highlight how this award-winning advocacy organisation is doing global politics in a grassroots, bottom-up manner through its use of storytelling. This dialogue between Peys and Cantacuzino not only explores the non-prescriptive, narratively-driven theory of activism that informs the work of The Forgiveness Project, but it also uses affect theory to theorise forgiveness as a deeply divisive ethico-political value and form of practice.

Many colleges identify the development of critical thinking (CT) as a key learning outcome. Nonetheless, few studies examined the development of CT during college, and the instruments employed in them are often limited. This article introduces the Critical Reasoning Assessment (CRA), a new instrument based on the Reflective Judgment Model (RJM; King and Kitchener 1994) designed to engage students in analyzing ethical dilemmas while being easy to administer and score. Using the CRA, we measured the CT skills of college students in three studies, both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. The results demonstrated substantial growth in CT skills during the first year and between the first and the fourth years of college; 42% and 60% of the participants advanced to a higher level of CT by the end of their first and fourth year, respectively. This study introduces a comprehensive, theory-based, easy-to-score and interpret instrument measuring CT. Applied to longitudinal data, it adds to limited findings on CT developmental trajectories and quantifies substantively interpretable shifts in the quality of CT.

PurposePurpose: The main purpose of the study is to understand the factors that facilitate correction behavior among individuals. In this study the authors examine the impact of self-perceived media literacy (SPML) and reflection on participants’ correction behavior.Design/methodology/approachMethods: Data for the study were collected from Amazon's MTurk using an online survey. Data were collected after a certificate of exemption was received by the Institutional Review Board in a research university in the United States (US) Qualtrics software was used to collect data. The total number of participants was 797.FindingsFindings: The findings show that although both SPML and reflection are positively associated with rumor refutation, higher SPML alone is not enough. Reflective judgment is critical for individuals to take part in this behavior online, such that individuals with higher reflective judgment indicated that they refute rumors online, irrespective of their SPML score.Originality/valueOriginality: The authors tested the relationship of multiple variables with participants correction behavior. Although research shows the importance of social correction, there is not much knowledge about what facilitates actual misinformation correction.

Based on a passage from the book Sociology in a New Key , in which Helmut Staubmann outlines a semantic reconstruction of the concept of aesthetics in its theoretical-sociological relevance, this paper presents some developments intended to complement Staubmann. I explore fundamentally different meanings of aesthetics, in particular those cultivated within idealist aesthetics in the context of theoretical philosophy. By highlighting key elements in the shift from this aesthetic tradition to classical social theory, specifically the expansion of the sensible realm, the enhanced cognitive aspect of the particular-sensible, and the formulation of distinct forms of intelligibility, this text endeavors to introduce a fresh layer to Staubmann’s analytical framework. It aims to assemble essential components for establishing a perspective on interpreting the diachronic evolution of sociological analysis. This perspective holds the potential to contribute to future projects focused on systematically redefining social theory.

This paper calls into question the view typically attributed to Kant that aesthetic judgements are particularist, resisting all conceptual determination. Instead, it claims that Kant conceives of aesthetic judgements, particularly of art, as playing an important role in the revision of concepts: one sense in which aesthetic judgements, as Kant defines them, ‘find a universal’ for a given particular. To understand the relation between artistic judgements and concepts requires that we consider what I call Kant’s diachronic account of aesthetic ideas, or how such judgements unfold in the course of communication and reflection. My reading draws Kant much closer to debates in the philosophy of art on the semantic dimension of artworks. Here, illuminating the way in which aesthetic judgements about art can play a role in conceptual revision allows us to make sense of the way in which modern artworks contest concepts rather than merely presenting or expressing them.

Recently, the ethical rather than just the economic resonance of entrepreneurship has attracted attention with researchers highlighting entrepreneurship and ethics as interwoven processes of value creation and management. Recognising that traditional normative perspectives on ethics are limited in application in entrepreneurial contexts, this stream of research has theorised entrepreneurship and ethics as the pragmatic production of useful effects through the alignment of public—private values. In this article, we critique this view and use Kant's concept of reflective judgement as discussed in his Critique of the Power of Judgement to theorise ethical entrepreneurial practice as the capacity to routinely break free from current conventions through the imaginative creation and use of self-legislating maxims. Through an analysis of the narratives of 12 entrepreneurs, we suggest there are three dimensions to reflective judgement in entrepreneurial contexts: (1) Social Performance; (2) Public Challenge and; (3) Personal Autonomy. Whilst the entrepreneurs were alive to the importance of commercial return, their narratives demonstrated further concern for, and commitment to, standards that they rationally and imaginatively felt as being appropriate. In our discussion, we integrate the findings into existing theoretical categories from entrepreneurship studies to better appreciate ethics within the context of value creation.

A large body of research in cognitive science differentiates human reasoning into two types: fast, intuitive, and emotional “System 1” thinking, and slower, more reflective “System 2” reasoning. According to this research, human reasoning is by default fast and intuitive, but that means that it is prone to error and biases that cloud our judgments and decision making. To improve the quality of reasoning, critical thinking education should develop strategies to slow it down and to become more reflective. The goal of such education should be to enable and motivate students to identify weaknesses, gaps, biases, and limiting perspectives in their own reasoning and to correct them. This contribution discusses how this goal could be achieved with regard to reasoning that involves the construction of arguments; or more precisely: how computer-supported argument visualization (CSAV) tools could be designed that support reflection on the quality of arguments and their improvement. Three types of CSAV approaches are distinguished that focus on reflection and self-correcting reasoning. The first one is to trigger reflection by confronting the user with specific questions that direct attention to critical points. The second approach uses templates that, on the one hand, provide a particular structure to reason about an issue by means of arguments and, on the other, include prompts to enter specific items. And a third approach is realized in specifically designed user guidance (“scripts”) that attempts to trigger reflection and self-correction. These types of approaches are currently realized only in very few CSAV tools. In order to inform the future development of what I call reflection tools, this article discusses the potential and limitations of these types and tools with regard to five explanations of the observation that students hardly ever engage in substantial revisions of what they wrote: a lack of strategies how to do it; cognitive overload; certain epistemic beliefs; myside bias; and over-confidence in the quality of one’s own reasoning. The question is: To what degree can each of the CSAV approaches and tools address these five potential obstacles to reflection and self-correction?