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This article exposes Marc Richir’s grounding of a transcendental aesthetics and his understanding of art, which considers the idea, already investigated by Husserl, that imagination and phantasy are fundamental pre-intentional acts that delineate the horizons of the relationship of human and world, both affectively and epistemologically. It has been studied how Richir’s phenomenological perspective was influenced on the one hand by Edmund Husserl’s analysis of specific acts of consciousness, and, on the other hand, by Kant’s transcendental schematism. However, in my article I show how Richir’s perspective on a transcendental aesthetics is particularly fertile because it incorporates, not only Kant’s schematism and Husserl’s Aktanalyse, but also Merleau-Ponty’s idea of a “flesh of the world” and his contribution to the understanding of the affective, bodily nature of knowledge, which, as it will be exposed, offers a new account of the transcendental. This sheds a light not only on specific epistemological matters, but also on the fact of art itself.

Fink’s Phenomenological Interpretation of the Schematism Chapter in Critique of Pure Reason Fink’s phenomenological interpretation of the chapter “Von dem Schematismus der reinen Verstandesbegriffe [Of the Schematism of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding]” (schematism chapter) in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason represents a significant contribution to how the relation between being and time can be thought phenomenologically. In a reading closely based on Kant’s text, the essay reconstructs how Fink highlights the fundamental relation of time, imagination, and ego.

Fairness and minority exclusion have emerged as the central concerns of contemporary Artificial Intelligence (AI) ethics. However, standard auditing and documentation practices often fail to capture harms affecting edge cases and marginalized groups. This article argues that this failure is structural: the act of “discretization”—converting continuous reality into discrete governance categories—inevitably produces a “residual.” Drawing on German Idealism (Kant, Fichte, Schelling) and continental philosophy (Dilthey, Gadamer, Merleau-Ponty), we reconceptualize residuals not as mere noise but as “surprising facts” that should trigger abductive hypothesis revision. We critique checklist-centered governance as a form of proceduralized auditing that can obscure these residuals. This article makes three key contributions: (i) a structural diagnosis of residual production using systems theory and topology; (ii) a philosophical reconstruction of abductive revision as a hermeneutic necessity; and (iii) an institutional design proposal—specifically, the Residual Ledger and Category Revision Protocols—to operationalize “Open Schema” governance.

In this paper, I discuss Kant’s concept-less schematism (KU, 5: 287) in the third Critique1 and make three claims: 1) concept-less schematism is entirely consistent with the schematism in the first Critique; 2) concept-less schematism is schematism with no empirical concept as an outcome; and 3) in accordance with 1) and 2), the imagination is free to synthesize the given manifold and leads to judgements of taste without this meaning either that the categories play no role at all or that these judgements are full-fledged cognitive determining judgements. While most commentators read the freedom of the imagination as its independence from the understanding, I argue that the freedom of the imagination is based on a non-determining employment of the pure concepts of the understanding. The freedom of the aesthetic imagination consists in the temporal schematization of the categories without any complementary determination of the empirical concept.

We argue that Bohrian complementarity is a framework for making new sense of scientific findings. It provides a conceptual pattern for making sense of the results of an empirical investigation into new realms or fields of natural properties. The idea of “formation length” engenders this mutual attunement of evidence and reality. Physicists want to be able to ascribe ontological features to atomic constituents and atomic processes such as “emission”, “impact”, or “change of energy-state”. These expressions supposedly refer to “local” forms of physical change that in sum constitute the possibility of there being a “global” (for example an atomic) system of possible states. We argue that it is only because we can in the design of experiments that we can make sense of the link between classical and quantum theoretical systems. We need the notion of formation length in order to express the principle that the atom is a unity. This not in the sense of being the ground for a particular kind of causality, but in the sense of unifying the grounds for the variety of causal manifestations that constitutes the atom.

This Article focuses on the notion of sensorium commune - a fundamental concept in the anthropological and psychological debates during the mid-18th century - in the accounts of Charles Bonnet and Johannes Nikolaus Tetens. Both authors regard sensorium commune as a function mediating between sensible elements involved in cognition and the faculty of understanding. However, their approaches differ in methods and aims. In the conclusion, the Author stresses that their uses of the notion of sensorium commune share some features with Immanuel Kant's account of transcendental schema. However, Bonnet and Tetens employ the notion with a genetic meaning, which focuses on the process of cognition, whilst Kant attributes to \"schema\" a brand new significance, which concerns the justification of cognition.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant describes schematism as a ‘hidden art in the depths of the human soul’ (A141/B180–1). While most commentators treat this as Kant's metaphorical way of saying schematism is something too obscure to explain, I argue that we should follow up Kant's clue and treat schematism literally as Kunst. By letting our interpretation of schematism be guided by Kant's theoretically exact ways of using the term Kunst in the Critique of Judgment we gain valuable insight into the nature of schematism, as well as its connection to Kant's concerns in the third Critique.

Challenging the common view that categories are prior to schemata, I argue that Kant considers transcendental schemata and categories to represent different guises of the a priori rules that allow the mind to unify a manifold. Since only transcendental schemata present these rules as ways of unifying successive representations, they can be said to constitute the sensible condition of any a priori cognition of objects. I take Kant to argue, on this basis, that Wolffian metaphysics abstracted from this condition, thus unwarrantedly using categories to obtain a priori knowledge of the soul, the world as such and God.

I use recent work on Kant and diagrammatic reasoning to develop a reconsideration of central aspects of Kant's philosophy of geometry and its relation to spatial intuition. In particular, I reconsider in this light the relations between geometrical concepts and their schemata, and the relationship between pure and empirical intuition. I argue that diagrammatic interpretations of Kant's theory of geometrical intuition can, at best, capture only part of what Kant's conception involves and that, for example, they cannot explain why Kant takes geometrical constructions in the style of Euclid to provide us with an a priori framework for physical space. I attempt, along the way, to shed new light on the relationship between Kant's theory of space and the debate between Newton and Leibniz to which he was reacting, and also on the role of geometry and spatial intuition in the transcendental deduction of the categories.